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PREFACE 
 
In most sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, following a prolonged spell of sustained growth, 
a sharp decline in commodity prices has combined with difficult domestic political and 
economic conditions. Only a few of the region’s non-resource exporters have been immune, 
continuing to expand at a robust pace, benefiting from low oil prices and enjoying healthy 
private consumption and investment growth rates. Overall, growth in SSA slumped to 3.4% 
in 2015 with a further slowdown to 1.4% projected by the IMF for 2016. The external 
environment, particularly for commodity exporters, remains challenging. 
Unsurprisingly, slowing economic activity has impacted banking soundness indicators, which 
have shown some signs of weakening: non-performing loans (NPLs) are on the rise in several 
SSA markets; portfolio concentration risks remains generally high, with bank lending 
activities typically focused on a few key sectors and a limited number of large corporates; 
exposure to government and state-owned enterprises has increased in some countries. On a 
positive note, SSA banks are still well-capitalised and profitability, albeit softening, remains 
at comfortable levels.  
Against the background of a rapidly evolving context for the SSA banking industry, the 
Economics Department of the European Investment Bank (EIB) has coordinated this volume, 
which combines in-house expertise on the region with contributions from leading experts 
from the local financial sector and from international financial institutions and research 
centres. The study aims to provide an overview of structural development and recent 
market trends in the region. It outlines some of the key challenges and opportunities that lie 
ahead. It also presents the results of the second edition of the EIB Survey of Pan-African 
Banks, a unique survey targeting the largest multi-country players in SSA, as well as 
containing more detailed structural analysis on long-term housing financing and long-term 
investment. As such, the report sets the basis for optimising the EIB’s initiatives in SSA. 
The EIB is the bank of the European Union and the world’s largest multilateral borrower and 
lender. The Bank is a key provider of both long-term financing and expertise, supporting 
investments that foster EU policy objectives, inside and outside the EU. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, EIB’s engagement is geared towards promoting local private sector development, 
social and economic infrastructure, regional integration and mitigation of/adaptation to 
climate change. In 2015, the Bank provided loans totalling EUR 971 million in SSA. 
 
Debora Revoltella 
Director 
Economics Department 
 ©European Investment Bank, November 2016 
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Introduction 
This study comes at a time when most SSA economies have slowed significantly, after a 
decade of robust rates of growth. Spillovers to the banking sectors are increasingly 
noticeable in some markets, mostly through the rising rates of NPLs observed. Banking 
groups are adjusting their overall strategy in the face of a challenging environment 
characterised by tighter funding conditions, slower lending growth and rising competition 
for deposits and easily bankable clients. The 2016 edition of the EIB survey of banking 
groups operating in SSA shows that e-banking and mobile banking remain areas of intense 
technological deployment. 
For this third edition of EIB’s study of banking sectors in SSA, the sections devoted to 
banking sector development in each sub-region have been complemented with a fresh look 
at digital financing services and the conditions necessary for them to blossom and increase 
financial inclusion. The overarching conclusion of the authors is that while digital financial 
services have great potential across the region, the regulatory framework and market 
conditions are such that expectations about concrete changes differ remarkably across 
markets. In addition, the study delves into two cross-cutting structural themes: housing 
financing and long-term investment. The authors highlight some low-hanging fruit and 
potential opportunities to run ahead of the advent of deeper and more liquid capital 
markets across SSA. However, the full exploitation of housing and long-term investment 
opportunities will be contingent on sustained and ambitious efforts to create and develop 
the necessary public institutions and improve corporate practices. 
More specifically, in the first chapter, Adeline Pelletier and Jean-Philippe Stijns examine the 
recent trends in the SSA banking sectors, relying on information both from banks’ financial 
statements and a survey of selected large banking groups operating in the region. Banking 
groups are still in the process of optimising their network of subsidiaries across the region 
but they appear to be in “wait and see” mode for the most part. From a longer-term 
perspective, expansion is still the norm in terms of strategic orientation. However, most 
banks have recently maintained a constant medium-term exposure to SSA and expect to 
keep the same approach going forward. A minority of groups, however, are experiencing 
and/or contemplating a reduction in their medium-term exposure. On the bright side, a 
growing proportion of banking groups are focusing on SMEs and retail clients, with internet 
banking technology and mobile banking technology areas of intense deployment and, in 
terms of the need for technical assistance, IT and credit risk management are the highest 
priorities. 
In Chapter 2, Jared Osoro and Habil Olaka illustrate the development of digital financial 
services in Kenya and the rest of the East African Community. They point out the critical role 
that the regulator and the existence of a dominant market actor have played in the success 
of mobile payment/money in Kenya. While the country’s achievement in mobile money has 
provided impetus for replication of the model across East Africa and even wider SSA, the 
success of such replication has been modest so far. They caution that without an appropriate 
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regulatory environment and supportive market structure, mobile payments will not 
necessarily follow the trend of regional expansion of banks in East Africa. 
In Chapter 3, Stuart Theobald observes that the banking industry in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) has been affected by the sharp decline in commodity 
prices, causing an increase in non-performing loans in most markets and tighter liquidity 
conditions. In Southern Africa, many markets are dominated by foreign-owned banks which 
are now looking to dispose of their interests. The author concludes that reform efforts such 
as improving capital adequacy, risk management and product transparency remain 
important. 
In Chapter 4, Jad Benhamdane, Amine El Kourchi and Said Hidane reason that the challenges 
of financial inclusion in West Africa and Central Africa continue to be of vital importance 
given that their banking penetration rates are among the lowest in the world. The countries 
of the CFA franc monetary zone fare particularly badly. They conclude that the promotion of 
digitalised services in these areas, which generally have high levels of mobile penetration, is 
the key initiative for improving access to banking services. However, they point out that the 
regulatory framework is more favourable in West Africa than in Central Africa. 
In Chapter 5, Issa Faye and Zekebweliwai Geh argue that the lack of access to long-term 
funds is a major constraint to the development of housing finance. Attracting long-term 
capital into Africa’s property market could look like “a journey of a thousand miles” as it 
requires the efficient functioning of many interrelated components. Nonetheless, alternative 
long-term capital sources such as private equity for affordable housing development, real 
estate investment trusts, mortgage-covered bonds and mortgage refinancing companies are 
promising emerging institutions and instruments that should be tapped to fill the continent’s 
long-term housing finance gap. 
In Chapter 6, Raffaele Della Croce, Michael Fuchs and Makaio Witte stress that the provision 
of long-term finance for productive investment is crucial to sustaining growth and 
diversifying economic activity in SSA. However, in order to respond to the challenges SSA is 
facing, it is necessary to broaden the options available locally for long-term finance and 
increase as well as diversify the investor base. Development finance institutions (DFIs) 
continue to play a crucial role in promoting long-term finance. In the authors’ view, a 
stronger shift from direct and indirect investments to the provision of guarantee and credit 
enhancement instruments would more effectively leverage public funding as a means to 
mobilise private capital. 
In Chapter 7, Tim Bending, Claudio Cali, Nina Fenton and Barbara Marchitto offer an 
overview of EIB’s operations in SSA, where the Bank’s engagement is geared towards 
promoting local private sector development, social and economic infrastructure, regional 
integration and mitigation of/adaptation to climate change. Over more than 50 years, since 
the launch of its activities in SSA in 1963, the Bank has supported 1 100 projects in 
47 countries totalling over EUR 17 billion of funding. In 2015 alone, the Bank provided loans 
totalling EUR 971 million in SSA. 
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Development partners, and IFIs in particular, continue to have a key role to play in ensuring 
that improvements in financial inclusion and access to finance for SMEs are sustained 
throughout challenging macroeconomic circumstances. Banking groups are carrying out 
important adaptation efforts through sustained investment in IT, risk management and 
digital financial services. Indeed, as banking groups prodded by competition forces make the 
strategic choice of serving more actively the SME segment, the need to put in place first-
class risk management processes has become inescapable. 
Regulatory standards will also need to evolve in order to bring SSA banks into closer 
alignment with Basel principles and best practices across the board. Supervisory authorities 
remain short of capacity and expertise in many markets, limiting their ability to conduct on-
site visits, and constraining the credibility and impact of their control functions. Resolution 
and deposit guarantee mechanisms also deserve an upgrade in several markets. 
To sum up, a rich reform agenda will need to be pursued on several fronts for trust to be 
resilient in times of market stress. Implementing reforms, investing in financial infrastructure 
and strengthening risk management, monitoring capacity and IT systems would go a long 
way to enhance the resilience of the SSA banking industry, and thereby strengthen its ability 
to finance development in SSA. 
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1. African Banking Groups: Recent Trends and Strategic Issues 
ADELINE PELLETIER1 AND JEAN-PHILIPPE STIJNS2, 3 
 
 Executive summary 
• In this chapter we examine the recent trends in the banking sector in sub-Saharan 
Africa based on information from banks’ financial statements and from a unique 
survey of selected large banking groups operating in the region. 
 
• While foreign affiliates of regional African banking groups already outnumber 
foreign affiliates of both global and emerging banking groups operating in SSA 
(including South African banking groups), global banking groups4 still account for 
the largest share of assets in sub-Saharan Africa’s banking industry. The foreign 
affiliates of global banking groups have long benefited from scale effects while 
African banking groups are beginning to reap such benefits. 
 
• According to financial statements, African banking groups exhibit lower 
profitability compared to other banks operating in SSA, but the difference is 
narrowing over time. Lower profitability largely stems from the lower quality of 
their portfolio and lower, albeit improving, operational efficiency. Moreover, the 
quality of the loan book seems to be poorer for the foreign affiliates of African 
banking groups than for the affiliates of global and emerging banking groups. 
Indeed, African banking groups are known to be somewhat more exposed to the 
SME segment, which exhibits higher default risk than large corporates. 
 
• Based on the EIB survey, banking groups in SSA are still in the process of 
expanding their footprint in countries with large market potential. However, 
whilst in the 2015 edition of the EIB survey all banks in the sample planned to 
expand in SSA in the long term, this year only two thirds of banking groups still 
plan to do so on a long-term basis. Accordingly, most banks have maintained a 
constant medium-term exposure to SSA during the last twelve months. Some 
groups are even experiencing and/or contemplating a reduction in their medium-
term exposure. 
 
• A large majority of banking groups are focusing on deposit funding. At least half of 
the banking groups plan to raise some forms of long-term funding. Banking 
groups in the sample report increasing deposit market shares. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Lecturer, Institute of Management Studies, Goldsmiths, University of London; Research Associate, London School of 
Economics. 
2 Senior Economist, European Investment Bank. 
3 The authors gratefully acknowledge that this chapter has benefited from feedback from EIB colleagues. However, the views 
expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Investment Bank. All remaining 
errors remain the authors’. 
4 Global banking groups are defined as banking groups operating in sub-Saharan Africa that originate from developed 
economies; regional African are banking groups from sub-Saharan Africa (ex-South Africa); and emerging banking groups are 
from emerging economies (India, South Africa, etc.). 
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• A growing share of banking groups has a long-term and significant focus on SMEs 
and retail clients. Correspondingly, internet banking technology and mobile 
banking technology are areas where the highest share of banking groups in SSA 
are either fully deployed or in deployment. Similarly, in terms of the need for 
technical assistance, IT is reported as the highest priority followed by credit risk 
management. All banking groups in SSA perceive demand for loans in local 
currency to be sustained and plan to raise funds in local currency. Most banking 
groups in SSA consider portfolio guarantees to be either important or very 
important. However, two thirds of banking groups in SSA consider their portfolio 
guarantee needs as only partially met. 
 
• All banking groups operating in SSA consider themselves as compliant with Basel I 
standards. Less than half of banking groups consider themselves compliant with 
Basel II, with the rest working towards compliance. One banking group in five in 
SSA is compliant with Basel III. 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter takes a close look at trends and strategic issues affecting banking groups with a 
significant footprint in SSA. This introduction discusses the macroeconomic context 
characterising SSA economies, as it affects directly the landscape of banking groups 
operating across the region. This section also takes stock of the level of financial 
development of the banking and financial sectors in SSA. The second section discusses the 
diverse features of regional SSA banking groups and of global and emerging banking 
operating in SSA. It also reports on the results from the analysis of a sample of 573 
commercial banks operating in SSA obtained using the BankScope database. The third 
section examines the responses to the second edition of the EIB survey of banking groups 
operating in SSA, focusing on the factors affecting the performance of the surveyed banking 
groups and how these groups are adjusting their strategies accordingly. The fourth section 
provides a conclusion. An appendix documents the questionnaire underpinning the EIB 
survey in detail. 
1.1.A. MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Over the last decade, SSA as a whole has been experiencing high annual economic growth 
rates, in the range of 5-7% on average and with a rapidly expanding middle class. Robust 
growth was made possible by economic reforms, coupled with a favourable external 
environment, including high commodity prices and ample capital inflows. 
However, an unsupportive global environment and a sustained slump in commodity prices 
have combined in some countries with difficult domestic political and economic conditions, 
including civil war, terrorism, and drought. As a result, growth slumped to 3.4% in 2015, the 
lowest level in some 15 years, down from 5.1% in 2014. It is projected by the IMF (2016b) to 
slow down further to 1.4% in 2016 before rebounding sluggishly to 2.9% in 2017. The 
external environment, particularly for commodity exporters, remains challenging. By 
contrast, several of the region’s non-resource exporters are expected to continue to expand 
Banking in sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and Digital Financial Inclusion 
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at a very robust pace of more than 5% in 2016, benefiting from low oil prices and enjoying 
healthy private consumption and investment growth rates. 
1.1.B. FINANCIAL SECTOR OVERVIEW 
The overall depth and financial sophistication of SSA financial sectors remain generally low, 
even controlling for per capita income levels. Financial sectors in SSA are usually small, 
underdeveloped, and dominated by a highly concentrated banking industry. Given the low 
level of development of stock and bond markets in SSA, banks play a crucial intermediation 
role and represent the main source of external capital for companies. Table 1.1 below 
illustrates the small size of stock markets in SSA, with the notable exception of South Africa 
(Johannesburg Stock Exchange). However, portfolio concentration risks tend to be high, with 
bank lending activities often focused on a few key sectors – manufacturing, trade, real estate 
and construction in particular – and a limited number of large corporate clients. 
Microenterprises are relatively well covered by MFIs, with SMEs representing the “missing 
middle” (see Pelletier, 2014, for instance). 
Table 1.1.: Stock Markets in SSA 
Country 
Market 
Capitalisation 
in 2012 
Market 
Capitalisation 
in 09/2013 
Number of 
Listings 
 In USD billions  
South Africa 998.3 970.5 388 
Namibia 144.2 136.9 34 
Nigeria 57.8 114.2 190 
Botswana 53.0 54.1 37 
Ghana 30.5 28.2 34 
Kenya 15.9 20.6 61 
Tanzania 8.4 14.8 7 
Malawi 10.6 13 14 
BVRM* 8.1 10.5 72 
Zambia 9.4 10.2 22 
Mauritius 7.1 8.5 91 
Uganda 5.9 8.3 15 
Zimbabwe 4.0 5.4 69 
Rwanda 1.7 1.9 4 
Sudan 2.2 1.8 59 
Mozambique 1.0 1 3 
Cape Verde 0.1 0.6 4 
Cameroon 0.4 0.2 6 
Sierra Leone 0.0 0 2 
Source: ACM insight data 
Note: * BVRM serves Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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Regulatory frameworks are not always in line with international best practices and they may 
prove volatile at times, inducing uncertainty within the banking community and with 
international investors. Moreover, central banks may be subject to political influence 
affecting the conduct of monetary policy and their supervisory functions. 
Table 1.2.: Financial Soundness Indicators in selected SSA Banking Markets 
 
Capital-
Asset 
Ratio 
Non-
Performing 
Loans 
Return 
on Equity 
Return 
on Assets 
Botswana 18.90% 14.94% 4.73% 0.53% 
Burundi 21.55% 12.41% 13.04% 2.08% 
Ghana 16.18% 23.80% 22.86% 4.87% 
Guinea 17.22% 16.08% 22.88% 2.40% 
Kenya 18.81% 16.01% 27.70% 4.23% 
Mauritius 18.68% 18.71% 13.14% 1.38% 
Namibia 15.31% 2.39% 31.45% 3.30% 
Nigeria 15.65% 24.25% 20.22% 2.66% 
Rwanda 24.14% 15.10% 14.02% 2.64% 
South Africa 14.53% 19.75% 21.00% 1.53% 
Uganda 21.75% 11.78% 22.28% 3.69% 
Source: Financial Soundness Indicators. Figures averaged over Q1, Q2 and Q3 of 2016 where FSI data are 
available at the time of writing. Countries selected based on data availability. 
Notes: NPLs are net of provisions. Capital-Asset Ratios are calculated as the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets. 
Banks have, for the most part, been resilient to the effects of the global financial crisis on 
the back of limited integration with global financial markets, little exposure to risk from 
direct financial linkages and heavy reliance on domestic deposits. Capitalisation levels 
remain quite comfortable and banks are generally liquid and profitable. However, non-
performing loans (NPLs) have reached significant levels in 2016 in several SSA markets (Table 
1.2). 
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Figure 1.1.: Interest Rate Spread (Percentage – 2000-2014) 
 
Note: the interest spread is the difference between the interest rate charged by banks on loans to private sector 
customers and the interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. The 
median, second and fourth quartile are reported across SSA countries for which data is available (between 23 
and 34 countries depending on the year). A similar pattern is observed if a constant panel of 22 countries is 
considered over the period 2000-2014. 
Source: World Bank Indicators 
Interest margins across the region are generally high although they have been trending 
down since 2000 (Figure 1.1). SSA banking sectors have also been deepening quite rapidly, 
especially in recent years, and this trend is affecting all SSA countries with very few 
exceptions, resulting in improved access to finance and financial services, although from a 
very low base. These general trends notwithstanding, there is considerable diversity across 
SSA countries with respect to the depth and financial sophistication of their banking sectors. 
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Figure 1.2.: Credit to the Private Sector (as a Share of GDP – 2015) 
 
Source: World Bank FINDEX 
Note: median and SSA quartile statistics computed across countries with data available for 2015. OECD members, 
Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs), Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs), and Low Income Countries 
(LICs) figures refer to the average for the corresponding income categories at global level. 
A limited number of relatively developed banking sectors contrasts with a high proportion of 
shallow banking sectors (Figure 1.2). SSA counts a few countries with world-class financial 
sectors: South Africa reports a ratio of credit to the private sector as a share of GDP above 
150%, higher than the average of OECD member countries; this ratio is above 100% for 
Mauritius (although that is still below the average for Upper-Middle Income Countries, 
UMICs, to which it belongs5). Cape Verde and Namibia are above the average for Lower-
Middle Income Countries (LMICs), with credit to the private sector as a share of GDP above 
40%. A few countries around the third quartile of the distribution – Togo, Mozambique, 
Kenya, Botswana, Senegal and Djibouti – have a ratio of private credit to GDP that is higher 
than 30%. Beyond, there is a long tail of shallower banking sectors, with median credit to the 
private sector around 20%, only marginally higher than the global average for Low Income 
Countries (LICs), and the first quartile of the distribution stands below 15%. 
                                                          
5 For FY 2015, the World Bank defines as low-income economies those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank 
Atlas method, of USD 1 025 or less in 2015; lower-middle income and upper-middle income economies are those with a GNI per 
capita of more than USD 1 026 but less than USD 4 035. Upper-middle income economies are those with a GNI per capita 
between USD 4 036 and USD 12 475. 
Banking in sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and Digital Financial Inclusion 
© European Investment Bank, November 2016  15 
Figure 1.3.: Credit to the Private Sector by Groups of Countries (2000-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank FINDEX 
Note: median and quartile statistics computed across countries with data available for 2015. Lower-Middle 
Income Countries (LMICs) and Low Income Countries (LICs) figures refer to the average for the corresponding 
income categories at global level. 
Financial depth, measured as credit to the private sector as a share of GDP, has been 
steadily increasing since the late 1990s/early 2000s (Figure 1.3). This trend is noticeable 
even for the 1st quartile of sub-Saharan countries, i.e. the least developed banking sectors in 
SSA. These countries reached in 2015 a level of credit to the private sector corresponding to 
14% of GDP, albeit off a very low starting point, just above 5%, back at the turn of the 
century. At the other extreme of the distribution, a pronounced upward trend can be 
observed for the more developed SSA banking sectors (3rd quartile). 
Despite more than a decade and a half of financial deepening in nearly all SSA countries, 
banks in SSA still have a remarkably long way to go (EIB, 2015). According to the IMF 
(2016a), progress in financial deepening has been lagging in several countries in SSA, in that 
it stands below the level consistent with its structural characteristics. Accordingly, there is 
ample room for banking sector deepening both at the top of the distribution and at the 
bottom. On one side, a growing number of countries should eventually join the league of 
South Africa, Mauritius, Cape Verde and Namibia and catch up. Indeed, the 3rd quartile still 
has a large gap to close to be at par with LMICs. On the other side, countries clustered 
around the 1st quartile still have around 5% of financial deepening to close to catch up with 
the global average for LICs, where the median SSA banking sector stands. 
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Table 1.3.: Ratio of Bank Non-performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Burundi 9.4% 7.4% 8.2% 9.9% 10.9% 17.9% 
Cameroon 10.1% 11.5% 11.6% 10.3% 9.7% 10.5% 
Comoros 1.0% 1.1% 1.5% 1.2% 2.5% 2.8% 
Djibouti 8.3% 9.4% 11.4% 14.5% 18.0% 22.1% 
Ghana 17.6% 14.2% 13.2% 12.0% 11.3% 14.7% 
Kenya 6.3% 4.4% 4.6% 5.1% 5.5% 6.0% 
Lesotho 3.0% 2.1% 2.5% 3.7% 4.1% 3.9% 
Mauritius 2.8% 2.8% 3.6% 4.2% 4.9% 7.0% 
Mozambique 1.9% 2.6% 3.2% 2.3% 3.2% 4.3% 
Namibia 2.0% 1.5% 1.3% 1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 
Nigeria 20.1% 5.8% 3.7% 3.4% 3.0% 5.3% 
DRC 1.0% 1.1% 1.5% 1.2% 2.5% 4.6% 
Rwanda 11.3% 8.2% 6.0% 7.0% 5.2% 5.8% 
Seychelles 5.5% 8.1% 9.0% 9.2% 8.0% 7.5% 
Sierra Leone 15.6% 15.1% 14.7% 22.4% 33.4% 31.7% 
South Africa 5.8% 4.7% 4.0% 3.6% 3.2% 3.1% 
Swaziland 7.8% 7.5% 9.7% 6.8% 4.3% 7.5% 
Tanzania 7.8% 5.4% 6.4% 5.1% 6.6% 6.3% 
Uganda 1.9% 2.0% 4.1% 5.8% 4.0% 5.1% 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
Note: all SSA countries with a complete time series for NPLs over 2010-2015 are shown. 
Moreover, in several SSA countries, private credit growth has slowed recently, especially 
when compared with the rapid credit growth rates observed between 2010 and 2013 and 
favoured by rising commodity prices and buoyant financing conditions (IMF 2016a). On the 
back of a quasi-generalised slowdown in SSA economies, NPLs are clearly on the rise in some 
countries of the region (Table 1.3).  
Despite notable progress, governance, regulation and supervision issues continue to hold 
back the development of a large number of SSA banking sectors. Against this backdrop, 
Banking in sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and Digital Financial Inclusion 
© European Investment Bank, November 2016  17 
global banks have staged a partial retreat from SSA or have put a break on their expansion 
plans in SSA markets since the onset of the financial crisis (Beck et al., ibid.) due to new 
prudential and compliance constraints imposed by home supervisors. Cross-border banks 
based and operating in SSA, often referred to as Pan-African Banks (PABs), have filled up the 
void left by global banks in the region and have therefore been attracting a lot of attention 
in SSA. The term pan-African banks is used when grouping together banks operating across 
several SSA markets, based in any SSA country, including South Africa. Section 1.2 deals with 
the rise of these PABs, otherwise referred to as regional African banks. Later in section 1.2, 
Pan-African Banks (PABs) will be referred to as either African MNB or Emerging MNB if their 
HQs are based in South Africa in order to identify differentiating characteristics. 
1.2. The Rise of Regional African Banks 
The impressive regional expansion of SSA banking groups has been accompanied by financial 
innovations such as the rapid diffusion of mobile banking, especially in East Africa with M-
Pesa (see Box 1.1), and regulatory changes, notably the steady increase in minimum capital 
requirements imposed on banks by the regulator in many countries. One compelling 
example is the case of Nigeria where banking reforms spurred regional expansion of local 
banks. The country introduced banking reforms in 2005 including a more than tenfold 
increase in the minimum capital requirement for banks from NGN 2 billion to NGN 25 billion 
(approximately USD 190 million). Compliance with this new rule was mainly achieved 
through mergers and acquisitions. The resulting consolidated banks were found to be 
significantly more efficient and slightly more profitable, with lower levels of NPLs (Cook, 
2011). This led to larger, more efficient, banks, which then embarked on an expansion 
process throughout West Africa following the consolidation wave in their home country. 
Box 1.1.: SSA: Digital Services and Financial Inclusion 
by Rodolfo Maino, Senior Economist at the African Department 
of the International Monetary Fund. 
Digital financial services are contributing to financial development and financial inclusion in 
SSA. The rapid spread of systems such as M-Pesa in Kenya and other countries in SSA has 
helped reduce transaction costs and facilitate personal transactions, while contributing to 
the surge of financial intermediation services. With less need for cash for transactions, more 
economic agents are able to send and monitor financial market signals, contributing to 
financial development. The environment for monetary policy improves as a result. 
SSA leads the way in the adoption of mobile banking. In rural populations, traditional bank 
intermediaries do not reach sparsely populated areas and the cost of their services is 
frequently prohibitive for low-income households and small businesses. The recent surge in 
mobile money observed in many SSA countries has been facilitated by low transaction costs, 
growing innovations, and strong growth in mobile phone subscriptions. In 2014, the share 
of the population holding mobile bank accounts reached 11% in SSA, the highest in the 
world (Figure 1.B1). 
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Figure 1.B1. Mobile Phone Subscriptions in 1999-2014 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
Access to financial services in SSA has increased steadily in recent years (IMF, 2016a). 
Today, there is less need to travel long distances to access financial services. The 
development of mobile payment systems has helped to integrate large sections of the 
population into the financial system, especially in East Africa (Figure 1.B2). The significant 
increase in the share of the included population is best exemplified by the case of Rwanda 
where 89% of the population had some kind of financial access in 2016, up from 75% four 
years earlier. The digital revolution has allowed people to make financial transactions and 
money transfers from their mobile phones. Lower costs have left them with more 
disposable income, and they now have a secure way to store cash, even those working in 
the informal economy. The expansion of the activities of savings and credit cooperatives 
also contributed towards greater financial inclusion. The successful experience of East Africa 
provides a useful model that could be adapted by other countries in the region. An 
important lesson from East Africa is the need to have a flexible enabling regulatory 
environment while taking into account supervisory challenges. 
Kenya’s story sheds light on steps to undertake a digital revolution in a country. Kenya still 
enjoys the advantages of an early start in pushing the frontier of financial inclusion through 
digital financial services. Also, in Kenya, a much larger share of the population is within five 
kilometres of a “financial access touch point” and had many more such touch points per 
person than was the case in other countries in the region (Figure 1.B3); in less than 10 years 
the use of mobile phone-based money has grown from zero to more than 75% as a share of 
the adult population, and the insurance sector has expanded, targeting Kenya’s emerging 
middle class. 
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Figure 1.B2. Sub-Saharan African Countries: Financial Inclusion 
 
Source: Finmark Trust, Finscope Survey. 
Note: Formal = formally financially included: individuals 16 years or older who have/use financial 
products/services provided by a financial service provider that is regulated or officially supervised; Informal = 
informally included: individuals 16 years or older who use financial mechanisms not provided by a regulated or 
supervised financial institution; Excluded = financially excluded: individuals 16 years or older who have no 
financial mechanisms and rely on themselves/family/friends for saving, borrowing, and remitting; their 
transactions are cash-based or in-kind. 
Figure 1.B3. Finance at your Doorstep 
Population within 5 km of a 
financial centre (%) 
Financial access 
touch points (thousands) 
Financial access touch 
points (per 100 000 people) 
   
Source: Country geospatial survey. 
Kenya’s success in digitalisation was facilitated by adaptive and flexible regulatory 
frameworks, reforms in financial infrastructure, and rapid improvements in skills and 
capacity. This virtuous circle can be divided into four phases: (i) expansion of the mobile 
phone technological platform; (ii) introduction of virtual savings accounts using a digital 
financial services platform complemented by virtual banking services; (iii) use of 
transaction, savings, and financial operations data from the digital financial services 
platform to generate credit scores and evaluate and price microcredit risk; and (iv) 
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expansion of digital financial services for cross-border payments and international 
remittances. To achieve these impressive results, banks have worked closely with 
telecommunications companies, allowing them a bigger market share vis-à-vis other 
emerging markets. 
Financial inclusion has opened the door for potentially game-changing opportunities: 
innovative pension plan support and government-targeted social protection, expansion of 
regional payment systems within regional blocks, enforcement of policies to stop money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, and a better environment for forward-looking 
monetary policy to replace years of financial repression and reactive policies. 
Financial inclusion makes saving easier and enables accumulation and diversification of 
assets, boosting economic activity in the process.  
Notwithstanding the progress achieved in financial inclusion, a lot remains to be done. As 
the economies of SSA countries continue to grow, the demand for financial services for 
people and business will keep pace. Moreover, recent policy decisions could cloud the 
central bank’s monetary policy signals and affect loanable funds. In August 2016, Kenya’s 
President signed the country’s Banking Bill Amendment into law, limiting the rate that 
commercial banks can charge for loans and prescribing how much interest banks could pay 
on deposits. The controls could blur the signals that emanate from interest rate decisions, 
undermine efforts to keep inflation within the government’s target range, and prevent the 
interest rate from playing its role to effectively allocate savings and investment resources. 
 
As a result of banking reforms and technological changes, the banking environment has 
progressively become more competitive. SSA is the developing region of the world with the 
largest proportion of foreign-owned banks (Claessens and van Horen, 2012). Low-scale and 
weak competition in many SSA markets has opened the way for SSA banks to operate across 
borders and compete with local banks. The emergence of these regional African banks with 
a clear pan-African ambition has modified the banking landscape and fostered competition 
and innovation. Regional African banking groups are headquartered in a variety of countries 
and some enjoy a significant presence in a large number of countries. They span large 
banking markets like Angola, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa but also several 
smaller ones. The largest one, Ecobank Transnational from Togo, has operations in more 
than 30 countries across SSA. 
African banks started their internationalisation in SSA around the mid-1980s. South African 
banks, such as Absa and Standard Bank, started their regional expansion after the end of 
apartheid two decades ago (Beck et al., 2011). More recently, the largest banking groups in 
South Africa have also started to invest outside the region, setting up branches or 
subsidiaries in developed countries and in other emerging countries: Standard Bank has 
operations in Asia, the US and Europe and has made important acquisitions in Argentina and 
Turkey. In comparison, the presence of foreign banks from developed countries (Barclays, 
Standard Chartered, etc.) in SSA is often much older, having started during the colonial 
period. 
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To the extent that regional African banks are better able to operate in SSA markets, and in 
particular to cater for low-income populations, the expansion of this group of banks is bound 
to alleviate local credit constraints. Such banks operating across country borders are 
expected to achieve economies of scale by leveraging group-wide functions and transferring 
know-how and locally adapted banking skills. They have the potential to offer higher-quality, 
lower-cost banking services and to widen financial intermediation to unserved SMEs and 
individuals.  
Most of the foreign banks have expanded throughout SSA in the form of subsidiaries. As 
Beck et al. (2011) point out, setting up a subsidiary involves higher costs than a branch, but it 
is also easier for the supervisor to have oversight as a subsidiary is organised and regulated 
according to the laws of the host country (Casu, Girardone and Molyneux, 2006). The often 
complex, not very transparent, ownership structures of African banking groups spanning 
several regulatory environments and legal traditions add to the supervisor’s misgivings when 
it comes to allowing foreign banks to set up branches in their home market (European 
Investment Bank, 2015). 
Figure 1.4.: Commercial Banks Operating in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on BankScope data. 
Three groups of foreign banks competing in the region can be distinguished: foreign affiliates 
of global banks from developed countries (henceforth, Global MNB6); foreign affiliates of 
banks from emerging countries, in which we can include the foreign affiliates of banks from 
                                                          
6 This group includes the following countries: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, USA. 
Domestic banks 
50% 
Foreign affiliates 
of African MNB 
23% 
Foreign affiliates 
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South Africa (henceforth, Emerging MNB7); foreign affiliates of regional African banks 
(multinational banks from Africa) (henceforth, African MNB8). As explained in section 1.1, 
the term pan-African banks is used when grouping together banks operating across several 
SSA markets, based in an SSA country, including South Africa. In order to examine the 
ownership of banks in Africa9, a sample of 573 commercial banks operating in SSA was 
obtained using the BankScope database: 50% of the banks in the sample are domestic banks, 
and 50% are foreign-owned. Of those 50% of groups that are foreign-owned banks, 23% are 
foreign affiliates of African MNB, 17% are foreign affiliates of Global MNB and 10% are 
foreign affiliates of Emerging MNB (as illustrated in Figure 1.4). 
Global, and to a lesser extent, emerging MNB, operate at a higher scale on average than 
African MNB in terms of equity, funding, profit and loan book. While foreign affiliates of 
African MNBs outnumber foreign affiliates of both global and emerging MNBs, global and 
emerging MNB still dominate African MNB in terms of assets. The African subsidiaries of 
Global MNB are the largest by assets (average total assets of EUR 2.48 billion over the period 
2006-2015), followed by the domestic banks (EUR 2.4 billion on average), the foreign 
affiliates of the Emerging MNB (EUR 478 million on average) and the foreign affiliates of the 
African MNB (EUR 286 million on average). While their importance has been diminishing in 
recent years, global MNB still have the largest share of assets in African banking sectors. This 
difference in scale is translated into important differences in terms of the outstanding 
volume of loans and deposits and short-term funding on the balance sheet of banks. The 
volume of deposits and short-term funding of Global MNB and domestic banks is much 
higher than those of the foreign affiliates of both African MNB and Emerging MNB (on 
average, EUR 2 billion for Global MNB versus EUR 243 million for the foreign affiliates of 
African MNB and EUR 366 million for the foreign affiliates of Emerging MNB over the 2006-
2015 period). In comparison, the volume of deposits and short-term funding stood at EUR 
1.8 billion on average for domestic banks in sub-Saharan Africa over the period. 
  
                                                          
7 This group includes the following countries; United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, China, India, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Taiwan, 
South Africa. 
8 This group includes the following countries: Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Libya, 
Morocco, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Zambia. 
9 To determine the origin of a banking group, the Global Ultimate Owner indicator of BankScope database is used. This 
database has been updated using the same definition by relying on the banks’ websites when the information is missing in 
BankScope. A company is a Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) if it controls at least 50.01% of the entity and has no identified 
shareholders or if its shareholder’s percentages are not known. For banks which have a dispersed ownership and for which 
there is no ultimate owner controlling at least 50.01% of the company, the country of origin of the bank is determined by 
aggregating the shares of the owners by country of origin and attributing bank ownership based on the nationality of the 
owners with the highest total percentage of shares. To reduce the diversity of the sample, all investment banks, Islamic banks, 
micro-finance institutions, private banks, real estate and mortgage banks, and development banks have been excluded given 
that they operate in different market segments than those of commercial banks. 
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Figure 1.5.: The Scale of African Banks 
A. Average Equity 
(EUR millions) 
 
B. Average Deposits and Short-term 
Funding (EUR millions) 
 
C. Average Profit before Tax 
(EUR millions) 
 
D. Average Loan Book 
(EUR millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on BankScope data. 
The larger size of the foreign affiliates of Global MNB (than that of African and Emerging 
MNB) is also reflected in the higher volume of loans (Figure 1.5.D). While the volume of 
loans on the balance sheet of banks is EUR 1.6 billion on average for the foreign affiliates of 
Global MNB and EUR 1.3 billion on average for domestic banks in SSA, it is only EUR 138 
million for the foreign affiliates of African MNB and EUR 217 million for the foreign affiliates 
of Emerging MNB. Both foreign affiliates of Global MNB and domestic banks exhibit much 
higher levels of equity capital (Figure 1.5.A). That said, all banks are well capitalised with a 
high tier 1 ratio, in particular the foreign affiliates of African MNB, with a tier 1 ratio of 26% 
on average over the 2006-2015 period against 23% for Emerging MNB, 19% for Global MNB 
and 20% for domestic banks. 
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Figure 1.6.: Intermediation and Efficiency of African Banks 
A. Average Cost-to-Income Ratio 
(%) 
 
B. Average Net Loans to Deposits 
and Short-term Funding (%) 
 
C. Return on Average Equity 
(%) 
 
D. Impaired Loans to Gross Loans 
(%) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on BankScope data. 
Remarkably, domestic banks lend more actively than African MNB and Global MNB (Figure 
1.6.B). They have a loans-to-deposits ratio of 76% on average over the 2006-2015 period, 
while the foreign affiliates of African MNB and Global MNB have very similar loans-to-
deposits ratios, closer to 60%. African MNB exhibit lower profitability, with ROAE of 7% on 
average over the 2006-2015 period, much lower than that of the other banks (15% for 
domestic banks and 18% and 17% respectively for the foreign affiliates of Global MNB and 
Emerging MNB). This is related to the lower quality of their portfolio (Figure 1.6.D) and lower 
operational efficiency (Figure 1.6.A). That said, there has been a remarkable improvement 
on this front: ROAE has increased from an average of 2% over the period 2006-2010 to an 
average of 12% in the following five years. In particular, although cost income ratios were 
very high in the mid- to late-2000s (circa 100%), they have decreased and are getting closer 
to those of the other banks (77% on average over the 2011-2015 period, against 65% for 
domestic banks and 64% for the foreign affiliates of Global MNB). 
The foreign affiliates of Global MNB have long benefited from scale effects while African 
MNB are only beginning to reap such benefits. Global MNB are relying on their group for IT 
and risk infrastructure, which explains their higher operational efficiency. It is conjectured 
that the sharp improvement in the cost-income ratio of the affiliates of African MNB can be 
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related to both an increase in their net income (Figure 1.6.c) and a decrease in their 
operating cost. Having expanded their operations across Africa much later than the Global 
MNB, African MNB had to incur significant investments (software, etc.) that have only 
recently been amortised and they have begun to reap the benefits of increased scale. 
Likewise, African MNB are bringing their operating model closer in line with that of Global 
and Emerging MNB as they grow in scale. 
The quality of the portfolio of loans seems to be lower for the foreign affiliates of African 
MNB and domestic banks than for the affiliates of Global MNB and Emerging MNB but the 
difference is narrowing over time (Figure 1.6.d). Domestic banks and African MNB are 
slightly more exposed to the SME segment, which exhibits higher default risk (Pelletier, 
2014). Yet, foreign affiliates of Global MNB have seen the ratio of impaired loans to gross 
loans increase over the last decade, in line with their increasing exposure to the SME 
segment driven by increasing competition in the large corporates segment. Indeed, new 
entrants have to reach out to clients hitherto left unbanked by established players. In turn, 
rising competition is forcing established players to get out of their comfort zone in order to 
maintain their growth rate and profitability. 
1.3. Analysis of Survey of Banking Groups in SSA 
This section discusses the results of the second edition of the EIB’s survey of African banking 
groups10. A first pilot edition of the survey was launched in 2015, based on a bank lending 
survey designed in the context of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (EIB 2013 and 
2014). The second and current edition of the survey was conducted during summer 2016. 
The survey has been expanded in two ways. First, the sample of banking groups that 
accepted our invitation to participate in the survey has grown from 10 to 15 banks, and it 
now includes some global banks with a wide footprint in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, the set 
of questions administered to banking groups has been expanded from 10 to 20 questions, 
covering an enhanced set of strategic issues, including demand and supply of local currency 
loans and technological deployment. The full questionnaire is presented in the Appendix. 
With 15 major banking groups operating in SSA, the ambition of the second edition of this 
survey is to offer an instructive monograph of African banking groups with the aim of 
informing private, public and official sector actors in ‘real time’. 
The group of targeted banking groups for this second edition of the survey comprises major 
pan-African Banks (PABs), including South African groups (belonging to the so-called 
’emerging banks’ category in Section 1.2), first tier sub-regional banks and global banks 
operating in SSA.11 No claim is made that the 2016 extended sample of African banking 
groups is exhaustive or even statistically representative. However, with the inclusion of 
                                                          
10 Outstanding IT support from Tomasz Olejnik is gratefully acknowledged. The diligent help of our Global Partners/Financial 
Sector Division and of colleagues based in our Dakar, Pretoria and Nairobi regional offices is also gratefully acknowledged. 
Remaining errors or shortcomings are the authors’ sole responsibility.  
11 The survey is administered by the European Investment Bank, under a confidentiality agreement with the individual 
participating banks. It is addressed to senior officials of the banks involved. African banking groups are surveyed at the group 
level, leaving it to the group to collect information from its subsidiaries. The inclusion of a specific bank in the survey does not 
in any way represent a statement about business preference or compliance with EIB policies. 
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some key global banks and of some first-tier (sub-)regional banks that make a noteworthy 
contribution to banking sector deepening and competition, efforts have been made to 
generate a snapshot of significant banking groups operating in SSA. These banking groups 
(and their African subsidiaries) represented on average around a third of total assets in SSA 
(including South Africa) over the 2006-2015 period. 
There has been turnover in the sample of banks in this survey but, upon analysis, it is not a 
concern and a comparison of banks’ answers between the two surveys is still meaningful. 
Two out of the ten African banking groups that responded to our survey in 2015 did not 
respond to the survey in 2016 while seven new banking groups have joined the sample. In 
addition, while the 2015 sample focused exclusively on domestic banking groups, the 2016 
sample has been enlarged to include two global (European) banking groups with a significant 
footprint in SSA. In this respect, while the sample’s diversity has been enhanced, the 
increased heterogeneity of banking groups in the sample has to be taken into in 
consideration. Generally speaking, sample turnover is not driving the changes observed 
between 2015 and 2016. Indeed, similar changes are generated by including in the analysis 
only banking groups present in both editions of the survey. Where relevant, mention will be 
made about where results differ, at least to some extent, between domestic, emerging 
(South African) and global banking groups.12 
The remainder of the section is organised as follows: section 1.3.B provides an overview of 
the current footprint of banking groups covered by the survey; section 1.3.C takes stock of 
banking groups’ strategic positioning in SSA in terms of countries, market segment, product 
and technological deployment; section 1.3.D links these strategic considerations with the 
market and funding conditions as perceived by banking groups, both at group and subsidiary 
level. 1.3.E and 1.3.F focus on market conditions, reliance on various types of funding at 
group and subsidiary level, and funding conditions. 1.3.G discusses the reported needs of 
banking groups in terms of local and foreign currency, portfolio guarantees and technical 
assistance needs vs. their availability. 1.3.H closes by commenting on the stage of 
compliance with Basel regulations that banking groups report in SSA. 
 
 
  
                                                          
12 The EIB does not generally differentiate between South African banking groups and other sub-Saharan African banking 
groups. In this section, this distinction will be made where it is relevant and as a further robustness check on the general 
observations made about sub-Saharan African banks. 
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1.3.A.  A TREND TOWARDS CONSOLIDATION IN SSA 
Figure 1.7.: Current and Prospective Positioning of PABs in SSA 
a. Current 
positioning 
b. Perceived 
market potential 
c. Strategic 
positioning 
   
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Panel A corresponds to Question 1.a, Panel B to Question 1.b and Panel C to Question 1.c (see Appendix) 
The footprint of banking groups in SSA is such that large parts of Western and of Central and 
Eastern Africa are covered by three or more PABs though Central Africa is somewhat less 
densely populated by PABs (Figure 1.7.a). There are only five countries where no banking 
group in our sample is active with at least a subsidiary or a branch. Kenya and Tanzania are 
covered by as many as seven banking groups, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Rwanda by six. 
Banking groups in SSA are still in the process of optimising their footprint to align it with self-
reported perceived market potential. Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia 
top the list in terms of market potential. Botswana, Mauritius and Senegal follow. Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya and Rwanda are the main countries where most (in net terms) banking 
groups active in SSA plan to increase their presence. Tanzania, Ghana and Senegal are next. 
Not surprisingly, there is a relatively high correlation (77%) between where banking groups 
see potential and where they plan to increase or decrease their presence (Figure 6.1.c). 
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Figure 1.8.: Current and Prospective Positioning of PABs in SSA 
a. Long-term strategic approach 
(beyond 12 months)  
b. Short-term strategic approach 
 
 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA. 
Note: Panel A refers to Question 4.a; panel B refers to Question 16 (see Appendix) 
Question 4: “Longer-term strategic approach (beyond 12 months): Looking at operations in sub-Saharan Africa, 
your group intends to….” Question 16: “In SSA, how are you/how do you plan to expand(ing) mainly?” 
Nonetheless, this relatively dynamic picture hides an inflection in the aggressiveness with 
which banking groups are planning to expand in SSA. While in the 2015 edition of the survey, 
all banks in the sample planned to expand in SSA in the long term, in this edition only two 
thirds of banking groups plan to do so (Figure 1.8.a). The other third, mostly regional banks, 
plan to maintain their operations constant. In other words, no banking group in the sample 
is planning to reduce its footprint in SSA on the long-term horizon yet. 
In contrast, in the short term, there is a growing trend towards either stalled expansion or 
even consolidation. Looking back to the last twelve months and forward to the coming 
twelve months, there is a growing proportion of banking groups reporting an intention to 
consolidate their footprint, 7% vs. 21% (Figure 1.8.b). The share of banks that had either no 
plan to expand or are consolidating was 21% during the last 12 months; looking forward to 
the next 12 months, this share grows to 28%. The trend towards consolidation is most 
notable amongst African banking groups. 
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Figure 1.9.: Group Total Medium-Term Exposure in SSA 
 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Question 5 (see Appendix): “Group total medium-term exposure to sub-Saharan Africa: Concerning cross-
border operations to SSA countries, your group has/intends to…” 
Less than one banking group in three has increased its total exposure during the last twelve 
months and only one in four intends to do so during the coming twelve months. Individual 
responses indicate that some groups are even experiencing and/or contemplating reducing 
their medium-term exposure. The trend towards slower or stalled expansion is confirmed 
when breaking down the various ways in which banking groups may consider expanding in 
the medium term (Figure 1.9). This diminished appetite for expansion translates into 
exposure to subsidiaries by either debt or capital, direct cross-border lending as well as 
expansion financed by other financial institutions but booked on the group’s balance sheet. 
In contrast, in the 2015 edition of the survey, half of the banks were reporting an increase in 
their medium-term exposure across SSA. This comes as little surprise on the back of the 
deteriorating growth prospects at the macroeconomic level. 
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1.3.B. A GROWING MARKET FOCUS ON THE SME SEGMENT 
Figure 1.10.: Long-Term (Beyond 12 Months) Strategic Focus of PABs in SSA 
a. Market Segment Focus b. New Product/Service Focus 
 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Panel A corresponds to Question 4.b, Panel B corresponds to Question 4.c (see Appendix). Question 4: 
“Longer-term strategic approach (beyond 12 months): Looking at operations in sub-Saharan Africa, your group 
intends to…” 
The above-mentioned change in the short-term strategic approach is accompanied by a 
qualitative shift in the long-term strategic focus of banking groups in SSA, both in terms of 
market segment and new products and services (Figure 1.10a). With respect to market 
segment focus, a growing share of banking groups are reporting a long-term and significant 
focus on SMEs (58%, up from 40%). Notably, these are all regional banking groups. For the 
first time in this survey, one regional banking group reports having a long-term focus on 
retail clients, while their reported long-term focus was on SMEs in 2015. This increased focus 
on retail clients and SMEs has naturally come at the expense of a diminished focus on large 
local and multinational companies. 
Altogether, nearly two thirds of the surveyed banking groups currently have a strategic focus 
on retail clients or SMEs in SSA vs. a third with a focus on corporates. This is a significant 
break from, in fact a near-reversal of, the survey results in 2015 and past anecdotal 
evidence. In the last edition of the survey, 60% of banking groups focused on corporates, 
40% on SMEs, none on retail clients. Changes in long-term strategic focus in terms of 
product and services are consistent with the shift towards SMEs and retail clients (Figure 
1.10.b). E-banking services are reported as a focus by a growing share of banking groups. 
Notably, this focus concerns half of the banking groups in the sample in 2016 vs. only a 
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quarter back in 2015. Mobile banking services continue to remain the focus of around one 
banking group in three in SSA, also in line with the increased focus on retail clients. 
1.3.C. IMPORTANT TECHNOLOGICAL EFFORTS IN E-BANKING AND MOBILE BANKING 
Figure 1.11.: Technological Deployment Status 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Question 19 (see Appendix): “Where does your group stand …” 
The state of technological deployment across banking groups in SSA is consistent with their 
long-term strategic focus (Figure 1.11). Internet banking technology and mobile banking 
technology is where the highest share of banking groups in SSA are either fully deployed or 
in deployment (86%). This highlights the importance given by banking groups to servicing 
SMEs, reaching out to retail clients and to cost-effective ways of collecting deposits. Next 
comes general  IT infrastructure (79%). Typically, reaching out to new clients is more costly. 
It is sensible that banking groups invest in technology to attract depositors, to serve them 
efficiently, and ultimately to control costs. FinTech – in particular, the use of financial 
technology to facilitate banks’ lending activities – still appears to be a new technology, 
especially in SSA: 57% of banking groups in SSA are either only planning its deployment or do 
not consider it a priority. Indeed, FinTech generally presupposes a fair amount of IT 
infrastructure before it can be deployed and survey results probably reveal a degree of 
sequencing of banking technology rather than a lack of interest in FinTech per se. 
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In terms of need for technical assistance, IT is reported as the highest priority by 43% of 
banking groups. Next comes credit risk management with 36%. This coincides with the view 
that banks are operating in the face of rising competition and reaching out to new retail and 
SME customers. Lending technology is not yet a significant priority (only 7% of the banks 
consider it a high priority), in line with the relatively premature stage of development of 
FinTech illustrated by Figure 1.11. 
1.3.D. MARKET CONDITIONS 
Figure 1.12.: Banking Groups’ Assessment of Ongoing and Prospective Market Conditions 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Question 2 (see Appendix): “In sub-Saharan Africa, key indicators have been/are expected to be …” 
The market drivers behind this rise in cautiousness towards continued expansion on behalf 
of banking groups in SSA are crystallised in Figure 1.12. 86% of banking groups have seen 
their asset base rising in 2015 and 79% of them expect it to rise further in 2016. A similar 
trend is observed for deposits market share. This optimism has to be tempered by the 
observation that a higher share of banking groups shared this positive outlook in the 2015 
sample. 
Beyond assets and deposits market share, the view of banking groups is less optimistic in 
SSA. Less than half of the banking groups report rising net profit margins and only 54% 
expect these to keep shrinking over the next 12 months. Less than a third of the banking 
groups report rising returns on assets and less than one in five expect those to rise going 
forward. Most banking groups have not raised capital on the market and less than one bank 
out of three expects to do so within the next 12 months. With banks more optimistic about 
deposit market share than loan market share, it is not surprising to discover that only half of 
the banking groups expect their loan-to-deposit ratio to increase. They are also reporting 
and expecting lower cost-to-income ratios, although less radically so than they reported and 
expected in the 2015 edition of the survey. Generally speaking, the optimism of banking 
groups in 2015 was not borne out in 2016 and, accordingly, banking groups are marking 
down their expectations for 2017 in the light of realisations in 2016. 
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1.3.E. BANKS’ RELIANCE ON DEPOSIT FUNDING IS EXPECTED TO RISE 
Figure 1.13.: Group Access to Funding in SSA 
 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Question 3 (see Appendix): “In sub-Saharan Africa, group's access to funding...” 
New trends have also emerged concerning group access to funding (Figure 1.13). Less than 
two baking groups out of three report that total funding is rising and expect it to rise during 
the next twelve months. The nature of funding relied on and expected to be tapped is also 
evolving. Most banks are increasing their reliance on deposit funding and some forms of 
long-term funding. Fewer in net terms see and expect their reliance on other types of 
funding to increase. 
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Figure 1.14.: Subsidiary Access to Funding 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Question 8 (see Appendix): “What has been/is expected to be the most relevant form of funding for your 
subsidiaries in SSA…” 
Funding structure has also evolved notably at the subsidiary level (Figure 1.14). Already back 
in 2015, 60% of banking groups reported and expected deposits to be the main source of 
funding of their subsidiaries. In the 2016 edition, this share has risen to 75%. Next, in 2015, 
IFIs were reported as their main source of funding by one fifth of the banking groups. There 
is no banking group in 2016 that is reporting using funding from IFIs as their main source of 
funding. These results emphasise the dominant and increasing role played by deposits as a 
source of funding. Notably, 17% of banking groups plan to rely on sources of long-term 
funding other than IFIs and wholesale debt securities over the next 12 months. 
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Figure 1.15.: Trends in Funding Conditions at Subsidiary Level 
(Percentage of banking reporting an improvement) 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Question 9 (see Appendix): “Funding conditions in your own subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa have been/are 
expected to be…” Overall relates to overall market conditions, mixing pricing, maturity and all other relevant issues. 
The increased dependence on deposit funding goes along with deteriorating funding 
conditions in general (overall) for more than one out of 5 banking groups, and particularly in 
terms of pricing (Figure 1.15). In net terms, banking groups are reporting that funding has 
become more onerous and only one third are expecting it to become more attractive within 
the next 12 months. Less than half of banking groups reports maturities on offer to have 
improved during the last 12 months. Looking forward to the next 12 months, banking groups 
are somewhat more optimistic, with 62% of them expecting a general improvement in 
funding conditions and half of them expecting an improvement in the tenor of the funding 
they can access. This relatively benign outlook should not hide the fact that banking groups 
are generally less optimistic with respect to funding conditions in the 2016 sample than in 
the 2015 sample. Restricting the sample to banking groups common to both editions of the 
survey does not alter these observations. 
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Figure 1.16.: Long-Term (Beyond 12 Months) Strategic Focus of PABs in SSA 
a. Plans to raise Regulatory Funds or 
other Long-Term Financing during the next 12 
months 
b. Bond issuance and 
plans to issue bonds 
  
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Panel A corresponds to Question 14, Panel B corresponds to Question 15 (see Appendix). 
Question 14: “Do you plan to raise regulatory funds or other long-term financing…”; Question, 15: “Have you/do 
you plan to issue(d) bonds?” 
Despite some headwinds, survey answers indicate that at least half of the banking groups 
plan to raise regulatory funds or other forms of long-term funding (Figure 1.16.a). In 
contrast, less than a third of banking groups have issued bonds over the last 12 months and 
less than a quarter of the banking groups plan to issue bonds during the next 12 months 
(Figure 1.16.b). 
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1.3.F. TRENDS AND NEEDS RELATED TO FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
Figure 1.17: Local Currency and Foreign Exchange Funding and Lending 
a. Plans to raise fund b. Perceived demand for loans 
  
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Question 11 (see Appendix). Question 11 | In SSA, in which currency do you plan to raise 
funds/perceive demand for loans in… 
All banking groups in SSA perceive demand for loans in local currency to be sustained (Figure 
1.17). Accordingly, a large majority of them plan to match this demand with funding in local 
currency. Next in terms of perceived demand for loans come loans in USD, which banking 
groups also intend to match with USD funding (54%). Lending and funding in EUR, and even 
to a greater extent in other foreign currencies, are in contrast considered low priorities by 
banking groups13. 
  
                                                          
13 Given the presence in the sample of banking groups active in the CFA franc zones, one hypothesis is that these banking 
groups typically prefer to fund themselves in CFAF rather than to pass through the EUR. This is somewhat of a puzzle, though 
not a surprise based on anecdotal evidence, given the credible peg of the CFAF franc to the EUR, especially over the time frame 
implied by typical funding maturities of banks. Another hypothesis, not necessarily excluding the previous one, is that most 
transactions in the CFAF zones are carried out in local currency, whereas in other regions the USD tends to play a more 
important role alongside the local currency. 
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Figure 1.18.: Demand and Supply Conditions for Portfolio Guarantees in SSA 
a. Degree to which Portfolio Guarantee 
Needs are met 
b. Perceived Degree of Importance of 
Portfolio Guarantees for SME 
lending 
  
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Panel A corresponds to Question 12, Panel B corresponds to Question 13 (see Appendix). Question 12 | 
With respect to the development of your SME lending business, do you consider your portfolio guarantee needs 
… Question 13 | With respect to the development of your SME lending business, do you consider portfolio 
guarantee products… 
Amongst banking groups in SSA, five out of six consider portfolio guarantees to be either 
important or very important (Figure 1.18.b). When it comes to needs, all banking groups in 
SSA consider them either met or partially met (Figure 1.18.a). Banking groups consider 
themselves as served by the market, typically by IFIs, but not fully. At this level, portfolio 
guarantees seem to represent partially unfinished business in the face of strong demand. 
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1.3.G. COMPLIANCE WITH BASEL I ACHIEVED, WORKING TOWARDS BASEL II (III) COMPLIANCE 
Figure 1.19.: State of Basel Standard Compliance 
 
Source: 2016 EIB survey of banking groups in SSA 
Note: Question 20 (see Appendix). Question 20 | Do you consider your banking group to be… 
The state of compliance of banking groups with respect to Basel standards is in flux (Figure 
1.19). All banking groups consider themselves to be compliant with Basel I, although there is 
a perception that single exposure limits are not always respected. With respect to Basel II 
standards, 46% of banking groups consider themselves compliant, with the rest reporting 
that they are working towards compliance. The picture changes further when it comes to 
compliance with Basel III standards: around one banking group in five is compliant while 
another one in five simply does not consider Basel III a priority. Upon inspection, it is Global 
and Emerging (South African) banks that report Basel III compliance. It is not surprising that 
no regional banking groups report being compliant with Basel III. Not every feature of Basel 
III is considered to be equally relevant in the context of a typical SSA banking sector. 
However, a selective approach driven by local regulators may be warranted as elements of 
Basel III are highly relevant. For instance, the liquidity coverage ratio is a feature of Basel III, 
and liquidity has revealed itself to be potentially vital in a SSA context. Similarly, the greater 
degree of transparency and disclosure imposed by Basel III would probably go a long way in 
bringing down funding costs for regional banking groups. Indeed, the complex and often 
opaque structure of ownership between African banking groups and their subsidiaries (IMF, 
2016c) adds to the challenge of supervision by national and regional authorities. It also 
intensifies the difficulties associated with the assessment of African banking groups’ 
compliance with international standards and of their creditworthiness. Adopting simpler 
ownership structures and more transparent disclosure of consolidated accounts and of risk 
exposures and procedures would therefore help to strengthen market trust in the soundness 
of African banking groups and, accordingly, would help to ease their access to capital 
markets and to other sources of long-term financing. 
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1.4. Conclusion 
This study comes at a time when most SSA economies have slowed significantly. Spillovers to 
the financial sectors are increasingly noticeable. Financial development has been on the rise 
in SSA since the early 1990s, with an acceleration in the early 2000s (IMF, 2006c) However, 
the pace of growth has slowed recently. This is especially evident in contrast with the rapid 
growth in rates of credit to the private sector between 2010 and 2013 (IMF, 2016b). 
Moreover, despite more than a decade and a half of financial deepening in nearly all SSA 
countries, banking sectors in SSA still have a remarkably long way to go. Banking groups 
surveyed in this chapter reckon that their footprint still aligns only imperfectly with 
perceived market potential and with their strategic priorities. Correspondingly, two thirds of 
banking groups in SSA still plan to spread further across the region on a long-term basis. 
However, in the shorter term, the picture is less enthusiastic and more complex. Although 
banks expect the situation to improve somewhat over the next twelve months, access to 
funding has been more challenging during the last year than banking groups had expected. 
Accordingly, a majority of banking groups have not increased their total exposure in SSA 
during the last year and do not intend to do so during the coming year. A few banking 
groups are actually planning to retrench to some degree. 
Banking groups are adjusting their overall strategy in the face of a challenging environment 
characterised by tighter funding conditions, slower lending growth and rising competition 
for deposits and easily bankable clients. A majority of banking groups are relying significantly 
on deposit funding. From a financial inclusion perspective, there is some good news: a 
growing share of banking groups is reporting to have a long-term and significant focus on 
SMEs and retail clients. Consequently, IT and credit risk management are reported as top 
priorities in terms of the need for technical assistance while internet banking technology and 
mobile banking technology are where the highest share of banking groups in SSA report 
being either fully deployed or in deployment. 
Development partners, IFIs in particular, have a key role to play in ensuring that the rising 
importance of financial inclusion and access to finance for SMEs are sustained throughout 
challenging macroeconomic circumstances. Long-term refinancing will have its usual role to 
play but needs don’t stop there. All banking groups in SSA perceive demand for loans in local 
currency to be sustained, which is encouraging since local currency loans are typically geared 
towards domestically-oriented SMEs that are expected to create local jobs. Most banking 
groups in SSA consider portfolio guarantees to be either important or very important. 
However, two thirds of banking groups in SSA consider their portfolio guarantee needs as 
only partially met. Providing portfolio guarantees and local currency refinancing are 
therefore, more than ever, key instruments with which IFIs can accompany banking groups’ 
efforts to reach out to a wider range of SMEs in SSA. 
In terms of the need for technical assistance, IT is reported as the highest priority followed 
by credit risk management. Moreover, while all banking groups operating in SSA consider 
themselves as compliant with Basel I standards, less than half consider themselves 
compliant with Basel II, with the rest working towards compliance. As competition forces 
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most banking groups increasingly out of their comfort zone and into SME lending, the need 
to put in place first-class risk management processes has become unescapable. In fact, with 
the coming of age of FinTech in SSA, risk management could become as much of a tool to 
originate new credit as an ex-post control function. Consequently, risk management 
departments will need to be scaled to their task and properly equipped with the IT they 
require. 
Heavy reliance on deposit financing also comes with its share of social responsibility for 
banking groups and their supervising authorities, obviously, but for investors as well. In 
markets where clients are either relatively new to banking services or have returned after 
one or more traumatic experiences with them, no banking sector can afford to scare off 
depositors. Strengthened risk management practices and enhanced corporate transparency 
have therefore become public goods key to the continued deepening of SSA banking sectors 
and broadening of access to finance. Banking groups able to win the highest level of trust 
from depositors, regulators and investors will gain a decisive competitive advantage. Where 
sector consolidation is in order, such competitive advantage is bound to decide which 
banking groups are able to keep growing and to make a lasting contribution to the 
development of SSA economies. 
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Appendix 1: The Survey Questionnaire, 2016 Extended Edition 
Q1 | What is your bank's positioning in each country14… 
    … current positioning 
… perceived 
market potential 
… strategic 
positioning 
1  Angola    
2  Benin    
 …    
49  Zimbabwe    
 
In Q1, for current positioning, the following answers are possible: a. active with subsidiary or 
branch – with significant market share (among top three market players); b. active with 
subsidiary or branch – with medium market share; c. active with subsidiary or branch – with 
niche market presence; d. active with representative office; e. inactive. The corresponding 
map illustrates the sum of African banking groups reporting answers a-c for a specific 
country. 
For perceived market potential, the following answers are possible: a. low; b. medium; c. 
high. The corresponding map illustrates the weighted sum of the answers of African banking 
groups for a specific country with a weight of one for answer a, two for answer b, and three 
for answer c. 
For strategic positioning, the following answers are possible: a. increase presence with new 
acquisition; b. increase presence with new capital provided by parent company/reinvested 
earnings; c. increase presence with new funding from parent company; d. increase presence 
via cross-border lending activity; e. remain stable; f. decrease presence via reduced cross-
border lending activities; g. decrease presence with lower funding from parent company; h. 
decrease presence by selling assets/subsidiaries. The corresponding map illustrates the net 
sum of the answers of African banking groups for a specific country with a weight of +1 for 
answers a-d, zero for answer e, and -1 for answers f-g. 
 
Q2 | In sub-Saharan Africa, key indicators have been/are expected to be … 
 
LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
Assets   
Loans market share   
Deposits market share   
Loans/deposits ratio   
Return on assets   
Cost-to-income ratio   
Net profit margin   
Raising capital on the market   
 
  
                                                          
14 The full list of countries covered by the survey is: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Q3 | In sub-Saharan Africa, your group's access to funding... 
 
…How has it changed 
over the LAST twelve 
 
…How do you expect it to 
change 
    
 
Total   
Deposits   
Interbank market   
IFIs   
Wholesale debt securities   
Loans or credit lines 
    
  
Short-term funding   
Long-term funding   
For each variable in Q2 and Q3, the following answers are possible: a. rising; b. stable; c. 
decreasing. The corresponding figures illustrate the net sum of the answers of all African 
banking groups with a weight of +1 for answer a, 0 for answer b, and -1 for answer c. 
 
Q4 | Longer-term strategic approach (beyond 12 months): Looking at operations in sub-
Saharan Africa, 
your group intends to… 
Overall  
Market segment focus  
New product/services focus  
 
For Q4, overall, the following answers are possible: a. expand operations overall; b. maintain 
the same level of operations overall; c. scale down operations overall. The corresponding 
figure illustrates the net sum of the answers of all African banking groups with a weight of +1 
for answer a, 0 for answer b, and -1 for answer c. 
The following answers are possible with respect to market segment focus: a. by focusing on 
large multinationals; b. by focusing on large local companies; c. by focusing on SMEs; d. by 
focusing on retail clients. The corresponding figure illustrates the breakdown of the 
percentages of answers following in each category. 
As for new product and services focus, the following answers are possible: a. by rolling out 
mobile banking; b. by rolling out mortgage financing; c. by rolling out consumer credit/credit 
cards; d. by rolling out leasing products; e. by rolling out e-banking services; f. none of the 
above/other. The corresponding figure illustrates the breakdown of the percentages of 
answers following in each category. 
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Q5 | Group total medium-term exposure to sub-Saharan Africa: Concerning cross-border 
operations to SSA countries, your group has/intends to… 
 
LAST 12 
months 
NEXT 12 
months 
Total exposure   
Exposure to subsidiaries – intra-group debt funding   
Exposure to subsidiaries – capital   
Direct cross-border lending booked on the balance sheet of 
the parent company  
  
Funding to banks and other financial institutions (e.g. MFIs) 
not part of the group, booked on the BS of the parent  
  
 
For Q5, the following answers are possible: a. expand(ed) exposure; b. maintain(ed) the 
same level of exposure; c. reduce(d) exposure. The corresponding figure illustrates the net 
sum of the answers of all African banking groups with a weight of +1 for answer a, 0 for 
answer b, and -1 for answer c. 
 
Q6 | Profitability of operations in SSA region: the contribution of activities in SSA in total 
ROA of the Group has/is expected to… 
 
LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
    
 
For Q6, the following answers are possible: a. increase(d); b. be(en) stable; c. decrease(d). 
The corresponding figure illustrates the net sum of the answers of all African banking groups 
with a weight of +1 for answer a, 0 for answer b, and -1 for answer c. 
 
Q7 | Compared to the overall group and corrected for the cost of risk, profitability of 
operations in SSA region: ROA of your SSA operations has been/is expected to be … 
 
LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
    
 
For Q7, the following answers were possible: a. lower; b. equal; c. higher. The corresponding 
figure illustrates the net sum of the answers of all African banking groups with a weight of +1 
for answer a, 0 for answer b, and -1 for answer c. 
 
Q8 | What has been/is expected to be the most relevant form of funding for your 
subsidiaries in SSA… 
 
LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
    
 
For Q8, the following answers are possible: a. deposits; b. credit from the parent bank; c. 
interbank market; d. IFIs; e. wholesale debt securities; f. loans or credit lines from the 
Central Bank; g. other short-term funding; h. other long-term funding. The corresponding 
figure illustrates the breakdown of the percentages of answers following in each category. 
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Q9 | Funding conditions in your own subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa have been/are 
expected to be… 
 
LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
Overall   
Pricing   
Maturity   
 
For Q9, the following answers were possible: a. improving; b. deteriorating; c. stable. The 
corresponding figure illustrates the net sum of the answers of all African banking groups 
with a weight of +1 for answer a, 0 for answer b, and -1 for answer c. 
 
Q10 | What share of your operations in SSA lie outside your base country… 
  ...assets ...revenues 
    
 
For Q10, the following answers are possible: a. below 10%; b. 10-25%; c. 25-50%; d. 50-75%; 
e. above 75%. The corresponding figure illustrates the breakdown of the percentages of 
answers following in each category.  
 
Q11 | In SSA, in which currency do you... 
 
… plan to raise funds … perceive demand for 
 Local currency   
USD   
EUR   
Other foreign currency 
(specify currencies below)   
Specify different currencies if 
applicable:   
 
For Q11, the following answers are possible: a. certainly; b. probably; c. perhaps; d. probably 
not. The corresponding figure illustrates the weighted sum of the answers of all African 
banking groups with a weight of +1 for answer a, +0.6 for answer b, +0.3 for answer c and 0 
for answer d. 
 
Q12 | With respect to the development of your SME lending business, do you consider 
your portfolio guarantee needs … 
  
 
... to be 
   
 
For Q12, the following answers are possible: a. met; b. partially met; c. largely met; d. 
irrelevant. The corresponding figure illustrates the weighted sum of the answers of all 
African banking groups with a weight of +1 for answer a, +0.6 for answer b, +0.3 for answer c 
and 0 for answer d. 
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Q13 | With respect to the development of your SME lending business, do you consider 
portfolio guarantee products … 
  
 
... as 
   
 
For Q13, the following answers are possible: a. very important; b. important; c. somewhat 
important; d. irrelevant. The corresponding figure illustrates the weighted sum of the 
answers of all African banking groups with a weight of +1 for answer a, +0.6 for answer b, 
+0.3 for answer c and 0 for answer d. 
 
Q14 | Do you plan to raise regulatory funds or other long-term financing … 
  
 
... during next 12 months? 
   
 
For Q14, the following answers are possible: a. certainly; b. probably; c. perhaps; d. probably 
not. The corresponding figure illustrates the weighted sum of the answers of all African 
banking groups with a weight of +1 for answer a, +0.6 for answer b, +0.3 for answer c and 0 
for answer d. 
 
Q15 | Have you/do you plan to issue(d) bonds? 
 
LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
    
 
For Q15, the following answers are possible: a. yes; b. no. The corresponding figure 
illustrates the net sum of the answers of all African banking groups with a weight of +1 for 
answer a, and -1 for answer b. 
 
Q16 | In SSA, how are you/how do you plan to expand(ing) mainly? 
 
 
LAST 12 months NEXT 12 months 
    
 
For Q16, the following answers are possible: a. organically; b. acquisitions; c. 
greenfield/brownfield investment; d. no plan to expand; e. consolidating. The corresponding 
figure illustrates the breakdown of the percentages of answers following in each category. 
 
Q17 | If you have/plan to expand via greenfield investment, is it because … 
 
  
 
... you think it’s 
   
Specify other reason if applicable:  
 
For Q17, the following answers are possible: a. cheaper; b. faster; c. other reason (please 
specify). The corresponding figure illustrates the breakdown of the percentages of answers 
following in each category. 
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Q18 | What are your main medium-term technical assistance (TA) needs … 
 
  
 
... seen from HQ level? 
   
Specify other needs if applicable:  
 
For Q18, the following answers are possible: a. marketing; b. IT; c. operational risk 
management; d. credit risk management; e. lending technology; f. other (please specify). The 
corresponding figure illustrates the breakdown of the percentages of answers following in 
each category. 
 
Q19 |  Where does your group stand … 
  
… with respect to: 
a. investing in general IT infrastructure?  
b. deploying internet banking technology?  
c. deploying mobile banking technology?  
d. deploying FinTech to streamline credit decisions?  
 
For Q19, the following answers are possible: a. fully deployed; b. in deployment; c. planning 
development; d. not an immediate priority. The corresponding figure illustrates the 
breakdown of the percentages of answers following in each category. 
 
Q20 | Do you consider your banking group … 
  
… to be: 
Basel I  
Basel II  
Basel III  
 
For Q20, the following answers are possible: a. compliant; b. working towards compliant; c. 
not an immediate priority. The corresponding figure illustrates the breakdown of the 
percentages of answers following in each category. 
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2. Banking in East Africa: The Experience of Digital Financial 
Services 
JARED OSORO1 AND HABIL OLAKA2  
 
 Executive summary 
• Just as Kenya is the largest economy in East Africa, its banking industry is a leader 
in the region insofar as providing credit towards supporting the economy’s 
growth aspirations is concerned. One area where such leadership has been 
evident is in digital financial services. 
 
• The leadership in digital financial services has attracted global attention with the 
region being recognised as a trailblazer in mobile money. The novelty of mobile 
money has largely been characterised as a technological innovation although 
technology is more of an enabler that supports the underlying innovative business 
model. 
 
• At the centre of the rapidly growing mobile money business is a regulatory 
environment that is equally innovative and dynamic. The role of the regulator was 
therefore critical in the success of mobile payment/money in Kenya. 
 
• A critical contributor to the success of mobile payment and mobile money has 
been the fact that the key promoter is a dominant market player. In markets 
where such dominance is not prevalent, the success of replicability has been 
limited. 
 
• Kenya’s achievement in mobile money has provided impetus for expectations of 
replication of the model across East Africa and even wider Africa. The success of 
such replication has been modest.  
 
• Even the expectation that mobile payments will ride on the rail of regional 
expansion of banks in East Africa is far from being realised given that unique local 
regulatory challenges in the respective economies are a binding constraint.  
 
  
                                                          
1 Director, Kenya Bankers Association Centre for Research on Financial Markets and Policy© 
2 Chief Executive Officer, Kenya Bankers Association  
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2.1. Introduction 
The five East African countries constituting the East African Community (EAC3) – Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda – share the common characteristic of being 
developing economies. Nonetheless, their respective economic status as represented by the 
evolution of nominal gross domestic product (GDP), real GDP growth, per capita income, 
gross savings and investment depicts a sense of diversity. 
As Table 2.1 shows, Burundi, which is the smallest of the five EAC economies, has 
experienced an erratic and feeble performance in terms of real output growth. The Rwandan 
economy, ranked fourth in terms of nominal GDP, has been consistent in achieving positive 
real growth output performance. Tanzania, the second largest economy in the EAC block, 
has similarly sustained strong real output performance. Real GDP growth for Kenya – the 
largest economy in the EAC region – and Uganda – the third largest – has been fairly strong, 
although its trend has been erratic. 
  
                                                          
3 South Sudan was admitted as the sixth member of the EAC in April 2016 so is not part of this analysis.   
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Table 2.1.: Selected Economic Indicators of the East African Economy 
    2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Burundi Real GDP growth (%) 3.8 5.1 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.7 -4.1 
  Nominal GDP 
(USD billions) 
1.8 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 2.9 
  Per capita GDP (USD) 217 243 261 266 283 315 306 
  Total investment 
(% of GDP) 
14.2 15.1 14.7 14.3 14.9 15.5 10.6 
  Gross national 
savings (% of GDP) 
16.9 3.7 1.0 -3.7 -4.2 -2.9 -4.4 
Kenya Real GDP growth (%) 3.3 8.4 6.1 4.6 5.7 5.3 5.6 
  Nominal GDP 
(USD billions) 
37.0 40.0 42.0 50.4 54.9 60.9 61.4 
  Per capita GDP (USD) 982 1 039 1 062 1 239 1 314 1 417 1 388 
  Total investment 
(% of GDP) 
19.3 20.7 21.7 21.5 20.1 21.4 22.5 
  Gross national 
savings (% of GDP) 
14.9 14.8 12.5 13.1 11.2 11.0 14.4 
Rwanda Real GDP growth (%) 6.3 7.3 7.8 8.8 4.7 7.0 6.9 
  Nominal GDP 
(USD billions) 
5.3 5.7 6.4 7.2 7.5 7.9 8.3 
  Per capita GDP (USD) 547 570 628 688 700 717 732 
  Total investment 
(% of GDP) 
23.6 23.2 23.5 25.9 26.5 26.1 25.0 
  Gross national 
savings (% of GDP) 
16.4 17.8 16.4 14.7 19.1 14.6 11.2 
Tanzania Real GDP growth (%) 5.4 6.4 7.9 5.1 7.3 7.0 7.0 
  Nominal GDP 
(USD billions) 
28.6 31.1 33.6 39.1 44.4 48.1 44.9 
  Per capita GDP (USD) 684 726 765 870 969 1029 942 
  Total investment 
(% of GDP) 
25.1 27.3 33.2 28.5 30.3 31.0 31.3 
  Gross national 
savings (% of GDP) 
18.3 21.2 21.6 19.3 14.9 21.7 22.6 
Uganda Real GDP growth (%) 8.1 7.7 6.8 2.6 4.0 4.9 5.0 
  Nominal GDP 
(USD billions) 
18.6 20.2 21.1 24.6 25.6 27.5 24.7 
  Per capita GDP (USD) 565 594 601 678 681 711 620 
  Total investment 
(% of GDP) 
27.6 26.0 29.5 29.5 27.8 26.4 26.5 
  Gross national 
savings (% of GDP) 
21.2 18.0 19.5 22.7 20.8 16.8 17.7 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016 
The development aspirations of the EAC region are entwined with the evolution of the 
financial sector in the respective economies, particularly the banking industry which is the 
dominant segment of the financial sector. The extent of reliance on external resources to 
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finance domestic investments in each of the five economies is reflected in the difference 
between the levels of gross domestic savings and total investments. Such reliance largely 
reflects the relative depth of each economy’s banking industry, as illustrated by the level of 
both total credit and credit to the private sector as a proportion of total income (Table 2.2). 
Domestic credit provided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a 
gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The Kenyan 
financial system is ahead of the others in the EAC as evidenced not only by the size of its 
banking industry but also by the corresponding market players’ foray into and leadership in 
digital financial services within the sub-region. 
Table 2.2.: Domestic Credit (% of GDP) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) 
Burundi 25.1 26.4 24.8 22.6 23.4 28.5 
Kenya 41.1 41.7 42.2 42.9 44.3 45.2 
Rwanda* - - - - - - 
Tanzania 15.5 17.2 18.0 18.2 20.2 22.8 
Uganda 14.6 16.1 13.8 14.2 16.8 17.9 
 Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
Burundi 16.9 18.9 17.8 16.3 15.4 14.3 
Kenya 27.2 30.6 29.5 31.7 34.2 34.9 
Rwanda* - - - - - - 
Tanzania 11.9 12.6 13.0 12.9 13.8 15.4 
Uganda 13.3 15.4 13.7 13.5 14.4 15.2 
Domestic savings gap 
Burundi 11.4 13.7 18.0 19.1 18.4 15.1 
Kenya 5.9 9.1 8.4 8.9 10.4 8.2 
Rwanda 5.4 7.2 11.3 7.4 11.5 13.8 
Tanzania 6.0 11.6 9.2 15.4 9.3 8.7 
Uganda 8.0 10.0 6.8 7.1 9.5 8.9 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; IMF World Economic Outlook database; *Figures for 
Rwanda are not available. 
Regulatory regime harmonisation within the EAC is driven by the Monetary Affairs 
Committee (MAC) of the EAC – a committee of the governors of each respective EAC 
partner’s central bank tasked with ensuring full integration of the region’s financial system. 
The MAC has developed a convergence criterion concerning the harmonisation of central 
banks’ legal and prudential supervisory rules and practices. Correspondingly, market 
outcomes observed in the recent past reveal some notable convergence among the banking 
industry players in East Africa (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3.: Selected Market Characteristics 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bank capital to assets ratio (%) 
Burundi 11.7 13.2 14.3 14.5 13.4 13.5 
Kenya 13.6 13.3 13.6 14.3 14.2 14.4 
Rwanda 11.4 14.5 23.9 20.0 13.7 14.1 
Tanzania 10.3 10.0 10.1 10.6 10.3 10.8 
Uganda 11.3 12.8 12.7 12.4 13.0 13.0 
Bank non-performing loans to total gross loans (%) 
Burundi 9.4 7.4 8.2 9.9 10.9 17.9 
Kenya 6.3 4.4 4.6 5.0 5.5 6.0 
Rwanda 11.3 8.2 6.0 7.0 5.2 5.8 
Tanzania 7.8 5.4 6.4 5.1 6.6 6.3 
Uganda 1.9 2.0 4.1 5.8 4.0 5.1 
Risk premium on lending (lending rate minus treasury bill rate, %) 
Burundi* - - - - - - 
Kenya 10.8 6.3 7.1 8.4 7.6 5.2 
Rwanda 9.5 10.0 6.7 7.4 12.7 13.3 
Tanzania 10.7 8.6 2.8 3.5 4.2 7.3 
Uganda 15.2 7.2 10.6 13.3 11.3 6.8 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; Figures for Burundi are not available. 
The market evolution in recent years has seen technological innovation move to the core of 
the banking industry’s market dynamics. This has been evident in the development of digital 
platforms, especially mobile money, for delivery of banking services. In the next section, we 
examine the market and regulatory developments underlying the thriving mobile payment 
space in Kenya with a view to assessing its replicability across the East African region. 
2.2. Mobile Money 
Two of the East African Community economies of Kenya and Tanzania, particularly the 
former, have attracted global attention as trailblazers in mobile money. The celebrated 
success story is that of Safaricom, a Kenyan telecommunications company associated with 
the Vodafone Group, which in 2007 launched a phone-based payment scheme called M-
Pesa. In less than a decade, close to three quarters of Kenya’s adult population, which is 
estimated at 22 million, have opted to use M-Pesa for money transfer. 
Meanwhile, however, the success of mobile money has evolved into partnerships between 
mobile network operators (MNOs) and financial institutions – especially banks – that have 
enabled the mobilisation of savings and provision of loans, both facilitated by mobile 
technology. Indeed, whereas mobile money has largely been characterised as a 
technological innovation, it has actually been more of an enabler supporting an innovative 
banking model. This innovative business model arose in a context of two economies where 
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only one in four people has a bank account while eight in ten have access to a mobile 
phone4.  
The fact that mobile money has been widely acclaimed around the world owes its success to 
its noticeable contribution to financial inclusion. A question that is therefore of crucial 
interest to us is: why has the success of mobile money in Kenya not been easily replicated to 
the same extent across East Africa? The key to answering this question is that the strides 
allowed by mobile money in the area of financial inclusion in Kenya should partly be 
attributed to the synergetic partnerships between banks and MNOs. This section illustrates 
the rich institutional arrangement underlying the mobile money business model. 
2.2.A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PIONEERING MOBILE MONEY MODEL 
The mobile payment model as pioneered by M-Pesa entails a four-level institutional 
arrangement – namely the customer, the MNO agent, a trustee and a commercial bank. To 
understand how the model works, take the example of a customer seeking to undertake a 
basic payment transaction. The customer makes a cash deposit at an MNO agent in return 
for an e-float, a virtual deposit in a mobile wallet, upon showing appropriate identification 
documents. Within one minute the customer receives a confirmation text message that the 
e-float has been deposited. The customer can either exchange the e-float for cash at a future 
date or transfer the e-float to another phone. The e-float can then be encashed with an 
MNO agent. 
At the core of this model is a mechanism of ensuring that customers’ funds are safeguarded. 
Accordingly, the e-float is backed in its entirety by deposits held at commercial banks and 
the interest earned is not for the benefit of a given MNO thereby obviating the need for 
MNOs to be regulated as commercial banks in Kenya. The funds held in trust are not fungible 
with those of the service providers and are therefore safe from claim in the event of an MNO 
becoming insolvent. 
The technological novelty, which is only part of the innovative model, is simply the provision 
of access to handsets to households as well as the development of a transaction platform. 
The other important part of the model entails the design of a liquidity management tool to 
service the web of agents and their customers. The key is that the actual liquidity is provided 
by the banks’ cash management systems. Figure 2.1 provides a simplified illustration of the 
business model. 
 
  
                                                          
4 The Economist, 9 May 2015.  
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Figure 2.1.: Mobile Payment Business Model 
 
Source: Authors 
The success of the outlined basic business model in Kenya has been phenomenal. Since the 
introduction of M-Pesa in 2007, the number of agents grew from about 400 to 132 000 by 
June 2015; the number of customers similarly increased from about 21 000 to 26 million for 
the corresponding period (Figure 2.2). The increase in the number of agents and customers 
inevitably saw a rise in the number and value of transactions from a low of 22 000 and 
KES 64 million respectively in May 2007 to 90 000 000 and KES 228 billion respectively by 
June 2015 (Figure 2.2). 
The success of mobile finance arose from its pioneering payment component but what is 
critically important is that it generated a platform that allowed intermediation – savings 
mobilisation and credit provision – to thrive. Safaricom had a dominant market position, 
with a market share estimated at over 70%. This is what enabled the development of the 
ecosystem illustrated in Figure 2.1. Indeed, it has been challenging to replicate the Kenyan 
experience in countries that are not characterised by the level of dominance that Safaricom 
enjoyed in the case of Kenya. 
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Figure 2.2.: Agents and Customer Evolution 
 
Source: National Payment Statistics, Central Bank of Kenya 
The exponential growth in the volume of mobile payments gave the necessary scale for the 
birth of innovative solutions on the corresponding platform of institutional collaboration. 
Among the first innovations was the introduction of bill payment and bulk payment services, 
which enabled banks to use the mobile platform to facilitate loan disbursement and 
repayment. This was followed by the launch of card-less Automated Teller Machine (ATM) 
withdrawals. This innovation allows M-Pesa customers to access cash from a network of 
automated mobile money agents, called PesaPoint. There have been myriad other 
innovative mobile payment solutions. These range from enabling rural households to use M-
Pesa to pay for clean drinking water5 to a collaboration between a farm input producer, 
Safaricom and an insurance company to enable farmers to pay insurance premiums by M-
Pesa. 
However it is the collaboration between MNOs and banks that has attracted most attention. 
This collaboration initially led to money transfer services and subsequently to savings 
mobilisation and even to credit provision. It began in 2010 with a collaborative arrangement 
between Equity Bank – one of Kenya’s top banks – and Safaricom. They launched a product 
named M-Kesho that allowed the bank’s customers to pair their bank accounts with their M-
Pesa accounts and to transfer money between these accounts at their convenience. 
                                                          
5 See Mwangi, P.G, (2011) ”M-PESA in partnership with Grundfos for rural water provision”, thinkm-pesa.com, June. 
[http://www.thinkm-pesa.com/] 
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By 2012 however, this collaboration ran into challenges occasioned by disputes relating to 
profit-sharing among the partners, causing it to eventually stall6. Fortunately, M-Kesho gave 
way to an ever better concept that emerged from collaboration between Commercial Bank 
of Africa (CBA) – another commercial bank in Kenya – and Safaricom. The outcome, known 
as M-Shwari, is considered as an improvement upon M-Kesho in three respects. 
• First, while for M-Kesho customers were required to fill out the account opening 
forms at the premises of Equity Bank, whether in branches or with agents, with M-
Shwari customers are able to open an account electronically and remotely. 
• Secondly, the activation of the account opened is seamless. The Know-Your-
Customer (KYC) as undertaken by the MNO is used by the bank, with the latter only 
verifying its accuracy. As a result, an M-Shwari account can be opened virtually in 
real time. In contrast, with M-Kesho, each account requires a new KYC, meaning that 
it takes two days to open an account. 
• Lastly, it takes only 30 days as from the M-Shwari customer’s initial deposit for credit 
eligibility to be determined based on a score derived from mobile usage whereas it 
takes six months for a M-Kesho customer to be eligible for credit. 
According to CBA data, deposits amounting to KES 1.35 billion have been mobilised since the 
launch of M-Shwari while the bank has disbursed loans worth KES 24 billion. The success of 
M-Shwari has inspired other banks to partner with Safaricom to issue similar products. For 
instance, Kenya Commercial Bank – the largest bank in Kenya by assets – has launched a 
product called M-Benki whose characteristics are closely aligned to those of M-Shwari7. Even 
in instances where banks are neither able to mobilise deposits nor provide credit on a 
mobile platform, nearly all of them have interfaced their systems with those of MNOs to 
enable their respective customers to access their accounts for the purpose of making 
withdrawals and deposits. 
2.3. The Regulatory Regime 
In Kenya, regulation of MNOs is the responsibility of the Communications Authority of Kenya 
(CAK). The framework for regulating the communications sector in Kenya is provided for by 
the Kenya Communications Act (No. 2 of 1998) as amended by the Kenya Communications 
(Amendment) Act, 2009. It is clear that payments, which are a financial service, are not 
within the regulatory purview of the CAK. It is on that basis that Safaricom, Vodafone and 
CBA applied to the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) to authorise M-Pesa. 
The delicate balance for the CBK was to decide on the two extremes of either declining the 
application on account of a non-banking institution having no legal basis to operate payment 
services or adopt a “learn-by-doing” regulatory attitude as a basis for allowing the regulatory 
environment mature with the business. The Central Bank of Kenya Act provided a window 
for the CBK’s leaning towards the latter choice, specifically the provision that the central 
bank has the prerogative to “formulate and implement such policies as best promote the 
                                                          
6 See Ngigi, G. (2012), “M-Kesho growth stalls over hitch on profit sharing”, Business Daily, 25 March. 
[http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/M-Kesho-growth-stalls-over-hitch-on-profit-sharing--/-/539552/1373474/-/8e1xlj/-
/index.html ] 
7 See https://ke.kcbbankgroup.com/about/media/news/detail/kcb-launches-m-benki/  
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establishment, regulation and supervision of an efficient and effective clearing and 
settlement system”. 
The evaluation of the Safaricom-CBA-Vodafone application was to subject the proposal to a 
test of the compatibility of the product design with existing laws, especially the Banking Act. 
In essence the CBK had to be satisfied that Safaricom does not engage in any form of 
financial intermediation, which under the Banking Act is restricted to banks. Further, the CBK 
had to obtain the assurance of the M-Pesa promoters that there were adequate measures to 
ensure the system was secure and adequately incorporated anti-money 
laundering/countering the financing of terrorism measures. 
There was a compelling case for a legal regime to support the advances already made in 
mobile money. This was realised in the National Payment Systems (NPS) Act (2011) and 
subsequently the National Treasury NPS regulations in 2014. The NPS regulations have 
enabled the streamlining of governance and business models whereby mobile money 
business has to be undertaken by a legal entity separate from the MNO. It also allowed non-
exclusivity in mobile money distribution whereby an agent can work with multiple service 
providers, it promoted interoperability between providers and it strengthened customer 
protection measures. 
The innovative and dynamic regulatory approach to mobile payments in Kenya necessitated 
that all parties be comfortable with the system’s safety and reliability. The CBK’s letter of 
non-objection that allowed M-Pesa to commence in 2007 was not definitive insofar as 
providing that comfort was concerned. The National Treasury – then Ministry of Finance – 
undertook an audit in 2008 with a view to allaying the concern that M-Pesa featured a series 
of inherent risks which could cause heavy losses for users. The audit findings released in 
January 2009 provided the necessary comfort that the product was in no way a potential 
source of losses to users on account of inherent risks. 
2.4. Replication Across Borders Versus Promoting Cross-Border Flows 
The success of M-Pesa in Kenya has not just provided impetus for expectations of replication 
across East Africa or even wider Africa, but also highlighted the need for establishing 
whether mobile money provides a viable proposition for money transfer amongst 
households dealing in local currency or small businesses doing cross-border transactions. 
Replicating across borders may not require any form of integration if the regulatory 
environment is adequate. However, cross-border flows necessitate some form of policy 
coordination. In East Africa, expectations are naturally that the EAC integration framework is 
a sound platform for cross-border mobile payments. The EAC integration roadmap provides 
a basis for expectations on cross-border payments. As table 2.4 shows, intra-EAC trade is 
increasing, albeit in favour of Kenya. 
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Table 2.4.: Kenya's Trade with the Rest of the East African Community (USD millions) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Uganda Export 564.9 385.7 498.5 611.2 596.6 657.6 855.2 
Import 18.5 13.9 88.8 75.5 57.1 116.4 116.4 
Balance 546.4 371.8 409.7 535.8 539.5 541.2 738.8 
Tanzania Export 264.1 253.6 331.5 422.4 388.2 419.2 470.0 
Import 41.0 62.6 99.2 105.0 100.8 133.1 176.4 
Balance 223.1 191.0 232.3 317.4 287.4 286.0 293.6 
Rwanda Export 96.3 66.1 86.2 129.4 123.0 133.0 152.6 
Import 1.5 2.9 1.3 0.4 3.1 5.4 4.8 
Balance 94.8 63.2 84.9 129.1 119.9 127.5 147.9 
Burundi Export 34.0 35.4 29.4 30.3 59.3 68.9 66.5 
Import 0.4 1.2 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.8 5.3 
Balance 33.6 34.2 27.2 28.8 58.1 67.1 61.2 
Total EAC Export 974.3 735.8 952.2 1 213.4 1 167.2 1 278.7 1 544.4 
Import 61.5 84.1 191.6 182.0 162.2 256.8 302.9 
Balance 912.8  651.6  760.6  1 031.4  1 005.1  1 021.8  1 241.5  
Source: EAC Secretariat 
The direction of trade illustrated by Table 2.4 is accompanied by cross-border financial flows. 
Typically, trade flows captured in formal statistics are often associated with payments 
through the banking system. On that basis, the prioritisation of payments underpinned by 
trade or indeed intra-regional investments is typified by the promotion of the so-called East 
African Payment System (EAPS), which runs on the Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) 
system of the region’s central banks. Mobile money is inadvertently peripheral. 
Mobile payments are disenfranchised from formal trade settlement given the scope and size 
of payment. Therefore, the trends, volumes and values of informal cross-border trade (ICBT) 
are difficult to establish. Indeed, ICBT has generally been regarded as illegal 
commercialisation of cross-border activities8. However, they have the potential to be the 
ideal mode of payment for small-size and informal cross-border trade. Further, ICBT has 
substantial food security and income creation benefits especially for low-income but 
entrepreneurial households9. Mobile payments can be considered a natural conduit given 
that the value of goods traded is compatible with the M-Pesa cap of KES 70 000 (equivalent 
to USD 700).  
  
                                                          
8 Afrika, J-G, K. and Ajumbo, G. (2012). 
9 ICBT in East Africa constitutes the trade of unprocessed foodstuffs, non-food stuffs and livestock, low-quality manufactured 
and processed goods, low-quality goods from Asia, contraband, counterfeits and substandard goods; and the value of such 
goods ranges from USD 50 – USD 1 000 per annum (Afrika and Ajumbo, ibid.), 
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Table 2.5.: Value of ICBT between Uganda and its Neighbours (USD millions) 
  Exports Imports 
  2006 2009 2010 2006 2009 2010 
Kenya 96.88 102.76 94.06 63.88 43.25 37.53 
Rwanda 25.04 34.93 32.69 0.7 1.98 1.47 
Tanzania 21.52 60.93 53.69 4.26 5.64 5.07 
Source: Afrika and Ajumbo (2012) 
Further, the anticipation that regional mobile payments will thrive because of the successes 
registered at the national level is bolstered by, but not necessarily predicated on, two 
assumptions that need validation. One is the assumption that Kenya’s evidently successful 
model, from both a market and regulatory perspective, can serve as a template for the other 
economies in the region. The other is the assumption that the business case of regional 
mobile payments is at least as strong as the local business case to begin with. 
Kenya’s bold “learn-by-doing” process of introducing mobile money in response to the 
regulatory dilemma earlier noted seems to have been the approach taken in much of East 
Africa, especially by Tanzania and Rwanda, and to a limited extent Uganda. If the template is 
proven to be transposable, then the outcome ought to reflect that. However, as Figure 2.3 
shows, Kenya still remains way ahead of Tanzania and Uganda – two economies whose 
mobile money trends are consistently moving in the right direction while Rwanda and 
Burundi’s mobile payments are still nascent, with their respective ratios of mobile money to 
output being less than 4.1%. Further, in a cross-border context, risks are potentially higher 
while benefits are less likely to be immediate.  
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Figure 2.3.: Mobile Financial Transactions (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Ngendakuroyo, F. (2014) 
Within the EAC and in wider Africa, Safaricom has partnered with mobile phone service 
provider MTN in a venture that will enable its 19.5 million M-Pesa users to send and receive 
money from 19 African countries10. This follows the signing of an agreement between 
Vodafone Group and MTN Group allowing their customers across their markets in Africa and 
beyond to conduct business using the mobile money transfer platform. M-Pesa, a franchise 
now available in nine African countries, will also help MTN users access the world market 
through its 250 000 agents, thereby enabling real-time transactions from sender to receiver 
at a much lower cost. 
The collaboration between the region’s two biggest mobile money operators is meant to 
enable convenient and affordable international remittances between M-Pesa customers in 
Kenya, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, and MTN Mobile 
Money customers in Uganda, Rwanda and Zambia. However, given the challenges mobile 
money is facing from a regulatory standpoint, the move seems only aspirational.  
The most notable regulatory challenge is the May 2015 court declaration in Uganda that the 
mobile money business operated by the five major telecommunications companies in 
Uganda is illegal. In the Kenyan case the collaborative regulatory arrangement between the 
                                                          
10 http://www.africareview.com/News/Safaricom-spreads-M-Pesa-services-to-19-African-countries/-/979180/2694602/-
/i30wc5/-/index.html 
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CBK and the CAK enabled the seamless rollout of mobile money. This shows that the 
challenges at individual country level have the obvious consequence of impeding cross-
border payments. While the EAC region – except Burundi – is ahead of Sub-Saharan Africa in 
terms of the influence of mobile money on access to finance, Kenya is still significantly ahead 
of the pack (Figure 2.4). This speaks to the prioritisation of enhancing local impact before 
placing emphasis on extending mobile payments across borders. 
Figure 2.4.: Account Ownership (% of Population aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank, Global Findex Database 
 
2.4.A. CROSS-BORDER EXPANSION OF BANKS AS A POTENTIAL VEHICLE FOR CROSS-BORDER 
MOBILE MONEY 
The model depicted in Figure 2.1 and the evolution of mobile payment into the collaborative 
arrangement that promotes intermediation without infringing on the legal requirements 
speaks to the extent to which MNOs and banks are interlinked. This evolution is far from 
complete from a cross-border perspective. There are expectations that cross-border mobile 
money, at least in the context of the EAC economies, will depend on the regional expansion 
of banks originating from Kenya. 
The East African Community integration initiative aspires to create a single market in terms 
of both intra-regional investment and of being seen as a single investment destination. It is 
anticipated that the EAC framework will not only ensure a seamless flow of investments 
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between the five economies but also encourage external investments in a particular 
economy as a springboard into the rest of the region. 
The cross-border expansion of financial market players domiciled in East Africa is visible, 
particularly over the past two decades. Studies undertaken in an attempt to understand the 
motivation of the regional expansion of financial sector players in East Africa have basically 
focused on what drives the cross-border expansion of Kenya-domiciled banks into the rest of 
the East African region. 
As much of the expansion of financial institutions in the East African region has happened 
over the last two decades, it is a reasonable assumption that this is a response to the EAC 
agenda. The plausibility of this assumption could be largely ascribed to the fact that the EAC 
Partner States’ economies individually, and even collectively, exhibit small open economy 
characteristics. Therefore the EAC integration roadmap presents the promise of a bigger 
regional economy, with economies of scale arising from cross-border expansion. 
To some extent though, this assumption hinges on the fact that a number of non-financial 
institution small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as large corporates are 
expanding across the region, which could imply that if such enterprises are responding to 
the opportunities that the EAC integration agenda offers, then in turn the banks that seek to 
serve them across the region are in effect doing so as a response to the integration initiative. 
There is thus a need to ensure that the regional financial system is integrated at the level of 
the EAC, now that market players have demonstrated the desire to cross geographical 
boundaries in pursuit of opportunities. We could therefore be seeing a reverse sequencing, 
where efforts to have an integrated financial system in East Africa are essentially responding 
to the market players’ initiative to venture across borders. Even then we could argue that 
such efforts are predicated on the desire for improved efficiency, hence the move to achieve 
optimal financial and economic benefits from the expansion. 
The same argument can be stretched to mobile payments as facilitated by banks. However, 
there is no apparent agenda yet of adopting a unified regulatory framework that could 
obviate incidences such as the declaration of this crucial service as being illegal in one 
market while in another the same service is thriving. Hence, even though banks and MNOs 
will have a thriving collaboration that supports mobile payments, the lack of clarity as to 
whether the financial sector is truly integrated in the region and the differences in the 
regulatory environment that extend from mere nuances to fundamental disparities will 
continue to hamper cross-border mobile payments in East Africa. 
2.5. Conclusion 
Financial markets – in particular the banking industry, which has seen aggressive cross-
border investment from Kenya – seem to be forging ahead of the EAC integration process. 
Mobile money is clearly not following this trend given the unique regulatory requirements. 
The challenge that remains is to bring the official attitudes towards the integration process 
in line with market realities when it comes to ensuring true integration of the financial 
markets generally and payments in particular. That cross-border mobile money is at best 
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limited, informal and therefore unregulated points to a lost opportunity given that mobile 
money has proven to be a cost-effective, convenient and safe means of payment that can 
propel increased cross-border payments on the back of greater small-scale trade. 
The financial sector generally, and the banking industry in particular, has embraced mobile 
banking through strategic partnership with MNOs. However, cross-border mobile money has 
not thrived as it has at individual national levels even against the background of a fast-
tracked EAC integration agenda. The market is ahead of the regulator with the latter being 
more risk averse to the extent of constraining trade and investment opportunity especially 
amongst small businesses. 
Furthermore, mobile money is far from being considered central within the regional 
payment systems promotion agenda. This can be seen from the sequencing of the 
regionalisation of the payment system starting with Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) – 
targeting large payments – before looking in depth at retail payments. There needs to be a 
deliberate pursuit of an optimal cross-border mobile payment system that is complementary 
to the large payments system under RTGS. 
In conclusion, the regulatory regime is reactive rather than proactive in respect of the 
developments in the mobile payment space as the economies in the region are still grappling 
with the national dynamics. Granted, the regulation of mobile payments involves more than 
one regulator (entailing central banks that do not regulate MNOs and MNO regulators that 
do not regulate banks). Nonetheless there are synergies between banks and MNOs in the 
respective economies’ national payment frameworks. An exploration on how such synergies 
will be realised at regional level is critical and timely. 
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3. Banking in Southern Africa 
STUART THEOBALD1  2 
 
 Executive summary 
• The banking industry in the Southern African Development Community3 has been 
affected by the impacts of weak commodity prices, causing an increase in non-
performing loans in most markets and far tighter liquidity conditions. 
 
• Changing regulations affecting international and regional banking groups are also 
making an important impact on the strategies of banks in the region. Many 
markets are dominated by foreign-owned banks which are now looking to dispose 
of their interests. Regulators are developing new ways of thinking about the 
systemic impact of shareholders given the paucity of capital-rich global groups 
with an appetite for banks in Africa. 
 
• Changing technology in the financial sector has had a dramatic impact on 
consumer banking in the region, particularly through mobile money services. So 
far there has been limited expansion of financial services beyond payment 
services, but some mobile operators and other non-banks are offering small loans 
and savings services. In most respects, this is not disruptive innovation so much as 
finding solutions to capacity and infrastructure constraints on traditional forms of 
financial services. 
 
• In most markets, regulators have been increasingly active in driving anti-money 
laundering regulations in line with global standards. In some cases this is seen as 
critical to the banking sector’s standing in the international community and to 
maintain correspondent banking relationships. Other reform efforts such as 
improving capital adequacy, risk management and product transparency remain 
important. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Southern Africa’s banks, like most of the continent’s, have had to contend with strong 
economic headwinds driven mainly by the decline in commodity prices over the past two 
years. Several of the 15-member Southern African Development Community countries 
depend on mineral exports for much of their hard currency receipts and tax funding. The fall 
in commodity prices has led to far weaker currencies while interest rates and inflation have 
increased. Government finances have been severely challenged. In several cases, domestic 
                                                          
1 Chairman, Intellidex. 
2 The views expressed in this document are those of the author. 
3 The 15 SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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financial systems have had to fund government deficits, crowding out private sector lending. 
In short, it has been a difficult two years for the development of the region’s banking sector. 
Another important theme has been the loss of interest by global banking groups in 
maintaining African banking networks. This is motivated by global capital rules, particularly 
for those groups designated as systemically important financial institutions. More stringent 
capital rules regarding the treatment of foreign subsidiaries have made it inefficient to run 
multinational banking networks. Several SADC markets are dominated by global groups 
which are perceived as important to the systemic stability of those markets. The 
consequences for those markets are still unfolding. So far Barclays has been the most 
prominent group to officially announce it will reduce its exposure to the continent, but 
others are also thought to be readying to follow suit. 
It is likely that African networks will remain intact, with new shareholders at the holding 
company level, but even then regulation is becoming increasingly difficult for cross-border 
banks within the continent. Barclays’ African network is held through a separate entity 
publicly listed in Johannesburg, making it relatively simple for the UK-based plc to exit its 
interest. Other global groups will be more likely to sell their banks in individual markets, such 
as Angola where Portuguese banks and other investors are trying to exit. For regulators, the 
challenge is to facilitate a process that will ensure strong owners in a world in which capital-
rich shareholders have little incentive to own banks. 
The region includes both the most developed banking markets on the continent and the 
least. South Africa dominates with over 75% of all of the banking assets in SADC, while 
Mauritius offers a sophisticated smaller market, attracting several regional financial firms to 
establish head offices in the island nation4. At the other extreme, markets such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Madagascar have extremely underdeveloped banking 
sectors with almost no domestic financing capacity. For these markets the challenges are 
structural, requiring significant regulatory and legislative development to enable growth of 
banking systems. 
  
                                                          
4 Intellidex calculations, BankScope (Bureau van Dijk) 
Banking in sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and Digital Financial Inclusion 
© European Investment Bank, November 2016  69 
Table 3.1.: SADC Banking Industry Selected Statistics 
 Domestic credit to 
the private sector  
(% of GDP) 
Total assets 
(USD millions) 
% of regional 
total assets 
Angola 27.2 97 611.71 8.97% 
Botswana 33.9 18 450.46 1.69% 
DRC 6.7 4 934.67 0.45% 
Lesotho n/a 1 940.19 0.18% 
Madagascar 13.0 3 844.43 0.35% 
Mauritius 104.3 52 713.00 4.84% 
Malawi n/a 3 192.43 0.29% 
Mozambique 35.4 14 091.60 1.29% 
Namibia 53.5 18 338.29 1.68% 
Seychelles 23.9 1 952.08 0.18% 
Swaziland 20.4 2 138.82 0.20% 
Tanzania 15.4 21 056.16 1.93% 
South Africa 150.0 819 954.31 75.31% 
Zambia 19.6 12 728.65 1.17% 
Zimbabwe 25.0 15 844.79 1.46% 
Sources: World Bank, BankScope (Bureau van Dijk), International Monetary Fund, Intellidex calculations 
Note: figures are for the most recent year available, which was usually 2015 
3.2. Fintech Developments 
Like the rest of Africa, Southern Africa has seen strong innovation, particularly on the back of 
the growth of cellular telephony. Mobile phone penetration is close to 100% in many 
markets, totally changing ordinary people’s access to communications – people who have 
been long frustrated by the dearth of landline infrastructure. Financial innovation has 
embraced this channel in several ways, particularly in transactional services. In many 
markets, remittances from family members working abroad or in local urban centres are the 
key sources of cash. Cellphone-based transfer systems have drastically reduced the cost and 
inconvenience of sending money home. Some have embraced more sophisticated cellphone 
banking, including maintaining accounts and conducting transactions using phones equipped 
with mobile wallets. In some markets this has leapfrogged the credit card stage, with 
consumers now used to phone-based transactions having never developed the habit of 
paying with cards, let alone with cheques. Botswana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have been the 
most active in mobile money development in the region, with Tanzania having adopted 
Kenya’s wildly successful M-Pesa, which in some respects has evolved into the most 
sophisticated fintech market on the continent. 
Such fintech evolution has also helped with core banking infrastructure in several markets. 
MFS Africa, for example, was developed to switch payments between mobile network 
providers and banks, effectively becoming a regional switching service that had not 
previously been available. Such development is taking place outside of the formal banking 
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sector, though such fintech groups will increasingly become the “new normal” and form core 
parts of future financial sectors. 
African start-ups have been bought by international banks in order to integrate such 
technology into their core capabilities. A good example is Johannesburg-based Tyme, a 
developer of cellphone-based payment systems and wallets, which was bought by the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia, to expand its operations in India, China and Vietnam. 
However the impact of fintech has so far not extended much beyond these transactional 
services. In particular, access to credit has not seen significant innovation in markets where 
banking credit is almost non-existent. Indeed, in many such markets it is non-bank financial 
institutions, particularly those providing small unsecured loans, which are changing the 
scenario for domestic borrowers, though usually through old-fashioned branch networks. 
Weak legal systems often make the recovery of security nearly impossible, so unsecured 
lending has become dominant. Interest rates are often very high and reports of abuse, such 
as holding borrowers’ bank cards and identity documents, are common. 
High interest rates even from large formal banks are also a big deterrent to growth in private 
sector credit extension. For many banks, government paper pays a good yield while deposits 
can be accessed cheaply. There is little reason to take on the risk of private sector lending 
when margins are substantial for taking almost no risk. However, among the non-bank 
mobile operators themselves, there has been more innovation. In Tanzania, for instance, 
mobile operator Vodacom now offers small loans while competitor Tigo pays a form of 
interest to clients who save in their mobile wallets. 
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Table 3.2.: Mobile Subscriptions Compared to Fixed Broadband Subscriptions 
 Fixed broadband 
subscriptions 
(per 100 people)  
Mobile cellular 
subscriptions 
(per 100 
people) 
Angola 0.4 63.5 
Botswana 1.6 167.3 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.0 53.5 
Lesotho 0.1 85.0 
Madagascar 0.1 41.2 
Malawi 0.1 33.5 
Mauritius 14.6 132.2 
Mozambique 0.1 69.8 
Namibia 1.8 113.8 
Seychelles 12.7 162.2 
South Africa 3.2 149.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4 71.0 
Swaziland 0.4 72.3 
Tanzania 0.2 62.8 
Zambia 0.1 67.3 
Zimbabwe 1.0 80.8 
Source: World Bank 
Note: 2014 data 
Fintech has the potential to crack some of the difficult problems facing SADC financial 
markets but, apart from the impact on remittances, this has not yet borne fruit. Areas where 
fintech could have a big impact are the identification of clients and the use of phones to 
geolocate clients in markets where land records and street addresses are not available. 
There are some signs that working capital for SMEs could be facilitated using phones as 
entrepreneurs manage all of their transactions through phone-based systems and generate 
good records of cash flow patterns. Farmers, also, could get working capital support while 
phone-based apps could link them directly to buyers with whom they can lock in future 
prices, eliminating risk and the long chain of middlemen who normally straddle the small 
farming value chain. Others are finding ways to offer more efficient savings and insurance 
products. 
Africa’s many entrepreneurs may well figure out other ways to use the growth in access to 
communications to overcome other barriers to accessing financial services. Fintech can find 
ways around barriers that currently exist to banking services, such as limited credit bureau 
records, branch infrastructure and points of sale devices. The data that accumulate through 
phone-based transactions could lead to new ways of understanding client risk profiles that 
could facilitate credit access. 
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Unlike other banking markets, fintech is less of a source of disruption than it is a source of 
previously unavailable financial services. The one potentially disruptive innovation would be 
new ways of mobilising savings that give consumers better returns for their money. 
Incumbent banks in many African markets pay little to depositors, using the retail base as a 
source of deposits to fund lending to government and low-risk corporate clients. 
Fintech, as in many other markets, also has to be facilitated by evolving regulation. Often, 
weak or absent regulations can be a boon for innovation in African financial services, but 
tight controls over deposit-taking or transactional services can retard development. 
Responsive regulators are essential. 
In this and other respects regulations and political leadership will remain critical to future 
market development. Economic development will increase balance sheets, risk appetite and 
the depth of capital markets. Fintech has already made a big impact on consumers’ lives and 
could find ways to break through the current barriers to further financial services 
penetration in the consumer sector. 
3.3. Prospects for the Sector 
The downward turn of the commodity cycle two years ago has led to sharply weaker growth 
in the SADC region. GDP growth forecasts have been revised downward several times. The 
two largest economies in the region, South Africa and Angola, may well already be in 
recession. This trend is prevalent across the subcontinent. After registering growth of 5.1% 
in 2014, Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to deliver growth of 3.0% in 2016, rising to 4.0% in 
20175. 
The exposure to commodities differs by market. Angola is heavily dependent on oil, Zambia 
on copper, Botswana on diamonds. South Africa has sizeable platinum, iron ore, gold and 
other mineral output. All of these have seen significant negative price movements, inducing 
economic distress in those markets. Angola and Zambia, for example, have seen sharp 
depreciation of their currencies, weaker current accounts and growing budget deficits. Both 
have been in discussions with the International Monetary Fund for financial support. The 
Zimbabwean government is facing arguably the worst fiscal crisis in its history as an 
independent state, with payments to civil servants delayed several times. 
                                                          
5 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook April 2016 
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Figure 3.1.: Selected Commodity Prices 
 
Source: Inet BFA 
Note: Based to 100 at the start 
There have been several consequences for the banking sector. First, many banks have large 
exposures to new projects in development, particularly new oil developments in Angola and 
Tanzania, which are not viable at current prices. While most of the exposures to the largest 
investments are held by global banks, it has been a development priority to include the 
domestic financial sectors in such projects. This is particularly a risk for the regional banking 
groups. Provisions have had to be made as a result, damaging banking returns. Second, the 
strain on government finances has often resulted in increased dependency on domestic 
funding, with available liquidity diverted to government borrowing. That has crowded out 
lending to the private sector. Third, in commodity-exposed markets several major employers 
in the mining sector have responded by scaling back operations, leaving thousands of 
workers redundant. Particularly in the case of South Africa where consumer lending is most 
developed, that has put strain on household budgets and further damaged banks’ credit 
performance. Fourth, several large mining groups have found themselves overleveraged in 
the weak price environment, triggering urgent equity fund raising, such as by Lonmin, a 
platinum producer in South Africa, in order to avoid defaulting to the banks. Other miners 
have scaled back borrowing while suspending capital expenditure projects. 
Commodity prices now appear to have bottomed out with some having recovered 
tentatively this year. The resources sector is generally much more efficient than it was two 
years ago, having focused on cost-reduction programmes. Capital expenditure has been 
directed to operations which are lowest on the cost curve. This positions the resources 
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sector well for a rebound in profitability as prices recover. Angola has paused its discussions 
with the IMF as oil revenues have slowly recovered. Zambia, however, is likely to have an 
IMF programme in place by the end of the year. 
Table 3.3.: Key Banking and Economic Statistics* 
 GDP at 
market prices 
(constant 
2010  
USD billions) 
GDP 
growth 
(annual %) 
Gross 
domestic 
savings 
(% of GDP) 
Interest rate 
spread (lending 
rate minus 
deposit rate; %) 
Year 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 
Angola 104 4.8 3.0 22.3 13.6 
Botswana 16 3.2 -0.3 37.7 5.4 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 30 9.0 6.9 14.3 15.7 
Lesotho 0 3.6 n/a n/a 8.3 
Madagascar 10 3.1 3.0 10.1 45.0 
Malawi 9 5.7 3.0 6.5 32.8 
Mauritius 12 3.6 3.5 11.5 2.4 
Mozambique 14 7.4 6.3 1.0 6.3 
Namibia 15 6.3 5.7 12.1 4.6 
Seychelles 1 3.3 3.5 22.2 9.2 
South Africa 416 1.5 1.3 18.5 3.3 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1 654 4.6 3.0 18.3 n/a 
Swaziland 4 2.5 1.7 n/a 6.8 
Tanzania 44 7.0 7.0 20.6 6.2 
Zambia 26 5.0 3.2 n/a 4.3 
Zimbabwe 13 3.8 1.1 -12.2 n/a 
Source: World Bank 
Short-term banking sector developments depend on the relief that higher commodity prices 
would bring. If the recent improvement is sustained, both corporate and retail customers 
would see improvements to their debt service capability. But the main benefit would be a 
repair in government finances as revenue returns from mining-related taxes recover and 
foreign exchange is generated. That should allow interest rates to come down and improve 
liquidity in the banking sectors, stimulating more private sector borrowing. The development 
of Africa’s consumer sector would resume with a return to growth of the middle class. 
In smaller markets such as Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, efforts could then resume in 
developing domestic capital markets. While those three markets, and most of the rest of the 
region with the notable exception of Angola, now have stock exchanges, these suffer from a 
lack of liquidity. Only South Africa’s Johannesburg Stock Exchange has sufficient volumes of 
trade for genuine price discovery. Mauritius and Namibia are the next largest but have not 
even 1% of the JSE’s volumes. Given the limited investor interest, the cost of equity is high 
and few companies have attempted to use the equity markets for funding. 
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Generally, the regulatory infrastructure that has been established is good, but the necessary 
reforms to the savings industry have not been undertaken, particularly the promotion of 
formal retirement savings. In most markets only employees of multinationals, civil servants 
and the largest domestic formal companies systematically contribute to retirement savings. 
The stock exchanges have also recently seen plummeting foreign interest as a result of 
weaker economic prospects and falling currencies. Outside of South Africa, corporate bond 
issuance is almost non-existent, despite regulatory efforts to open capital markets for them. 
Consequently, banks tend to rely on deposits and wholesale funding, with domestic capital 
markets ill-equipped to provide much equity or debt. 
From a regional perspective, SADC member countries have been working towards greater 
co-operation in regulatory oversight through the Committee of Central Bank Governors in 
SADC. The momentum towards better integration of financial systems may weaken 
somewhat given the slowdown in development of regional banks. 
3.4. Country Comments 
The remainder of this chapter briefly surveys developments in key markets of the region. 
3.4.1. ANGOLA 
The country has been severely affected by the rapid decline of oil prices. That has driven a 
shortage of hard currency which has hampered a financial sector that is substantially 
dollarised. Inflation has risen along with the weakness in the domestic currency and has 
recently accelerated to over 35%6. The banks have had to contend with a far more rigorous 
regulatory environment that has driven increased capital levels and sharply stricter anti-
money laundering regulations. Angola has been criticised internationally for weak anti-
money laundering standards which has already led to some international banks cutting their 
correspondent relationships, worsening the dollar shortage. Only two Angolan banks have 
USD commercial banking relationships. 
The European Central Bank has also instructed European banks to reduce exposure to 
Angola, which has directly affected several Portuguese banks. The ECB’s move came after 
the collapse of Banco Espirito Santo, Portugal’s second-biggest bank, which owned 55% of 
an Angolan subsidiary. When the European bank collapsed, Angola’s central bank took the 
bank into curatorship along with a EUR 3.3bn credit line. The credit was initially thought by 
the Portuguese central bank to be recoverable.  
However, the Angolan bank was recapitalised, leading to a dilution of the Portuguese 
interests to insignificance and the credit line has had to be written off amid some diplomatic 
tension. Angolan exposure has since been seen as a serious risk to the Portuguese banking 
sector and a few banks are trying to secure sales of their Angolan interests. 
                                                          
6 Banco Nacional de Angola http://www.bna.ao/default.aspx 
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Figure 3.2.: Angolan USD Exchange Rate and Domestic Inflation 
 
Sources: Angola Department of Finance, Bloomberg 
With around 20 banks in operation in the country, there has also been a need to consolidate 
in a market with total assets of about USD 100 billion. The consolidation effort has so far 
resulted in one big merger, that of Banco Millennium Angola and Banco Privado Atlantico, 
finalised in May, to create the second-largest privately held bank. Non-performing loans vary 
widely between the banks, but those that have reported recently show NPLs of 3% to 4% of 
their books. Asset growth has remained strong despite the difficult conditions, with most 
banks reporting 30% and higher year-on-year growth. That asset growth has likely helped to 
keep NPLs lower as a proportion of the total book, so the impact of economic conditions is 
not yet clear.  
Angola had turned to the IMF for support following a collapse in government revenue on the 
back of the oil price decline. The IMF support may have come with a reform programme to 
help develop the Angolan banking sector. However in June the talks were terminated. 
Angola has been able to raise substantial funding from Chinese and Korean lenders though it 
will take sustained improvement in oil prices for the country to be able to continue avoiding 
an IMF package. 
3.4.2. BOTSWANA 
Botswana has one of the region’s best developed and regulated banking sectors and capital 
markets. It is dominated by foreign-controlled banks, particularly South Africa’s First 
National Bank and Standard Bank, and UK banks Barclays and Standard Chartered, which 
make up four of the five biggest banks in the country and hold 90% of the industry’s assets. 
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The sector has suffered along with the rest of the economy in the face of sharply weaker 
diamond prices, with real GDP shrinking by 0.3% in 20157. That is expected to recover this 
year to 3.7% growth. Apart from weaker diamond prices the market has suffered from a 
drought, leading to water shortages and an electricity shortage (with much electricity 
generation dependent on water availability). 
The banking sector has seen an uptick in non-performing loans with NPLs at 3.9% of lending 
books in 2015 and an accompanying fall in profitability driven by sharply reduced interest 
margins. Nevertheless, Botswana’s banks remained profitable with an average return on 
equity of 13.3% in 2015, down from 19.1% in 20148. 
Botswana has seen reasonably high penetration of mobile phone payment services with 21% 
of the adult population having used a mobile money account in the past year, according to 
the World Bank’s 2014 Findex study. This has largely been driven by established banks 
providing mobile channels for clients. 
3.4.3. MAURITIUS 
After South Africa, Mauritius has the most sophisticated banking industry in the region. Its 
population has the highest level of financial inclusion on several measures including home 
lending. The island’s economy is driven by its services sector including financial services, 
technology and tourism, as well as manufacturing and construction activity. As a commodity 
importer, the price cycle has had the opposite effect on it compared with the rest of the 
region, though weak international conditions have an indirect negative impact on trade and 
services consumption. Overall in 2015 GDP growth was reported at 3.5% with 3.9% forecast 
for 20169, with further growth constrained by the negative global business cycle, of which 
weaker commodity prices are also a consequence. 
The banking sector has remained stable throughout the period with consumer and corporate 
lending volumes staying constant, though the non-performing loan ratio grew sharply to 
13% of total loans at the end of 2015 from 5.9% a year earlier. 
The Mauritian financial sector is split between domestic banks and foreign-owned banks, 
many of which operate from Mauritius’s offshore financial centre, with the assets of the 
industry divided evenly between them. Return on equity for the sector was 12.1% as at the 
end of 2015, a strong performance relative to the rest of the region, though sharply down on 
the 20% plus levels achieved a few years earlier10. The sector has significant cross-border 
exposures, particularly to India, making the risk dynamic for Mauritius unique. The banks are 
strongly capitalised with an average capital adequacy ratio of 16.5% at the end of 2014. 
Mauritius has a comprehensive development plan aimed to position the country as a high 
income economy by 2025. The government is implementing a comprehensive programme to 
                                                          
7 Bank of Botswana, Bank Supervision Annual Report 2015 
8 Bank of Botswana 
9 Statistics Mauritius, National Accounts Estimates, June 2016 
10 Bank of Mauritius, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Report, May 2016 
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diversify the economy and improve its global competitiveness. Financial services are a key 
part of that, with Mauritius’s status as an offshore financial centre set to grow alongside the 
growth of trade in services in general. The financial sector is broadly construed with 
regulation that is open-minded about non-banks entering financial services. Mauritius 
therefore presents itself as an ideal market to launch regional fintech businesses. It has no 
exchange control and a variety of attractive tax incentives for financial services companies. 
This has occasionally raised questions about Mauritius’s status as a tax haven, particularly by 
India, which receives a significant volume of inward investment from the island nation from 
entities that choose to base themselves there. The tax advantage for doing so, however, was 
largely eliminated by a new treaty signed earlier this year which may negatively impact 
Mauritius as a location for financial services intermediaries servicing India. From a SADC 
perspective, however, Mauritius is a full member enjoying all of the rights that come with it.  
3.4.4. SOUTH AFRICA 
With over three quarters of the SADC region’s banking assets, South Africa dominates the 
sub-region’s banking industry. Its banks are all highly active in the rest of the continent and 
look set to maintain that activity despite the increasing regulatory burden faced by regional 
banks. The continent’s two biggest banking networks, Standard Bank and Barclays, are both 
run from Johannesburg. The planned exit of Barclays plc from its African subsidiary will leave 
Barclays Africa as a standalone African banking network listed and run from Johannesburg. 
Domestic conditions, however, have been difficult. South Africa has been negatively affected 
by the commodity price slump while political moves with a direct impact on the financial 
policy environment have been very negative. The country narrowly averted the loss of its 
investment grade rating in June, but could face a downgrade come December. Electricity 
shortages for several years have been relieved but largely thanks to a fall in demand. GDP 
growth is expected to be around 0% this year and unemployment has risen to record levels. 
Certain large corporate exposures, particularly platinum producer Lonmin and cement 
producer PPC, have had to be restructured and recapitalised in order to protect bank 
exposures. So far those have been successful. 
Despite this, bank profitability has so far remained robust, with return on equity at the end 
of 2015 of 17.1%, a multi-year high11. Profitability has been supported by steadily increasing 
net interest margins as the banks have aggressively repriced risk since the global financial 
crisis severely damaged banks’ credit performance. Following severe losses in 2009, 
particularly in home lending, competitive pressures abated and banks all increased the 
margins they charged over their prime rates. Impairments have also been on a downward 
trend over the past few years as banks have aggressively worked the highest risk clients off 
their books, though at the time of writing, the latest results from the banks were showing 
that this trend is reversing. 
                                                          
11 South African Reserve Bank, Bank Supervision Annual Report 2015 
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The sector has faced several anti-money laundering enforcement actions including large 
fines levied by the South African Reserve Bank on many of the major local and foreign banks 
over the last few years. This has driven an aggressive compliance effort at all the banks that 
has led to accounts of several prominent individuals and companies being closed. The efforts 
look set to secure South Africa’s reputation for the high regulatory quality of its banking 
system. 
Another major development for the sector has been the successful restructuring of African 
Bank which collapsed in 2014 following very large impairments to its personal unsecured 
loan books. A bad bank/good bank structure was created and came to fruition in early 2016, 
with a new African Bank now in commercial operation. Bond holders were required to take a 
10% haircut and subordinated debt holders significantly more, while the government has 
guaranteed the liabilities linked to the bad book left behind. The resolution on the whole has 
successfully protected creditors to the bank. 
While South Africa’s banks are highly active in the rest of the continent, domestic economic 
performance remains the critical driver for the banks. A commodity price recovery would be 
highly positive, as would several promised structural reforms from the government that will 
unlock potential in mining and tourism development. Should the government deliver, the 
prospects would look reasonably good for the banks. As it stands, the uptick in non-
performing loans indicates that the difficult economic environment is translating into client 
distress. Should the economy not recover, bank profitability is sure to drift lower. 
3.4.5. TANZANIA 
Tanzania has a large, fragmented banking market with 34 full-service banks and 
12 community banks operating, with the four largest banks holding 50% of assets. The Bank 
of Tanzania has been making an effort to drive the sector towards consolidation by requiring 
higher capital ratios, but few transactions have taken place. The central bank has also put 
significant pressure on banks to improve transparency and anti-money laundering processes. 
Tanzania has the highest penetration of mobile money services in the SADC region, thanks 
primarily to neighbouring Kenya where the highly successful M-Pesa money transfer service 
was developed. Some 34% of adult Tanzanians used a mobile service to transfer money in 
the previous 12 months according to a 2014 World Bank study,12 the second highest after 
Kenya in Africa. More recent figures suggest about 60% of adults have a mobile money 
account while just 15% have a bank account. This positions Tanzania among the most active 
mobile money markets in the world. 
In some respects, Tanzania has overtaken Kenya in the depth of mobile financial services 
that are now available in the market. It has been particularly successful because payments 
can be made across multiple networks, so the market is not reliant on a single standard like 
M-Pesa. It has also gone further in offering loan and savings products over mobile. The 
largest network operator, South Africa’s Vodacom, brought M-Pesa into the country and has 
                                                          
12 World Bank Findex study, 2014 
 80   © European Investment Bank, November 2016 
now introduced M-Pawa for smaller loans, saying Tanzanians have borrowed USD 19.5 
million through the small loans13. Tanzanians can also save in their mobile money accounts 
and receive a form of interest from mobile operator Tigo (though it is described as a “profit 
distribution” so as to not fall under banking regulations), which has also recently launched a 
lending service with loans of an average size of USD 514. This has the potential to shift the 
way credit works in the country, with banks having so far had a limited impact, particularly in 
the consumer sector. 
Private sector credit extension is only 15.4% though formal banks have traditionally relied on 
the retail sector for deposits, which could be disrupted by the development of fintech. 
Consumer lending has increasingly been undertaken by licensed unsecured lenders, for 
whom the mobile operators may pose a threat. The country illustrates just how a banking 
market can leapfrog payment stages – few banking clients have ever held a credit card or 
cheque book and most likely never will, while almost everyone has at least seen mobile 
payments in action. 
Generally, the difficult commodity market has had an impact on Tanzania, forcing it to 
tighten monetary conditions to defend the currency. Interest rates shot up and liquidity was 
drained from the banking sector by doubling statutory reserve requirements to 10%. 
However, most recent government figures show reasonable growth in money supply while 
the government has largely avoided drawing funding from the private sector. The banking 
sector remains profitable and GDP growth, while down from highs of over 10% a few years 
ago, was still 7% last year. While the sector still needs to build banks of sufficient scale to be 
able to take on large ticket financing, it remains a vibrant and profitable market place. 
3.4.6. ZAMBIA 
Zambia’s banking market is small but active and well regulated. It is dominated by foreign-
owned majors and has remained profitable despite a rapid deterioration in economic 
conditions since 2015. Because of low copper prices, the main mineral resource, the 
government’s budget deficit worsened substantially during the year. That was compounded 
by a major electricity shortage leading to rolling blackouts. Zambia has successfully 
conducted three Eurobond issues over the last four years, though the weaker economy 
caused yields on the Eurobonds to spike. The government has begun discussions with the 
IMF to secure a funding package which could be in place by the end of the year. At the time 
of writing, once the August election is behind it, the government is expected to have scope 
for unpopular fiscal decisions including ending subsidies on fuel and electricity. 
The worsening fiscal outlook drove a major fall in the value of the currency, which has 
worsened the government’s balance sheet given USD 4 billion of hard currency liabilities 
linked to the Eurobonds. The exchange rate depreciation triggered inflation in the partly 
dollarised economy, which led the central bank to significantly tighten monetary conditions, 
increasing interest rates and statutory reserve ratios. The government tapped the domestic 
                                                          
13 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e8b56ee-41ca-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1.html#axzz4HDXDkfMx 
14 http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/751/142394.html 
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financial sector for funding at yields close to 28%. The banking sector, which obtains low-
cost funding from a wide consumer deposit base, has been able to generate strong local 
currency returns, but developments in the banking system to improve consumer lending 
have stalled as a result. 
Figure 3.3.: Zambian Inflation, Exchange Rate and Treasury Bill Yields 
 
Sources: Zambia Central Statistical Office, Bank of Zambia, Bloomberg 
The IMF programme will relieve liquidity conditions and may be accompanied by other 
efforts to promote private sector development. GDP growth was 5% last year and is 
expected to decline to 2.7% this year. The power crisis is abating as new projects come on 
stream and copper prices have recovered slightly. New copper operations are due to open 
that will be profitable even at current prices. As such, conditions in Zambia are expected to 
be far better as from next year. 
3.4.7. Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s long-suffering banking sector has taken a turn for the worse. In recent months 
the government’s financial position has been close to collapse, with civil servant and even 
armed forces salaries paid late. This is due to a massive shortage of hard currency in the 
country which ‘de facto’ dollarised in 2009 following the collapse of its own currency. 
The currency shortage is in part due to weak commodity markets but also a massive drought 
that constrained what little commercial agriculture that remains. Both the private sector and 
the government struggle to raise any finance from abroad, with the state in arrears on 
USD 1.8bn of loans from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank. The government has attempted to re-engage the IMF with the hope of 
securing some form of rescue deal, but this has not yet resulted in an agreement.  
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The government has faced widespread and organised protests after civil servant salaries 
were paid late earlier this year. There is virtually no employment outside of the civil service, 
with millions reliant on millions more working outside the country to send back remittances. 
For several years the banking sector has been told it has to “indigenise”, which means 
transfer majority ownership to Zimbabweans. Most of the banks in the country are foreign-
owned. The policy was clarified earlier in 2016 and banks are no longer officially facing the 
threat of having to transfer majority ownership, though certain ministers have privately 
continued to insist that indigenisation of the banks must go ahead. Given that the biggest 
challenge facing the country is a shortage of foreign currency, the foreign ownership of the 
banks is one of very few international linkages Zimbabwe still has.  
Most of the foreign parent banks have effectively valued their Zimbabwean subsidiaries at 
zero and deconsolidated them. They retain nominal ownership based on the view that 
eventually Zimbabwe will have to turn the corner. With the government now facing the 
biggest crisis ever, that corner may come soon. 
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4. Development of the Banking Sector in West Africa and 
Central Africa in an Era of Financial Digitalisation 
JAD BENHAMDANE, AMINE EL KOURCHI, SAID HIDANE 1 
 
 Executive summary 
• The activity of the banking system of the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) continues to be positive, marked in 2014 by growth in resources 
and an increase in bank assets, including a 15% rise in customer loans. 
Furthermore, changes to the legal framework and the strengthening of banking 
supervision requested by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) will 
help to form the basis of a modern system, tailored to the new challenges facing 
the region. 
 
• With a slight increase in gross customer loans (+8%), the banking sector of the 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) continues to be 
driven by oil price fluctuations. At end-March 2015, against the backdrop of a 
decline in energy revenues, the loss ratio rose by 2% in one year to 11.9%. 
Diversification of risk and increased banking penetration are the next challenges 
facing the banking sector in the region. 
 
• The challenges of financial inclusion in West Africa and Central Africa continue to 
be of vital importance given that their banking penetration rates are among the 
lowest in the world, particularly in the CFA franc monetary zone. Currently, the 
promotion of digitalised services – for transferring, withdrawing and depositing 
money and making loan applications – in these areas with high levels of mobile 
penetration is the key initiative for improving access to banking services. It should 
be noted, however, that the regulatory framework is more favourable in West 
Africa. 
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4.1. Analysis of Recent Trends in the Banking Sector in West Africa 
4.1.1. MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND: SUSTAINED GROWTH 
4.1.1.A. A POLITICAL TURNING POINT TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES RELATING TO 
TERRORISM 
In 2015, the political landscape in West Africa was marked by a number of major events. In 
March the election in Nigeria was peaceful and was won by the opposition candidate, 
M. Buhari. He has made combating terrorism in the north of the country the number one 
priority during his mandate and convinced Niger, Chad and Cameroon of the need to 
safeguard security in the region. 
Later in the year, the presidential elections in Togo and Côte d’Ivoire also went off 
peacefully. The presidential elections in Guinea and Burkina Faso played out differently, 
however, and were the scene of protests.  
4.1.1.B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WAEMU ON THE UP WHILST ECOWAS 
STAGNATED 
West Africa remains the second most dynamic region in sub-Saharan Africa after East Africa, 
with a rate of expansion of just over 4% in 2015 compared to nearly 6% in 2014. The rate of 
GDP growth was therefore above average compared to the rest of the continent (3% in 2015 
and 3.4% in 2014). 
Furthermore, inflation has remained at a moderate level – around 1% in 2015 – thanks to an 
improvement in the terms of trade. With reference to BCEAO’s key interest rate – which has 
remained at 2.5% since September 2013 – the monetary policy of the WAEMU countries has 
remained accommodative.  
With economic growth of 7% in 2015, the WAEMU2 zone leads the way as the economic 
engine of West Africa. Its eight member countries have thus shown their ability to continue 
their economic integration whilst advancing the process of diversifying and enhancing the 
business climate. For its part, ECOWAS3 – the Economic Community of West African States – 
recorded a lower rate of economic growth, estimated at 3.2% in 2015, which was heavily 
impacted by the drop in oil prices. 
                                                          
2 Member countries of WAEMU: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo. 
3 Member countries of ECOWAS: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
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Figure 4.1.: GDP Growth in West Africa (as a %) 
 
Source: IMF 
Disparities within West Africa itself show that there are different levels of development. 
With its population of 179 million, Nigeria has a bigger GDP than the sum of the GDPs of the 
other countries in the region. Meanwhile, Côte d’Ivoire had the best performance in West 
Africa in terms of economic growth in 2015. 
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Table 4.1.: West Africa Indicators in 2015 (selected countries) 
 
Population 
(in millions) 
Real GDP 
(in USD billions) 
GDP PPP 
per capita (USD) 
Benin 11 8.5 2 113 
Burkina Faso 18 11 1 723 
Côte d’Ivoire 24 31.2 3 316 
Ghana 27 36 4 266 
Guinea-Bissau 2 1 1 508 
Guinea 12 6.7 1 214 
Mali 16 13 2 199 
Niger 18 7.1 1 080 
Nigeria 179 490 6 108 
Senegal 15 13.7 2 451 
Togo 7.3 4.2 1 483 
Source: IMF 
 
4.1.1.C. DECLINE IN RAW MATERIAL PRICES: MIXED IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS 
DEPENDING ON THE COUNTRY 
The sustained drop in the price of raw materials and oil since mid-2014 has had a mixed 
impact on West African countries. Overall, the WAEMU countries were able to reduce their 
energy bill and improve their export revenue, with cocoa and peanut prices remaining 
buoyant. The budgetary situation of Nigeria – and to a lesser extent, Ghana – deteriorated as 
oil revenue decreased. Overall, the region's current trade account fell from 0.7% of GDP in 
2013 to a deficit of -3.7% in 2015. 
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Figure 4.2.: Public Accounts within ECOWAS (as a % of GDP) 
 
Source: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
4.1.2. KEY BANKING SECTOR TRENDS WITHIN WAEMU: GRADUAL INTEGRATION OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES FOR SUSTAINED BUSINESS GROWTH 
4.1.2.A. A SECTOR BASED AROUND FIVE BANKING PLAYERS 
The number of credit institutions has been growing constantly, reaching 132 at end-2014 
compared to 127 in 2013; Côte d’Ivoire was the country that had the most (25). The 
economic environment has been conducive to the internal expansion of the banking 
network, which now numbers 2 306 branches, offices and points of sale, with a total of 2 571 
ATMs in the eight member countries. 
In terms of business, there are 26 banking groups active in WAEMU which together hold 
nearly 86% of all assets and aggregate net profit. Ecobank (15.3% of total assets) and BMCE 
BOA (11.9%) are the leading groups, followed by Société Générale (9.4%), ABI (9.4%) and 
Attijariwafa Bank (7.7%), which points to the successful strategy of pan-African banks – 
primarily Moroccan in origin – in the region. At 31 December 2014, the Attijariwafa Bank 
Group posted a pre-tax profit of USD 629 million, followed by Ecobank (USD 395 million) and 
Banque Centrale Populaire (USD 359 million). 
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Table 4.2.: Leading Banking Groups in WAEMU at End-2014 
 
Number of branches 
Market 
share Counters ATMs* 
Ecobank 8 15.3% 259 547 
BMCE BOA 8 11.9% 213 248 
Société Générale 4 9.4% 144 210 
Atlantic Business 
International 
(ABI) 7 
9.4% 
183 190 
Attijariwafa Bank 7 7.7% 244 235 
BNP Paribas 4 4.9% 99 160 
Diamond Bank 4 3.9% 38 38 
Oragroup 10 3.7% 71 65 
United Bank for 
Africa (UBA) 4 
 
3 63 88 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
Note: * Automated teller machines 
4.1.2.B. BALANCE SHEET ANALYSIS: INCREASED BANKING PENETRATION RATES LINKED 
TO GROWTH IN RESOURCES AND ASSETS 
Despite WAEMU's banking activity being one of the least dynamic in sub-Saharan Africa, it 
has continued to grow over the years. Of the 132 banks in the zone, 121 came under the 
umbrella of WAEMU’s financial analysis. The aggregate balance sheet total increased by over 
18% in 2014 compared to 2013. These banks’ total assets amounted to CFAF 23.734 trillion 
(USD 43.9 billion4) in 2014. This trend was very prominent in Mali (+27.7%), Côte d’Ivoire 
(+21.6%) and Niger (+17.8%). 
Net bank assets grew by more than 19% in 2014 to CFAF 19.76 trillion (USD 36.5 billion). 
Outstanding loans to bank customers accounted for more than 65% of this item and grew by 
over 15% to CFAF 12.905 trillion (USD 23.8 billion). All business sectors in the WAEMU zone 
benefited from the increase in lending, especially the mining, energy and tertiary sectors, 
while retail, catering and hotel-related business accounted for more than 30% of total 
commitments in 2014.  
                                                          
4 According to the exchange rate applicable at 31/12/2014, CFAF 1 = USD 0.0018. 
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Aggregate revenue grew by 16% to CFAF 18.924 trillion (USD 35 billion) in 2014. Accounting 
for over 83% of the total, customer deposits amounted to CFAF 15.885 trillion (USD 29.4 
billion) in 2014.  
Figure 4.3.: WAEMU – Bank Penetration 
 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
4.1.2.C. STRUCTURAL BALANCE SOUGHT IN TERMS OF APPLICATION AND SOURCE OF 
FUNDS 
BCEAO – the Central Bank of West African States – has not changed its key interest rates 
since 2013. The minimum bid rate for tender operations in respect of liquidity injections is 
thus fixed at 2.5% whilst the interest rate for the marginal lending window is 3.5%. At the 
same time, and owing to the regulatory requirements of the Central Bank – with the 
standard required for the ratio for the coverage of medium and long-term application of 
funds by long-term sources of funds fixed at 50% – short-term loans continue to account for 
the lion's share of outstanding loans. However, the increase of the share of medium-term 
loans from 34% in 2009 to 37% in 2014 suggests a bigger role for banking intermediation and 
greater support for the productive sectors of the region’s economies. The structure of 
sources of funds shows that the breakdown between demand deposits and term deposits is 
balanced.  
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Figure 4.4.: WAEMU – Structure of Lending to the Economy 
Structure of lending in 2009 
 
Structure of lending in 2014 
 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
4.1.2.D. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: BANKING SECTOR MORE PROFITABLE 
In 2014, NBI (net banking income) totalled CFAF 1.35 trillion (USD 2.4 billion) compared to 
CFAF 1.201 trillion (USD 2.2 billion) in 2013, chiefly driven by the rise in customer loans. As a 
result, operating profit increased by more than 21% over the same period. Net profit on 
banking activity in WAEMU amounted to CFAF 270 billion (USD 500 million) in 2014, up 43% 
compared to the previous year.  
WAEMU's banking sector thus generated a return on equity (ROE) after tax of some 12.8% in 
2014 versus 10.1% in 2013. This positive trend was mainly driven by the region's strong 
economic growth combined with the rise in customer loans and the fact that overheads 
increased at a slower pace (+8.7% compared to 2013 according to the Bank of France). The 
downward trend observed between 2011 and 2012 was attributable to measures 
implemented by the banks to restructure non-performing loans. 
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Figure 4.5.: Average ROE between 2010 and 2014 (as a %) 
 
Source: WAEMU Banking Commission 
4.1.2.E. INCREASED BANKING AND FINANCIAL SUPERVISION TO MAINTAIN THE UNION'S 
CHARACTERISTIC RESILIENCE 
WAEMU's banking space is now focused on enhancing its regulatory framework. Firstly, the 
application of prudential ratios under the Basel II/III reform, as decided by WAEMU on 3 July 
2014, is essential given that banks are currently only applying Basel I standards and the 
Cooke ratio for a minimum capital ratio of 8%. Furthermore, as decided on 30 March 2015, 
as from 1 July 2017 banks will have to increase their minimum share capital to 
CFAF 10 billion (more than USD 18.6 million) compared to CFAF 5 billion at present. 
The June 2013 stress test exercise evaluating WAEMU revealed that the banking system was 
generally resilient but that certain vulnerabilities still existed. 
• Credit risk: any deterioration of the credit or default risk associated with the 
concentration of loans would have serious consequences for Benin, Togo or Guinea-
Bissau, thus explaining the authorities’ desire to raise the capital requirements of 
banks. 
• Asset quality: given the current rate of gross non-performing loans (14% in 2014), 
banks in the WAEMU zone might be sensitive to a fresh decline in the quality of their 
loan portfolio. At the same time, the level of provisioning is difficult to assess due to 
differing accounting rules; provisions must be set aside for arrears of 180 days 
instead of 90 days as recommended by international standards.   
• Sovereign risk: more than half of WAEMU’s banks may be faced with liquidity issues, 
with a capital ratio that would fall below the minimum rate of 8% in the event of 
partial default on sovereign bonds. Banks are increasingly lending to governments at 
present – this type of loan now makes up 20% of banks’ assets – whilst WAEMU's 
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injections of short-term liquidity are rising, accounting for 9% of liabilities according 
to the Central Bank's report. Furthermore, the average volume of interbank 
operations remains relatively low, representing around 6% of the average amount of 
WAEMU's injections of liquidity. 
• The money market was expected to receive a boost with the November 2014 launch 
of the West African Monetary Union's Automated Securities and Liquidity 
Management System (SAGETIL-UMOA). Developed especially to increase the 
purchase and sale of government securities on the secondary market, it will help to 
ease the pressure on banks’ balance sheets. Treasury bills – amounting to 
CFAF 1.4667 trillion in 2014, i.e. 48% of gross issuances of government securities – 
are mostly purchased by commercial banks, which hold them until maturity. 
4.1.2.F. A CHALLENGE LINKED TO FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
Overall, WAEMU countries are lagging behind in terms of basic banking infrastructure and 
points of access to banking services (low density of ATMs, not enough branches). 
Consequently, according to the Bank of France the proportion of adults that have a bank 
account with a formal institution remains low (12.6%).  
The financial authorities, with the support of the Central Bank, are adding to the number of 
initiatives aimed at increasing this figure: on the demand side with lower bank charges and 
greater consumer protection and on the supply side via support for the development of new 
technologies.  
Figure 4.6.: Banking Penetration Rates Worldwide in 2014 (as a %) 
 
Source: Bank of France 
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4.1.2.G. AN AREA CONDUCIVE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
Following its rollout in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire in 2009 and thanks to a high mobile 
telephony penetration rate across the West Africa region – around 44% in 2014 
according to the African Development Bank – mobile banking provides a genuine 
opportunity to increase banking penetration rates among financially excluded 
populations. 
To promote these innovations, BCEAO has authorised the bank model of electronic 
money issuance within WAEMU and the non-bank model of electronic money 
institutions (EMIs)5 – Orange Money, Tigo Cash, etc. 
Accordingly, the issuance of electronic money has been a huge success since 2010. 
Currently, two major categories of financial services are deployed via this channel, 
accounting for daily transactions worth CFAF 10.3 billion (nearly USD 19 million) in 2014 
alone: 
• Paper money – deposits, withdrawals, etc.; 
• Services using electronic money – phone credits, paying bills, making transfers. 
Figure 4.7.: WAEMU – Mobile Financial Services in Value Terms (in CFAF billions)
 
 
Source: BCEAO 
According to the World Bank, in 2014 over 24% of adults in Côte d’Ivoire and 11.6% in Mali 
had a mobile money account, compared to an average of 2% worldwide. BCEAO also 
                                                          
5 According to BCEAO, “an electronic money institution is an enterprise or any other legal entity authorised to issue means of 
payment in the form of electronic money and whose activities are limited to issuing electronic money, making electronic money 
available to the public and managing electronic money”. 
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estimates the number of users in WAEMU countries at over 20 million, of whom 70% are 
essentially located in Côte d’Ivoire, which along with Burkina Faso and Mali accounted for 
more than 91% of the total value of transactions in WAEMU in 2014. 
Figure 4.8.: Breakdown of the Volume of Mobile Banking Transactions in WAEMU 
 
 
Source: BCEAO 
4.1.2.H. MANY PLAYERS ARE EXPERIENCING GROWTH IN MOBILE BANKING 
Partnerships between telephone operators and banks are now the norm on the market, with 
financial institutions having a better knowledge of what is at stake financially. This is the 
case, in particular, for the region’s most popular service – Orange Money – which counts 
over 35% of all subscribers following its partnership with BNP Paribas in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali 
and Senegal and with Bank of Africa in Niger.  
Meanwhile, on launching in Mali in October 2014, money transfer company LemonWay 
formed a partnership with BIM (Banque Internationale du Mali) which has been hugely 
successful. Right now, the temptation for banks is to move into this sector by acquiring 
technological enterprises as there is currently a lack of adequate regulations and/or 
supervision for these services. 
These partnerships would initially be an opportunity to strengthen financial integration. 
Effectively, only banks currently have the financial capacity to overcome the obstacles 
holding back the development of mobile banking in the sub-region – high cost of minor 
transactions, limited diversification of services offered, interoperability issues, rising number 
of payment arrears, etc. – and to continue to invest in a market that is still in its infancy.  
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Figure 4.9.: Number of Mobile Financial Services Players 
  
Source: BCEAO 
THE OUTLOOK FOR INCREASED DIGITALISATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES IS BRIGHT 
The favourable trend in terms of the legal framework (increased supervision by BCEAO, 
market flexibility, transition towards the Basel II/III Accords, increased number of 
government digital programmes) basically suggests that there will be: 
• an improvement in banks’ solvency; 
• a gradual increase in the number of banks; 
• an increase in banking activity and lending to the economy. The rate of non-performing 
loans may remain constant, however, due to the limited diversification of the economies of 
the countries in the region; 
• an increase in banking penetration rates thanks to the rapid expansion of new 
technologies. 
Speaking of which, digitalisation appears to be a key factor in the growth of the banking 
sector across the continent – an African mobile payments market that is expected to reach a 
value of USD 1.5 billion in 20196. In addition to this, there would be other sources of revenue 
as the uses for mobile banking are set to become more sophisticated via, inter alia, the 
development of multi-sectoral insurance, savings and especially real-time credit products. 
To this end, FinTech companies7, which initially thought that they would replace the 
conventional banking model, are now positioned as partners – in Africa at least – via bank 
                                                          
6 According to the figures provided by Boston Consulting Group. 
7 FinTechs are innovative start-ups that use technology to offer alternative solutions to financial and banking services. 
Spearheading this trend, groups such as Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon – GAFA – are targeting Africa with the aim of 
moving in on the traditional territory of banks.  
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disintermediation, which can take a number of forms – financing activities, virtual 
currencies, payment systems, credit, savings, etc. 
Among other innovations, the solutions using social networks dominated by the continuing 
innovation of Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon (GAFA), using contactless technologies 
(Near Field Communication (NFC), Near Sound Data Transfer (NSDT)) or offering virtual 
agents for better support, continue to be sources of opportunity for Western Africa where 
the legal framework is less stringent. 
Ultimately, the region is seeing a strengthening of partnerships between banks and 
telecommunications operators giving rise to additional competitive advantages, as well as an 
increase in the number of banking intermediary licences granted to new entrants and other 
FinTech companies. 
4.1.3. NIGERIA: A STRATEGY INVOLVING THE FINANCIAL INCLUSION OF OUTLYING 
COMMUNITIES TO OFFSET LOSSES LINKED TO THE OIL SECTOR 
4.1.3.A. BANKING SECTOR: NON-PERFORMING LOANS RISING ONCE AGAIN 
The Nigerian economy is currently faced with a number of major challenges. As a leading oil 
power, it is more than ever confronted with a decrease in oil prices, reduced budgetary 
room for manoeuvre, a deterioration in the terms of trade – with the naira and the country’s 
monetary reserves falling – and a security crisis in the north of the country. Furthermore, 
lending to the federal government is rising hand in hand with the deterioration of the 
situation. Against this backdrop, the “2015 FGN Budget: Transition Budget” was launched 
with the aim of increasing non-oil revenue and streamlining public expenditure. 
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Figure 4.10.: Lending to the Economy (in NGN billions) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
Another effect of the fall in hydrocarbon prices was that the rate of non-performing loans 
rose from 3% in 2014 to 5% in 2015. The oil and gas sector, the main activity financed by 
Nigeria’s banking sector, accounted for USD 17.2 billion or 25% of total lending at end-2015. 
Figure 4.11.: Breakdown of Outstanding Loans to the Industrial and Agricultural Sectors in 
2014-2015 (% of total lending) 
 
Source: CBN 
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percentage of deposits, this illustrates the limited participation of commercial banks in 
financing economic activity, with the hydrocarbons sector being chiefly funded by external 
sources. 
4.1.3.B. NEW TECHNOLOGIES, A VEHICLE OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN NIGERIA 
Following the banking crisis in 2009 which caused banks’ solvency to deteriorate – the ratio 
of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets fell from 20% in 2008 to 1% in 2010 – the 
recapitalisation of Nigeria's banks enabled the banking sector to restore a certain level of 
solvency, albeit centred around five players. 
Furthermore, whilst the ratio of deposits to GDP remains low at 14%, access to banking 
services is improving in qualitative terms with greater inclusion of outlying communities.  
Figure 4.12.: Private Sector Lending and Deposits (as a % of GDP) 
 
Source: CBN 
Note: *The data for 2015 are an estimate and present an incomplete series. The drop in lending in rural areas 
may therefore be lower than expected. 
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for Financial Inclusion, the first “e-wallets”8 initiative for farmers was rolled out, serving to 
provide methods of bank payment to rural populations.  
In quantitative terms, in order to assess the progress achieved, according to the latest 
Enhancing Financial Innovation & Access (EFINA) analysis 52% of Nigeria’s population was 
either excluded from the banking system in 2015 or had access via informal networks, 
compared to more than 63% in 2010. 
Figure 4.13.: Access to the Financial Sector (% of total) 
2010 
 
2015 
 
Source: EFINA 
4.1.4. GHANA: TOWARDS RAPID EXPANSION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO OFFSET THE 
UNCERTAINTIES OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
4.1.4.A. GHANA'S BANKING SECTOR: EASING OF LENDING CONDITIONS 
Ghana’s banking sector is being affected by the current international economic climate, 
which is undermining the country's economic performance: large currency depreciation, 
ongoing energy crisis, aggravation of macroeconomic imbalances and poor performance of 
the oil sector. The rate of GDP growth was 3.5% in 2015 compared to 4% in 2014 and 7.3% in 
2013, with government debt increasing.  
The regulatory role played by BoG – Bank of Ghana – appears vital. The key interest rate has 
risen – from 18% at the beginning of 2015 to 26% at present – at a time when the Ghanaian 
cedi has shed nearly 51% of its value against the US dollar since 2013 and with average 
inflation in 2015 standing at 17%.  
                                                          
8 The concept of “e-wallets” is based on access to a digital platform that is accessible via mobile phone, so enabling users to 
carry out a variety of purchase and sale transactions remotely. 
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Against that backdrop, the banking sector is facing stagnant lending volumes and 
profitability and an increase in non-performing loans. 
More specifically, over the period from January 2013 to September 2015, and taking into 
account a non-performing loans ratio of 11% in 2014, the banks were very prudent overall 
with total lending of GHS 28 billion (nearly USD 7.4 billion). 
Since June 2015, however, the situation has eased somewhat. Encouraged by a brighter 
economic and budgetary outlook and monetary stabilisation – exchange rate and inflation – 
the banking sector has reduced rates for the riskiest investments and limited collateral 
requirements although there has not been any real growth in lending as yet. On the other 
hand, deposits have continued to grow to more than GHS 35 billion (nearly USD 9.3 billion).  
Table 4.3.: Simplified Balance Sheet of Ghana’s Banking Sector 
In USD millions (exchange 
rate: GHS 1 = USD 0.266) 
Sep. 2013 Sep. 2014 Sep. 2015 
Total assets 9 014 12 710 15 210 
Foreign assets 866 1 306 1 312 
Domestic assets 8 147 11 404 13 898 
Capital expenditure 2 598 2 817 2 954 
Advances (gross) 4 201 6 327 7 635 
Other assets 347 484 760 
Fixed assets 233 350 516 
Total liabilities 9 014 12 710 15 210 
Total deposits 5 600 7 451 9 383 
In foreign currency 1 525 2 472 3 032 
Total borrowings 1 412 2 418 2 499 
Foreign liabilities 909 1 669 1 167 
Domestic liabilities 6 830 9 199 11 715 
Other liabilities 732 1 002 1 037 
Paid-up capital 589 690 766 
Funds to shareholders 1 270 1 805 2 291 
Source: BoG 
4.1.4.B. USING NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO DIVERSIFY THE CUSTOMER BASE 
Although still higher than in 2010, the profitability of Ghana's banking sector fell over the 
last year. The sector is trying to add to its customer base, which has been affected by 
competition from telephony operators and microfinance institutions. Consequently, 
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partnership operations and acquisitions have taken place, as illustrated by the purchase of 
the microfinance operator ProCredit Ghana by Fidelity Bank in 2014. 
Figure 4.14.: Profitability Indicators of Ghana's Banking Sector (as a %) 
 
Source: BoG 
At the same time, the country's relatively developed financial education and high mobile 
phone penetration – over 4 million mobile phone accounts in 2014 – also provide 
opportunities for the adoption of digitalisation and new technologies in banking services. 
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on two factors: stabilisation of the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the recovery 
of oil prices. 
4.2.2. OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTOR 
4.2.2.A. A DIVERSE AND HIGHLY CONCENTRATED BANKING LANDSCAPE 
At end-June 2014, CEMAC's banking system comprised around 50 active banks – 13 in 
Cameroon, four in the Central African Republic, ten in Congo, ten in Gabon, five in Equatorial 
Guinea and eight in Chad. Commercial banks, and in some countries large microfinance 
institutions, dominate the CEMAC zone’s financial sector with 90% of total assets.  
The region’s banking landscape remains diverse and highly concentrated: the three leading 
banks in each country account for more than 70% of assets. In parallel, foreign banks 
manage almost half of all assets. At the same time, public banks have considerably expanded 
in the CEMAC zone9, particularly in Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon, increasing from two in 
2006 to 11 in 2014 and accounting for nearly 11% of assets in the sector that year compared 
to 3.6% in 2005. 
Furthermore, the region’s financial depth has improved substantially in recent years. 
CEMAC's banking assets, including microfinance assets, accounted for around 27% of the 
zone's GDP at end-June 2014, compared to 15.7% in 2004. 
  
                                                          
9 There are also very large government stakes in the region’s banks, particularly in Equatorial Guinea (a direct or indirect stake 
in the capital of all of the country's banks), Cameroon (stakes in six banks), Gabon, the Republic of the Congo (five banks) and 
Chad (four). 
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Table 4.4.: Structure of the Banking System in the CEMAC Zone at End-June 2014 
Banks Number of 
institutions 
Total assets 
(in EUR billions) 
Percentage of total 
financial sector 
assets 
As a % 
of GDP 
Banks 50 18.0 90 24 
Private 39 16.1 81 22 
Public 11 1.9 10 2 
Domestic 18 8.2 41 11 
Foreign 32 9.8 49 13 
Cameroon 13 6.0 30 8 
Central African 
Republic 
4 0.3 1 0 
Chad 8 1.4 7 2 
Congo 10 3.1 15 4 
Equatorial Guinea 5 3.1 16 4 
Gabon 10 4.2 21 6 
NBFI10 8 0.8 4 1 
MFIs11 777 1.2 6.2 2 
Sources: COBAC (Central African Banking Commission), IMF 
4.2.2.B. IMPROVING BALANCE SHEET SITUATION 
According to the latest statistics issued by the Central African Banking Commission 
(COBAC)12, the aggregate balance sheet totals of the CEMAC zone's banks amounted to 
CFAF 12.571 trillion (USD 21.12 billion) at end-March 2015, up 8.62% compared to the figure 
at end-March 2014.  
Similarly, deposits collected were 6.5% higher than the previous year, totalling CFAF 9.944 
trillion (USD 16.7 billion), i.e. 79.1% of the balance sheet total. Deposits improved in all 
countries except Gabon where they fell by CFAF 188 billion (-8.32%).  
In keeping with the same trend, gross lending totalled CFAF 7.528 trillion (USD 12.6 billion), 
up 8.07% compared to March 2014. This upturn was driven, in particular, by the 
performances of the Cameroon and Chad banking sectors. 
Against this backdrop, lending to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, estimated at 
10%, continued to grow but is still low compared to the average on the continent (almost 
23%) or the average on cross-border and emerging markets (over 35%). Thus, despite 
lending volume having grown since the middle of the first decade of the millennium, lending 
                                                          
10 Non-Banking Financial Institutions.  
11 Microfinance Institutions; Figures at end-September 2013. 
12 Introductory statement of the Governor of BEAC and COBAC Chairman on the margins of the 7th annual meeting between 
the COBAC Chairman and the management of CEMAC credit institutions, Douala, 3 July 2015. 
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by banks remains very selective in the region due, in particular, to the concentration of 
lending to a limited number of sectors and customers13. 
Lastly, it should be noted that most loans are being granted in the short and medium term at 
a time when demand deposits account for the lion’s share of bank resources. At the same 
time, the ratio of loans to deposits also increased, from 57% in 2010 to 67% in 2013 – which 
is still very low, reflecting the zone’s structural weaknesses in terms of intermediated 
financing. 
4.2.2.C. BANKS’ EXPOSURE TO THE PUBLIC AND OIL SECTORS IS STILL HIGH 
The apparent quality of the CEMAC banks’ portfolio has deteriorated somewhat. Non-
performing loans amounted to CFAF 894 billion (USD 1.5 billion) at end-March 2015 
compared to CFAF 696 billion one year earlier, accounting for 11.9% and 10% of gross 
lending respectively.  
Against this backdrop, and faced with the current fiscal pressures, the banks’ direct and 
indirect liabilities vis-à-vis the public sector may constitute a source of risk for the zone's 
banking sector. In 2015, IMF testing indicated that a 15% rise in non-performing loans, 
combined with a 25% drop in bank deposits, would be sufficient to make more than half of 
banks non-compliant with the regulations. 
4.2.2.D. THE PRUDENTIAL ASPECT OF THE BANKING SYSTEM COULD BE IMPROVED 
According to COBAC, only 24 banks in the CEMAC zone have sufficient net capital to comply 
with all prudential norms applicable to such capital. The norm concerning minimum capital is 
the requirement that most banks are deemed to be breaching.  
According to the regulator, this situation is attributable to the increase at end-June 2014 of 
the amount of minimum share capital to CFAF 10 billion for each bank and to CFAF 2 billion 
for financial institutions. 
In response, COBAC invited the management of banks in the COBAC zone to take 
appropriate measures to bring their establishments back into compliance with the 
regulations on a sustainable basis in order to safeguard the stability of the region's banking 
system.   
4.2.2.E. PROFITABILITY ERODED BY THE ECONOMIC CLIMATE 
After plummeting in 2009, the CEMAC banking sector’s profitability has gradually recovered 
to levels close to those observed in 2004-05. In 2013, the average return on equity (ROE) 
even increased to 19.3% compared to 16.9% in 2005.  
                                                          
13 According to the IMF (Evaluation report on the stability of CEMAC's financial system, 2 July 2015), the concentration of assets 
in the public and hydrocarbons sectors is a source of risk both for CEMAC's financial sector and for the economies of the 
countries in the region. 
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Nevertheless, the economic downturn sparked by the fall in raw material prices, 
accompanied by a liquidity squeeze, is likely to impact credit quality to a greater degree and 
thus weigh heavily on banks’ profitability in the CEMAC zone. 
Already in 2015, the aggregate net profit of banks declared as being established in the 
CEMAC zone fell substantially by 13.4% to CFAF 124.6 billion in comparison with 2014.   
4.2.2.F. CHANGES IN LIQUIDITY DEPENDENT ON FLUCTUATIONS IN OIL REVENUE 
The banking sector in the CEMAC zone has for a long time been awash with liquidity due, in 
particular, to demand deposits and government revenue generated by oil wealth. However, 
the contraction of this revenue has forced governments in the region to turn to bank 
financing to correct budgetary imbalances14 and to reduce their bank deposits with the 
BEAC. Loans granted by the banking system to governments in the region accounted for 
7.7% of total lending to the economy at end-2014. 
Figure 4.15.: Lending to the Economy in the CEMAC Zone (in CFAF billions), of which the 
Percentage Extended to Governments, 2010-2014 
 
Sources: BEAC, Bank of France 
Furthermore, and in order to support economic activity in the countries in the region, since 
the beginning of the millennium BEAC has continued to revise downwards its key interest 
rate, the interest rate for tender operations: in July 2015 it was 2.45% compared to 6.3% in 
2002.  
  
                                                          
14 Between the second quarter of 2015 and the second quarter of 2016, the budget deficit of all CEMAC Member States grew 
from 3.5% to 7.9% of GDP, thus doubling in the space of a year. 
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Figure 4.16.: BEAC's Interest Rate for Tender Operations, 2002-2015 (as a %) 
 
Sources: BEAC, Bank of France 
Against this backdrop, credit institutions in the zone were exposed to the double blow of 
liquidity impacted by fluctuations in oil revenue and banks in difficulty. In response, BEAC 
was forced to reduce by 50% the coefficients of these banks’ reserve requirements, which 
hovered between CFAF 500 billion and 600 billion. 
4.2.2.G. ACCESS TO FINANCING IN THE REGION REMAINS UNDERDEVELOPED 
The Central African region has one of the world's lowest proportions of adults with a bank 
account in a formal financial institution, 11.8% in 201415, some distance from the average in 
sub-Saharan Africa (34%). A number of obstacles continue to prevent people from accessing 
affordable financial services, including in particular the economies’ lack of diversification, the 
fragility and lack of income and distance from financial institutions16. 
Access to financial services in the region differs from country to country, however. Gabon 
has a relatively high account penetration rate (33%) whereas Cameroon's and Chad's 
financial penetration rate is only 12%. 
  
                                                          
15 A Bank of France estimate in its CFA Franc Zone Annual Report 2014 
16 In sub-Saharan Africa, distance from financial institutions is the second most common reason, mentioned by 27% of people 
without a bank account. 
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Figure 4.17.: Bank Account Penetration Rate in Central African Countries (as a %) – 2014 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
4.2.2.H. MOBILE TECHNOLOGY AS A POWERFUL DRIVER OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN 
THE REGION 
According to the World Bank17, mobile technology could significantly boost financial 
inclusion in sub-Saharan Africa. Especially as over 12% of adults in the region have a mobile 
phone bank account compared to just 2% worldwide. 
In Central Africa, the development of mobile banking is more limited in comparison with 
other regions in the continent such as East Africa, particularly due to the regulation that 
forbade credit institutions from issuing electronic money, until 2015 at least. As a result, the 
rate of penetration of mobile phone bank accounts in countries in the region is still low. 
Figure 4.18.: Penetration of Mobile Phone Bank Accounts in Central Africa18 (as a %) – 2014 
 
Source: World Bank 
                                                          
17 World Bank press release: Massive Drop in Number of Unbanked, says New Report, (2014 Findex), 15 April 2015. 
18 In particular, the countries covered by the World Bank review. 
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Having said that, as seen across the continent, CEMAC countries have also skipped the fixed 
internet stage and massively embraced mobile internet. In the long term this presents 
considerable opportunities for FinTech companies subject, of course, to swifter and bolder 
regulatory developments and providing offers become more diversified and the technology 
can be used across borders. 
4.2.3. CAMEROON – THE BANKING SITUATION IS SATISFACTORY OVERALL DESPITE THE 
INCREASE IN NON-PERFORMING LOANS 
4.2.3.A. A BANKING SYSTEM DOMINATED BY PAN-AFRICAN BANKS 
Cameroon's banking system is the biggest in the CEMAC zone with around 15 commercial 
banks, of which nine are subsidiaries of foreign groups. More pan-African banks are now 
active in the country, including the Nigerian bank Union Bank of Africa (UBA), Ecobank, 
Banque Atlantique, the Gabonese bank BGFI Bank and the Moroccan bank Attijariwafa 
Bank–Société Commerciale de Banque Cameroun. 
Overall, the sector has been dominated since March 2011 by Afriland First Bank, which is 
majority-owned by local investors and has around a 20% market share in Cameroon. 
Furthermore, the Group recently closed its CFAF 15 billion bond issue, designed to support 
its current plans to expand across the continent. 
Faced with difficulties in accessing credit, since July 2015 Cameroon SMEs have had a 
dedicated SME bank, BCPME – Banque Camerounaise pour les PME. Despite having to deal 
with certain constraints when it launched – delays with both the injection of public funds 
and the installation of an automatic processing system – BCPME managed in three months 
to register 1 000 customer accounts and record mostly demand deposits worth 
CFAF 2 billion19. It also released almost CFAF 500 million in its maiden loans to around 
50 SMEs20. 
4.2.3.B. SOUND FUNDAMENTALS DESPITE THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CLIMATE 
After recording a 17.5% increase in 2013, the Cameroon banking system’s balance sheet 
total grew by only 9.2% in 2014, with slower growth in lending (down from 21% to 11.6%) 
and deposits (down from 15.4% to 8.8%). 
In 2015, particularly thanks to strong domestic demand linked to the rise in investment, 
lending to the economy grew by 17.6% according to the IMF. The proportion of lending to 
the private sector as a ratio of overall lending is 90%. 
                                                          
19 According to Agnès Ndoumbè Epse Mandeng, Managing Director of BCPME, www.investiraucameroun.com, 4 November 
2015. 
20 “La Banque camerounaise des PME débloque 500 millions FCFA pour ses premiers crédits aux entreprises”. 
www.investiraucameroun.com, 18 February 2016. 
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The most recent review by the IMF in 2015 confirmed the solidity and generally healthy 
condition of banks in Cameroon in spite of an increase in non-performing loans21 from 10.2% 
in June 2014 to 13.1% one year later.  
The Cameroon banking system's credit risk is expected to be reduced thanks, in particular, to 
the slight improvement in the financial situation of the country's only oil refinery SONARA22; 
however, the problem concerning three small banks in difficulty has yet to be resolved23. 
Table 4.5.: Key Indicators of the Cameroon Banking Sector 
  2012 2013 2014 AAGR* 12-14 
Lending to the economy (in USD billions) 2.71 3.87 3.87 19.6% 
Private sector deposits (in USD billions) 3.90 4.52 4.92 12.3% 
Equity (in USD billions) 0.40 0.54 0.59 22.2% 
Balance sheet total (in USD billions) 5.50 6.46 7.05 13.2% 
Net operating ratio (as a %) 58.9 57.9 54.7 - 
Net margin ratio (profit/NBI) (as a %) 11.3 38.3 12.3 - 
Return on assets (as a %) 0.6 1.5 0.8 - 
Return on equity (as a %)  25 42.7 21.8 - 
 
Sources: COBAC, IMF 
Note: (*)AAGR = Average annual growth rate 
4.2.3.C. FINANCIAL INCLUSION HAS ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT 
The banking penetration rate in Cameroon remains low (12%) due in particular to the 
concentration of banking networks in urban and suburban areas and the high cost of 
banking services with respect to people's earnings.  
Microfinance in Cameroon, which officially accounts for 15% of lending by the country's 
financial sector, is helping to improve the country’s banking penetration rate through the 
establishment of  microfinance institutions (418 at end-2015), including in rural areas. 
Against this backdrop, the IMF has encouraged the authorities to promote financial 
inclusion, specifically by extending the banking network to rural areas and developing 
mobile financial services. Along these lines, in 2011 the Cameroon Government launched the 
Guaranteed Minimum Banking Service, designed to provide users with minimum banking 
services free of charge.  
  
                                                          
21 The country’s authorities attributed this increase to more rigorous risk management. 
22 SONARA had to borrow from local banks to finance its modernisation programme (over USD 200 billion). However, these 
loans are becoming more and more difficult to pay back because of cash flow problems. 
23 According to the IMF, the Cameroon authorities are continuing to examine the different options to help these banks and are 
trying, in particular, to reach a compromise with their shareholders. 
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However, the application of this measure has so far met with a lukewarm response from the 
country’s banks24. Gabon's National Credit Committee claims that this measure has led to 
losses for a number of banks, in particular BICEC, NFC-Bank, Banque Atlantique, Société 
Générale de Banques au Cameroun, Ecobank and Afriland First Bank. 
4.2.4. GABON'S BANKING SECTOR FACING NEW CONSTRAINTS 
4.2.4.A. A VERY CONCENTRATED SECTOR 
Gabon's banking system comprises ten banks, of which five are local banks and five are 
subsidiaries of foreign groups. The main banks operating in the country are Banque 
Gabonaise de Développement (BGD), Banque de l’Habitat du Gabon (BHG), Banque 
Internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie du Gabon (BICIG), BGFI Bank Gabon, Citibank, 
Ecobank Gabon, Orabank Gabon (formerly Financial Bank Gabon), UBA Gabon, Union 
Gabonaise de Banque (UGB) and POSTBANK which began operating in 2014. 
Overall, the sector remains highly concentrated, with three banks (BGFI, BICIG and UGB) 
holding nearly 75% of total assets. BGFI Bank's local subsidiary alone has a market share of 
over 50% in both deposits and lending but also in terms of participation in the financing of 
large infrastructure projects, so confirming its leadership in a market that is relatively open 
to competition.  
4.2.4.B. AN ACTIVITY FACED WITH MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 
Gabon’s banking sector, which has long been sustained by the oil business, has been 
affected by a difficult economic environment resulting from the fall in Brent prices25. Despite 
a slight increase in customer deposits (+2.5%) and gross customer loans26 (+1.2%), driven in 
particular by the rise in lending to the government (+43.6%), the balance sheet total 
contracted by 2.6% at end-2014. 
The country’s banking system is also facing a number of other challenges, led by the recent 
deterioration in the quality of the loan portfolio. In 2014, the ratio of non-performing loans 
to gross loans was 8.1% versus 4.8% in 2013. In addition, outstanding loans to the private 
sector, which accounted for 75.3% of total lending, fell by 1.2%. 
  
                                                          
24 According to a review conducted by the Cameroon Consumers Association in 2012, this measure was not observed by all of 
the country's banks. 
25 According to the IMF, Gabon's financial system is very sensitive to macroeconomic shocks, especially those affecting the oil 
sector. 
26 The financial system's ratio of gross lending to customer deposits was 83.5% in 2014, i.e. substantially higher than the figure 
for the CEMAC zone (72.4%). 
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Table 4.6.: Key Indicators of Gabon's Banking Sector 
  2012 2013 2014 AAGR* 12-14 
Lending to the economy (in USD billions) 1.84 2.32 2.05 5.3% 
Private sector deposits (in USD billions) 3.03 3.15 3.11 1.4% 
Equity (in USD billions) 0.43 0.48 0.47 4.5% 
Balance sheet total (in USD billions) 4.38 4.52 4.40 0.3% 
Net operating ratio (as a %) 52.7 56.9 58 - 
Net margin ratio (profit/NBI) (as a %) 20.9 21.6 16.4 - 
Return on assets (as a %) 23.3 19.6 21.5 - 
Return on equity (as a %) 1.9 1.6 1.7 - 
 
Sources: COBAC, IMF 
Note: (*)AAGR = Average annual growth rate 
4.2.4.C. GREATER FINANCIAL INCLUSION  
Stimulated by the arrival of new financial institutions and new banking services such as 
mobile banking, Gabon's financial inclusion has improved significantly in recent years. The 
country's rate of financial inclusion was 33% in 2014, the highest rate in CEMAC and similar 
to the rates in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (34%). 
In 2014, the Gabon public authorities’ decision to require public sector officials, students, 
pensioners and non-permanent employees to open accounts in local banks contributed 
hugely to the progress made recently in the country in terms of financial inclusion. 
Despite these advances, access to financial services remains concentrated in a few urban 
areas and the strengthening of the sector as measured by the ratios of both deposits and 
lending to GDP could be improved. 
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5. Meeting  Africa’s Long-Term Housing Finance Needs: 
A Journey of a Thousand Miles? 
ISSA FAYE AND ZEKEBWELIWAI GEH1,2 
 
 Executive summary 
• Africa faces a continent-wide affordable housing deficit of around 51 million 
units, according to a conservative estimate based on conservative assumptions, 
with 16 countries having a deficit greater than 1 million units.3 The surging 
demand for affordable housing, fuelled by the rapid urbanisation process and 
demographic growth, has effectively driven up prices and pushed decent housing 
out of reach for the majority of those in need. 
 
• Lack of access to long-term funds is a major constraint to the development of 
housing finance4 in particular, and the housing market in general. Banks across 
the continent are reluctant to provide housing loans due to the real and 
perceived sector risks, as well as the maturity mismatch between their short-term 
deposits and the long-term nature of housing loans. The lack of secondary 
markets and adequate financing instruments makes it challenging to meet the 
financing needs for housing.  
 
• Attracting long-term capital into Africa’s property market could look like a journey 
of a thousand miles as it requires the efficient functioning of many interrelated 
components: a favourable macroeconomic environment, enabling legal and 
regulatory frameworks, formal land titling to enhance security of tenure, 
enforcement of property rights and long-term contractual maturities, and well-
functioning capital markets, among others. However, if we do not take that first 
step, the journey will always remain one of a thousand miles.  
 
• Financial deepening and broadening initiatives underway have strong potential to 
accelerate Africa’s quest to close its housing finance gap. Alternative long-term 
capital sources such as private equity for affordable housing development, real 
estate investment trusts, mortgage covered bonds and mortgage refinancing 
companies are promising emerging institutions and instruments that should be 
tapped to plug the continent’s long-term housing finance gap. 
  
                                                          
1 Research Department, African Development Bank (AfDB). 
2 The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the AfDB. This paper draws heavily on 
the analysis contained in the “Housing Market Dynamics in Africa” manuscript, forthcoming, January 2017. 
3 See Housing Market Dynamics in Africa, forthcoming, January 2017.  
4 For the purpose of this paper, we define housing finance as a loan from a bank or another financial institution to purchase a 
house or land or to construct a house. In a nutshell, our definition of housing finance looks at the entire housing value chain.  
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5.1. Introduction 
Africa’s population and cities are experiencing substantial growth. By 2060, the continent 
will be home to an estimated 2.4 billion people5. Over the next 15 years, African cities are 
expected to house 219 million people. This translates to at least 40 000 new urban residents 
every day6. Moreover, Africa’s affordable housing deficit is conservatively estimated at 
51 million housing units. Few people will disagree with the fact that the continent is on the 
brink of a housing crisis. Addressing the affordable housing backlog will require at least 
USD 2 trillion over 10 years.  
The housing sector has a widespread impact on the economy. The sector can be a driver of 
sustainable and inclusive growth due to its multiplier effect on the broader economy in 
terms of job creation, taxes, income generation and GDP contribution. In Morocco, for 
example, the housing sector contributed 6.6% of GDP in 2014, while contributing about 9% 
to job creation. In Ethiopia, the housing sector created 534 000 new jobs from 2005 to 2014, 
following the launch of the government’s Integrated Housing Development Programme.  
Our ongoing analysis shows that where families lack decent housing, health outcomes are 
poorer, children fare less well in school and tend to drop out earlier, unemployment and 
underemployment rates are higher, and financial inclusion is lower. 
Harnessing Africa’s demographic boom and the potential of the housing sector presents 
both an opportunity and a challenge for Africa’s housing market development. The 
opportunity emerges, on the demand side, from the vast swathes of urban households in 
pressing need of affordable housing, which creates new markets for financial service 
providers and real estate developers. However, the low and irregular income stream of 
many African families poses a constraint to financial service providers. On the supply side, 
inexistent and underdeveloped housing finance markets remain a major constraint as 
highlighted by the lack of equity for developers, and the inadequate instruments tailored to 
the development of housing finance.  
The lack of secondary mortgage markets: few mortgage refinancing facilities (operational 
only in the WAEMU7 region, Tanzania, Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt) and shallow capital 
markets including bond markets (highly driven by treasury bills) further compound the 
problem of inadequate financing for housing. Most importantly, there is the tendency to 
overlook the fact that housing development is synonymous with large and long-term 
investments that require long-term financing. In many African countries, the lack of long-
term funding is a reflection of the failure to tap into the contractual savings industry – 
pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, and so on. As a consequence, 
long-term assets, such as mortgage loans, are predominantly financed using short-term 
liabilities, such as deposits. This results in maturity mismatches, which inherently creates 
                                                          
5 See Faye et al, (2017)  
6 Majale et al, 2011. 
7 The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) member countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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liquidity and interest rate risks in the housing market. Nonetheless, there is room for 
financial innovations geared towards deepening and broadening the housing finance market 
and increasing households’ access to housing finance products8. 
While this paper examines the major constraints inhibiting Africa’s housing finance market 
development and acknowledges the long-term perspective of lengthening maturities in the 
housing finance market, it also discusses potential institutions and innovative solutions that 
could help accelerate change and phase out the dearth of long-term finance needed to 
address the continent’s housing crisis. It is structured as follows: section 5.2 provides a brief 
overview of Africa’s housing finance market, section 5.3 discusses the major challenges 
facing the sector, while section 5.4 examines emerging solutions that could be explored to 
attract long-term financing into Africa’s housing finance sector. Section 5.5 provides the way 
forward for public and private sector stakeholders, as well as development partners. 
5.2. An Overview of Africa’s Housing Finance Market 
Africa’s housing finance market has steadily grown over the past decade. Nevertheless, this 
growth has been from an extremely low base. With the exception of Morocco, Namibia, 
South Africa and Tunisia, the depth of the housing finance market as measured by the 
residential mortgage-debt-to-GDP-ratio is still very shallow (Figure 5.1.). The mortgage-debt-
to-GDP ratio is 5.5% in Africa, compared to 9% in the Middle East, 23% in the East Asia and 
Pacific Region, 44% in Europe and 63% in North America. The penetration of housing finance 
among households similarly reveals generally low patterns in Africa. In 2014, a meagre 5.2% 
of African households took out a loan to purchase a home9. In the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU), for example, just 15 328 housing loans were approved in 
2013 to serve an urban population of 36.3 million people10. Moreover, housing loan tenors 
are extremely short, which implies higher annual payments for debt principal.  
                                                          
8 Ibid 
9 Demigurc-Kunt et al, 2015. 
10 BCEAO, 2014. 
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Figure 5.1.: Residential Mortgages as a % of GDP 
 
  
 
Source: Faye et al, forthcoming, 2017 
On the supply side, lending conditions have not fared any better. Small and medium-sized 
developers, which constitute the majority of Africa’s real estate developers are glaringly 
lacking equity, and were also particularly hard hit by the recent financial crisis as funding 
sources continued to dry up. Consequently, this has further shrunk the supply of affordable 
housing across the continent, even as demand for residential property continues to increase. 
Today, only 6.7% of all African households can afford to purchase a house supplied by the 
market, at an average starting price of USD 28 000. As a result, most urban households are 
priced out of the housing market, and thus rely on informal sources of finance, which also 
contributes to the proliferation of informal settlements and slums11.  
Banks across the continent have habitually avoided lending to the housing sector due to real 
and perceived risks. Bank lending to the residential real estate sector continues to tighten. 
According to the Institute of International Finance’s composite index for bank lending 
survey, the credit standards applied by African banks for residential real estate loans 
dropped by 7.4 points to 36.4 in 2016Q1, hitting the lowest level since 2012Q1. Challenges in 
raising funds in domestic and international markets, as well as sector-specific risks were the 
main reasons cited by surveyed banks for tightening credit standards. The few commercial 
banks that do lend are very conservative and have traditionally served middle and high-
income individuals.  
                                                          
11 A majority of urban households (over 200 million according to UN Habitat statistics) live in informal settlements. Moreover, 
in most countries, such as Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, it is reported that self-built housing accounts for over 60% of 
constructed houses.  
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Low-income households who constitute over 50% of the population are regularly shunned. 
In fact, in most African economies, the housing finance market is segmented based on 
income levels, with the high- and upper middle-income groups being served by the market. 
The gap market consists of moderate-income households who, despite their willingness to 
pay for a home, struggle to find sources of formal housing finance. Low-income households, 
including those at the bottom of the pyramid which often have irregular income streams, are 
excluded from formal housing finance markets, and thus rely on informal sources of finance 
or government social programmes, if there are any. Indeed, high interest rates, low or 
irregular household income, and most importantly, the lack of access to long-term funds are 
reasons cited by commercial banks as major housing finance constraints.  This is exacerbated 
by new developments in the global financial market.  
Following the financial crisis and the economic downturn recently experienced in Europe 
and the US, it is evident that the era of progressively cheap money is dwindling. Hence, 
African governments and lenders will need to place greater emphasis on domestic resource 
mobilisation by tapping into local sources of long-term finance such as the contractual 
savings industry12. This includes insurance companies, pension funds and sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs), which by their nature are the holders of long-term savings in African 
economies and are a vital source of long-term resources. Between 2009 and 2014, assets 
under management (AUM) by African SWFs grew by about 34%, from USD 121 billion in 
2009 to USD 162 billion in 2014.13 In 2013, pension funds in just 10 sub-Saharan African 
countries held over USD 379 billion in AUM14. It should be noted that over 97% of these 
pension assets are concentrated in South Africa, Nigeria, Namibia, Kenya and Botswana. 
Nonetheless, pension funds across Africa are growing at a remarkable pace. Between 2008 
and 2015, for instance, the Nigerian pension industry grew more than threefold from 
USD 7 billion to USD 27 billion. A recent study by the consultancy PwC projects that the 
continent’s pension industry will grow to reach USD 1 098 billion by 2020. On the other 
hand, the AUM of African insurance companies in 2012 totalled an estimated 
USD 273 billion, with projections to grow to over USD 378 billion by 2018, equivalent to a 
37% increase15. Having the right institutions and economic conditions is vital to ensure that 
the savings of African economies are effectively and efficiently channelled to finance large 
ticket investments such as housing development. In this light, more efforts are needed to 
advance enabling policies and build strong institutions. 
5.3. Critical Housing Finance Challenges 16 
In what follows, we highlight three critical issues that explain the main impediments to 
accessing long-term finance needed for housing in Africa: macroeconomic volatility, 
underdeveloped capital markets, and weak institutional and regulatory frameworks.  
                                                          
12 Ibid 
13  For more information, see a working paper by Faye et al., forthcoming, 2016.  
14 Making Finance Work For Africa, The Commonwealth Secretariat, and EMPEA 2014. 
15 Riscura. http://www.riscura.com/brightafrica/african-insurance-premiums/ accessed on July 19, 2016. 
16 Ibid 
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5.3.1. MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY 
Strong macroeconomic fundamentals and political stability are crucial for attracting long-
term capital. The literature shows a negative relationship between inflation and financial 
market developments17. High inflation raises doubts about future interest rates and prices. 
The uncertainty on the real value of future nominal payments in turn discourages long-term 
financing. The situation in countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe provides an illustrative 
example of the impact of macroeconomic instability on interest rates, access to long-term 
finance and financial market development. In Zambia, for instance, it is clear that the 
macroeconomic situation has contributed to a situation wherein “mortgage finance is 
expensive while interest rates are high and range between 14- 17%. Mortgage lenders still 
face difficulties in terms of accessing wholesale finance, short maturities on available funds, 
inadequately matched funding for long-term credit, potential losses due to high default 
rates, high transaction costs, deposit requirements of 10 to 20% and relatively short loan 
repayment terms of 2-10 years. There is a large cash economy in which 50% of sales are cash 
sales.”18 
In a nutshell, higher inflation rates imply a higher real interest rate, which increases the cost 
of borrowing. This could discourage borrowers and lenders from entering into long-term 
contracts and participating in the formal market. Macroeconomic stability is a key 
component of building sustainable housing finance markets and attracting the requisite 
long-term finance. In many African countries, the macroeconomic environment has been 
relatively stable as inflation eases to single digits in recent years (Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2.: Inflation in Africa, 2003-17 
 
Source: African Development Bank 
Note: (e) estimates; (p) projections 
                                                          
17 See for example Mozes (1995), Boyd et al (2001) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2002). 
18 See CAHF’s Housing Finance in Africa Yearbook 2016. 
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While that trend is encouraging and could contribute in boosting growth in the continent’s 
finance markets, African governments should not rest on their laurels given that some 
countries are facing growing inflationary pressures that could jeopardize the development of 
housing finance. In the past two years, inflationary pressures have been particularly high in 
commodity-exporting countries on the back of depreciating currencies. In Nigeria, for 
example, the weak naira has contributed to a rising inflation rate recorded at 16.5% year-on-
year in June 2016, which is the highest on record in over a decade19. Many other countries 
have had to deal with rising inflation including South Sudan, Malawi, Sudan, Egypt, Angola, 
among others (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1.: The 10 African Countries with the Highest Inflation Rate (as of July 2016) 
 Current Rate  Lowest Rate  Highest Rate Period 
South Sudan 295 -14 295 2008-2016 
Angola 29.23 6.89 241.08 2001-2016 
Central Africa 
Republic 
25.58 -10.67 51.73 1981-2014 
Zambia 21 6 22.9 2005-2016 
Malawi 21.5 6.3 37.9 2001-2016 
Ghana 18.9 18.7 63 1998-2016 
Mozambique 18.27 1.05 18.27 2009-2016 
Nigeria 15.6 -2.49 47.56 1996-2016 
Eritrea 12.5 -1.38 34.7 1993-2015 
Egypt 12.3 -4.2 35.10 1958-2016 
Source: Trading Economics 
Moreover, high inflation rates discourage investors including the institutional savings 
industry from engaging in long-term finance for housing and also dampen demand for 
affordable housing. Double-digit mortgage rates in many African countries today are a 
partial reflection of rising inflation. Mortgage lenders in Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and many 
other countries identify high real interest rates as a major obstacle to mortgage market 
development efforts20. It is therefore important that African governments and central banks 
continue to sustain the positive macroeconomic performance achieved over the last decade, 
including better management of inflation and interest rate volatility, as well as other 
disruptive economic, social and political factors. 
5.3.2. UNDERDEVELOPED CAPITAL MARKETS 
Opportunities abound for building Africa’s capital markets given their nascent stage of 
development. Besides a small handful of financial centres in Casablanca, Johannesburg, 
Nairobi and Lagos, most capital markets across the continent are very small, illiquid and 
inefficient (Figure 5.3). 
                                                          
19 Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2016. 
20 Based on information from central bank surveys and supervision reports. 
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Narrow capital markets limit the potential of many countries to access long-term finance. 
Though there has been a growing trend of countries tapping international capital markets, 
local financial markets remain underdeveloped. The African Eurobond market, as evidenced 
by the oversubscription of Eurobond issues, can be a potential source of long-term finance 
that could be used for housing and infrastructure development in Africa (Table 5.2).  
Table 5.2.: Eurobonds Issued in Selected Countries (2011-2015) 
 Amount 
Issued 
(USD m.) 
Coupon 
(%) 
Issue Year 
  
Maturity Spread at 
Issuance 
Ratings at 
Issuance* 
Nigeria 500 6.75 28/01/2011 10 years 307 BB- 
Senegal 500 8.75 13/05/2011 10 years 596 B+ (S&P) 
Namibia 500 5.50 03/11/2011 10 years 336 BBB- 
Zambia 750 5.38 20/09/2012 10 years 384 B+ 
Morocco 1 000 4.25 05/12/2012 10 years 275 BBB- 
Morocco 500 5.5% 05/12/2012 30 years 290 BB- 
Rwanda 400 6.63 02/05/2013 10 years 499 B 
Nigeria 500 5.13 12/07/2013 5 years 381 BB- 
Nigeria 500 6.38 12/07/2013 10 years 393 BB- 
Ghana 1 000 7.88 07/08/2013 10 years 540 B 
Ghana 1 000 7.88 07/08/2013 10 years 540 B 
Zambia 1 000 8.50 14/04/2014  10 years 593 B 
Ghana 1 000 8.13 11/09/2014 12 years 572 B 
Kenya 1 500 6.88 24/06/2014 10 years 418 B+ 
Kenya 500 5.88 24/06/2014 5 years 410 B+ 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
750 5.38 16/07/2014 10 years 309 B 
Senegal 500 6.25 30/07/2014 10 years 379 B+ (S&P) 
Ethiopia 1 000 6.63 04/12/2014 10 years 453 B (S&P) 
Tunisia 1 000 5.75 26/01/2015 10 years -- BB- 
Côte d’Ivoire 1 000 6.38 24/02/2015 12 years -- B 
Sources: IIF, Moody’s. 
Note: *Fitch Ratings 
However, evidence has shown that this may not be the case during challenging times such as 
the global financial crisis21. As the international community eases up on its bond-buying 
programme, known as quantitative easing, its impact would reverberate across the 
continent. Rising interest rates in international markets and weakening local currencies 
relative to the dollar would probably expand the risk premiums on African issuers, thereby 
increasing the cost of borrowing for African sovereigns. Hence, in the near future, this 
                                                          
21 Beck et al, 2011. 
Banking in sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and Digital Financial Inclusion 
© European Investment Bank, November 2016  125 
 
method of funding may be less attractive. Supporting the development of local capital 
markets, particularly bond markets, is therefore imperative for sustainable and affordable 
long-term financing in Africa. However, such efforts should adopt a long-term perspective 
given that the necessary conditions for developing well-functioning capital markets cannot 
be met in the short term. 
Figure 5.3.: Underdeveloped Capital Markets in Africa* 
  
 
Source: World Bank 
Note: Latest data available 
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Even though local currency debt securities in Africa increased from USD 11 billion in 2005 to 
USD 30 billion in 2014, the local debt market remains shallow compared to other emerging 
economies. Government securities across the continent tend to dominate domestic debt 
markets. In sub-Saharan Africa, government bonds account for over 75% of the domestic 
bond market capitalisation, which effectively crowds out private issuers. Moreover, 
institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies prefer investing in 
short-term government maturities, which are less risky. In Nigeria, for instance, 80% of 
pension funds are invested in short to medium-term securities22. This further impairs the 
development of long-term maturities.  
With the exception of local debt markets such as South Africa, Morocco, Egypt and Nigeria, 
liquidity in African markets is low. Moreover, non-active and inexistent secondary markets in 
many countries make it challenging to raise affordable long-term debt in domestic markets. 
As a consequence, many investors adopt a buy-and-hold strategy. Such a strategy is not 
appealing to some fund managers who are not interested in investing in housing assets 
without safe exit options. Paraphrasing Beck et al (2011), it is important to note that the lack 
of liquidity in the market relates partly to the fact that it is a requirement for corporate 
bonds to be traded on exchanges. This together with the one-off nature of corporate bond 
issuances and the small size of issues causes significant liquidity problems and makes it 
difficult to raise long-term financing. 
It is clear that the current legal and regulatory environment for capital markets is not 
conducive to attracting investors. Thus, it is important to put in place the necessary 
conditions for corporate bond markets to thrive and attract private capital. This will be 
challenging, as it requires transformational policy measures and actions which won’t happen 
overnight as effective and well-functioning capital market developments will take time to 
materialise. Some incentive mechanisms and policy options governments can adopt to 
attract investors include fiscal incentives such as phasing out double taxation for companies 
listed on several stock exchanges, revising listing requirements including cost and 
governance issues related to transparency and protection for investors, promoting 
regulatory frameworks that enable institutional investors to revise their investment strategy 
and exclusion lists in order to ensure housing is part of the eligible asset class for 
investments, as well as the need to improve the efficiency of trading and communication 
systems. Moreover, in order to attract long-term financing for housing, there is a need to 
adopt a long-term perspective wherein efforts are made to standardise mortgage 
underwriting practices and procedures, which are key for developing secondary mortgage 
markets. In order to create the necessary scale for liquid capital, it is also critical to promote 
regional stock exchanges and allow for cross-listing23. In the meantime, alternative solutions 
geared towards stimulating liquidity in the housing markets should be explored. 
 
                                                          
22 Miller, 2014. 
23 Ibid 
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5.3.3. WEAK INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
Credit maturities are longer in countries that have strong institutions and uphold the rule of 
law24. Consumer, creditor and property rights protection, strong corporate governance, the 
existence of collateral and bankruptcy laws, and most importantly, the enforcement of these 
laws and other long-term contractual commitments are vital for increasing access to long-
term financing. In most African countries today, the lack of supportive institutional and 
regulatory frameworks continues to impede the growth of long-term finance and housing 
finance. The lack of clarity, combined with regulatory restrictions, presents a challenge for 
institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies to actively provide 
long-term financing. It is well documented that the investment guidelines for pension funds 
in Africa, if any, are weak and often contain restrictive requirements in terms of eligible 
asset class or exposure to foreign assets25. For example, in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, 
pension funds are not permitted to invest in housing development companies26. In many 
other countries, investment limits on foreign assets and domestic securities shut the door to 
long-term investments and prompts a majority of institutional funds to invest in short-term 
government securities. Moreover, African pension funds often face capacity constraints to 
implement these restrictive investment guidelines. In fact, governments through national 
social security companies manage most African pension funds. As such, they may not have 
attracted talented fund managers from the private sector and end up using civil servants 
who may not have the required skills and capacities to understand and efficiently implement 
the investment guidelines, including making the right investment decisions on foreign assets. 
Land governance systems and regulation also remain very weak. The multiplicity and co-
existence of dual land tenure regimes (customary and statutory land rights), high transaction 
costs, and poor land governance and management systems are characteristic of land 
markets in Africa. Today, just an estimated 10% of land in Africa is formally registered to 
individuals as freehold property, although wide variations exist across regions and even 
within countries. Overlapping and conflicting land tenure systems continue to undermine 
the use of land as collateral in accessing housing finance. Hence, there is a need for 
sweeping land reforms geared towards providing tenure security. In so doing, governments 
need to improve land rights delivery, including land formalisation and making land available 
to buyers or allottees at scale. Most importantly, resolving contradictions between 
customary and statutory tenure is vital for strengthening land governance. In this respect, it 
is noted that traditional systems of land delivery are now generally being integrated into a 
statutory land market structure. 
Formal land titles are a necessary precondition for delivering large-scale housing 
provisions.27 Formal land titles confer legal proof of ownership, which is exclusive and 
transferable, and thereby strengthens tenure security. As such, they constitute a major asset 
that the poor could leverage to access housing finance, for instance. Besides, while the 
                                                          
24 See Tasić and Valev (2008), and Giannetti (2003). 
25 Ibid 
26 AMCHUD, 2014. 
27 See Faye et al (2017) for more discussion on land tenure regimes. 
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argument that there exist alternatives to formal land titles that are cheaper and easier to 
implement may be valid, it remains that as far as leveraging housing finance is concerned, 
the market tends to favour formal land titling as the solution. In other words, reforming the 
land formalisation process is necessary in attracting long-term private capital. Still, it is 
worth noting that however perfect or efficient a land titling system is, it may not help 
channel long-term financing to housing if the legal frameworks in place are not enforced to 
protect property rights. 
Financial sector infrastructure, including credit bureau databases that contain both positive 
and negative information, is inexistent in many countries. As a result, lenders and investors 
lack basic credit information on households and firms to effectively price and manage risks. 
In fact, the lack of adequate credit information systems adds to the market uncertainty and 
increases the perceived risk related to housing finance transactions. It is important to note 
that the underwriting processes currently used by the conventional banking sector prevent 
many qualified borrowers employed in the informal economy (where the majority in need of 
housing is located) from accessing housing finance. Therefore, the lack of or limited capacity 
of the conventional banking sector coupled with weak credit information systems is a huge 
bottleneck to the flow of financing to the housing sector. Credit bureaus and collateral 
registries have been shown to foster the use of long-term finance by firms28. Building the 
necessary financial infrastructure is thus vital for deepening the continent’s financial sector 
and increasing access to long-term finance.  
It is also important to note that in order to provide long-term financing in a sustainable 
manner, good corporate governance systems including sound risk management frameworks, 
as well as responsible and adaptive lending methods are expected from both investors and 
financial institutions. This is a challenge as it requires a lot of transformative measures to be 
put in place. For instance, housing finance providers are expected to strengthen their risk 
management framework and put in place the necessary safeguards to mitigate risks. This 
includes adapting underwriting standards that contain know-your-customer rules, 
independent checks of stated household income, prioritising lending to existing customers 
that have a positive loan repayment track record, lowering loan-to-value and debt-to-
income limits, adopting flexible loan repayment plans, and so on. Moreover, exploring 
alternative loan guarantee options that may be less stringent for borrowers, including 
offering equitable mortgages whereby the title certificate is kept by the lender; considering 
promissory mortgage liens; liens on pension fund accounts, within limits; personal 
guarantees; pledged savings; and salary payroll deductions are other options to consider. It 
is also critical that institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds 
have appropriate risk management systems in place, focusing on risk-based supervision 
approaches and including appropriate provision for oversight and supervision. Verifying the 
effectiveness of these systems should be the focus of national regulatory and supervisory 
institutions whose capacity ought to be reinforced. 
                                                          
28 See Love, Martinez Peria, and Singh (2013) and Martinez Peria and Singh (2014). 
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It is obvious from the aforementioned discussion that reforming and building institutions as 
well as putting in place the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks are key to 
lengthening credit maturities and fostering access to long-term finance. Nonetheless, 
achieving such a goal would require sustained efforts over the long run. 
5.4. Emerging Housing Finance Solutions in Africa 
It is evident that significant challenges prevent borrowers and lenders from accessing long-
term finance for housing as highlighted in the preceding section. Removing these barriers to 
long-term finance will require sustainable reforms over the long term. No matter how 
difficult and long this journey may be for many countries and stakeholders, it remains very 
promising in the sense that the long-term nature provides room for innovating and scaling 
up new and emerging solutions. In this light, it is noted that many countries and regional 
institutions have started implementing initiatives to reform and develop their housing 
finance systems, including building secondary mortgage markets. The ensuing sub-sections 
will discuss some emerging solutions geared towards increasing access to long-term 
financing for the housing sector. 
5.4.1. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FROM THE BOND MARKET 
Even though the bond market is still in its infancy (see Figure 5.4), some efforts are being 
made across the continent to mobilise long-term financing for housing development through 
domestic and international bond markets. In a few countries such as Kenya and Morocco, 
governments, property developers and primary mortgage lenders are beginning to look to 
the bond market for financing housing-related projects. This includes local governments 
issuing municipality bonds to finance housing related-infrastructure; property developers 
raising private capital through housing development bonds for their projects; and mortgage 
lenders raising long-term financing through asset-backed securities such as mortgage 
covered bonds. The discussion that follows provides an overview of the efforts made in 
these areas in Africa. 
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Figure 5.4.: African Bond Market (as a % of GDP) 
 
Source: African Market Initiative 
Notes: * CONSUMAF (cumulative issues 2007-2001) **CREPMEF (market capitalisation) 
Local governments can issue municipal bonds to finance capital-intensive projects such as 
infrastructure development projects including roads, water and sanitation, housing, and so 
on. However, this funding instrument remains a rarity in Africa, with only the cities of 
Johannesburg and Lagos having ever issued this type of bond. The city of Dakar’s attempt to 
issue a municipal bond in 2015 provides useful lessons on what it takes to raise funds in the 
capital market. Actually, for municipalities or cities across the continent looking to fund their 
rapid urbanisation and infrastructure needs, they will need to have a strong balance sheet, 
strengthen their creditworthiness as well as their fiscal and financial management processes, 
and put in place the policy and regulatory frameworks needed to support the development 
of municipal bonds including sound governance systems, among others. In many countries 
where decentralisation remains weak, having the full support of the central government is 
vital for issuing municipal bonds. 
In Kenya, property developers and financial institutions such as Shelter Afrique have issued 
housing development bonds to finance real estate projects across the continent. Between 
2005 and 2014, Shelter Afrique successfully issued five bonds in amounts ranging between 
USD 5.2 million and USD 51.6 million with tenors of up to five years. Housing Finance, 
Kenya’s leading mortgage lender, has also successfully raised long-term financing for housing 
through the bond market, all of which were oversubscribed. However, not all housing bond 
issues have been successful. Home Afrika, the sole listed property developer in Kenya’s 
unsuccessful launch should serve as an example to institutions eager to float housing bonds 
in the market. An effective corporate governance system and a strong balance sheet are 
some of the minimum hurdles developers and financial institutions will need to clear before 
issuing housing bonds. 
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Mortgage securities, such as mortgage covered bonds (MCB), are another example of 
capital market funding for housing, which has proven successful in Europe and other 
emerging countries such as Chile, the Czech Republic and Hungary29. A mortgage covered 
bond is a debt instrument secured against a pool of mortgages wherein the investor has a 
priority claim on the collateral, underlying assets and its proceeds in the event the issuer 
goes bankrupt. The low risk feature of this asset and its attractive risk-adjusted returns have 
permitted MCB lenders to raise funds in the market at lower borrowing cost. This has 
enabled covered bond lenders to offer more long-term loans for housing30. MCBs could be a 
new and attractive funding tool for countries with a fairly developed financial market. Even 
though this funding instrument has not yet been used in the continent, countries such as 
Morocco and South Africa are currently working to establish mortgage covered bond 
systems. It is important to note that prerequisites for implementing MCBs include the 
existence of a comprehensive financial infrastructure and a strong safeguard system with a 
solid financial supervisory framework, especially in the banking sector. 
5.4.2. MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY FACILITIES 
Given the small size of mortgage markets across the continent and the lack of secondary 
mortgage markets, mortgage liquidity facilities have emerged as a growing source of long-
term capital for primary mortgage lenders. A mortgage liquidity facility (MLF) is a refinancing 
company that provides long-term financing to mortgage lenders. Using their mortgage 
assets as collateral for loans from a centralised bond issuer (in this case a mortgage 
refinancing company) banks can access long-term funding from MLFs at competitive rates to 
offer more housing loans. As an intermediary between capital market investors and 
mortgage lenders, MLFs primarily raise funds through bond issuances under better rates and 
conditions than mortgage lenders might be able to, if acting alone. Today, these facilities are 
operational in Egypt, Nigeria, Tanzania and the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) as shown in Box 5.1. 
Box 5.1.: Caisse Régionale de Refinancement Hypothécaire-UEMOA – Promoting a 
Regional Mortgage Market 
The West Africa regional mortgage refinance fund, known in French as Caisse Régionale de 
Refinancement Hypothécaire-UEMOA (CRRH-UEMOA) was created in 2012 with the West 
African Development Bank, ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, Shelter Afrique, 
and 48 regional commercial banks as shareholders. As of June 2014, CRRH-UEMOA’s capital 
stood at CFAF 5.632 billion (USD 9.63 million). 
 
As of February 2014, CRRH-UEMOA had mobilised CFAF 51.9 billion (USD 88.85 million) 
through the issuance of 10-year tax-free bonds for the benefit of 23 commercial banks in 
seven WAEMU countries, at an average rate of 6%. Bond proceeds will be used to refinance 
fixed-rate mortgages up to CFAF 100 million (USD 171 176). The impact of CRRH-UEMOA is 
                                                          
29 See Chiquier and Lea, 2009. 
30 Avesani et al, 2007. 
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already visible as longer maturity loans – with a tenor of 15-20 years, and lower interest 
rates – are now being offered in a number of countries. 
 
On the basis of its mandate to deepen regional financial markets and contribute to 
standardising mortgage loan portfolios, documentation, and risk management, CRRH-
UEMOA plans to gradually extend the maturity of future bond issuance in order to 
strengthen its capacity to finance low- and moderate-income housing. The listing of CRRH-
UEMOA securities in the regional stock market (BRVM) serves a dual purpose of increasing 
the liquidity of its bonds and debt securities while deepening regional financial markets. 
 
Source: Faye et al, forthcoming, 2017 
Besides being an important source of long-term affordable finance, liquidity facilities also 
have several benefits such as developing bond markets, promoting competition and making 
housing loans more affordable. In Tanzania, for instance, the establishment of the Tanzania 
Mortgage Refinance Company (TMRC) in 2010 has been critical in promoting the growth of 
mortgage finance. As of March 2016, TMRC has catalysed the entry of 24 new banks into the 
mortgage financing market, increased the mortgage repayment period from the maximum 
of 7 years that banks offered in the past to 20 years today. Financing offered by TMRC to its 
12 member banks accounted for USD 20.5 million or 12% of the outstanding mortgage debt 
(USD 171 million) in the market as at March 2016. As illustrated, TMRC’s activities continue 
to increase competition and expand the housing finance market in Tanzania. 
MLFs have a vital role to play in Africa’s burgeoning mortgage market as they provide a 
stepping stone for secondary mortgage market development. By leveraging capital market 
funding to increase liquidity in the mortgage market, MLFs are an important instrument in 
addressing the maturity mismatch between the liabilities and assets of primary mortgage 
lenders. Given the catalytic role of MLFs in building local capital markets and narrowing the 
long-term finance gap, it is essential for national governments and the development finance 
community to support the growth of this instrument in the near term. This support could 
include the technical assistance for designing enabling policies and regulatory frameworks, 
building the requisite financial and risk management infrastructure, and the provision of 
concessionary funding to these facilities. 
5.4.3. LEVERAGING PATIENT CAPITAL FOR HOUSING THROUGH PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
As discussed above, institutional investors in Africa, particularly pension funds and insurance 
companies, continue to grow considerably as an important source of long-term capital. The 
increasing size of assets managed by African institutional investors such as pension funds, 
SWFs and insurance companies are a reflection of ongoing reforms and improvements made 
in several countries to support the development of the institutional investor industry. This 
includes a rapidly changing demographic, improving regulatory environment, and a more 
stable macroeconomic environment.  
As the portfolios of these institutional investors continue to increase, these fund managers 
will need to strengthen their capacities and acquire the necessary skills that will enable them 
Banking in sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and Digital Financial Inclusion 
© European Investment Bank, November 2016  133 
 
to efficiently select alternative asset classes to diversify their portfolio in order to spread 
risks, while also generating strong returns. Long-term investments such as housing 
development and the private equity model – with a typical fund cycle of 7-10 years – fit the 
long-term horizon of pension and insurance plans as well as SWFs.  
Private equity (PE) is a viable asset class for institutional investors looking to diversify their 
portfolio. Enabling regulatory reforms in countries such as Botswana, Kenya, Namibia and 
Nigeria have facilitated the participation of local institutional investors such as pension funds 
in private equity and housing. The indicative amounts related to AUM in the institutional 
savings industry on the continent, mentioned above (section 5.2), are very informative as to 
the amount of money that could be mobilised and invested through private equity funds. 
Focusing on pension funds alone, it is reported from Preqin data that 173 pension funds are 
currently targeting investments in African-focused private equity firms. However, only 13 of 
these funds are African pension funds. This suggests that efforts are needed to cause African 
pension funds to play a vital role in developing the continent’s private equity market in 
particular, and the capital market in general. To put things in perspective, it is important to 
note that conservative estimates show that African pension funds currently have over 
USD 29 billion available to invest in private equity (Table 5.3)31. If these funds were fully 
mobilised for private equity investment in Africa, it would more than double the size of the 
continent’s private equity industry today.  
  
                                                          
31 Ibid 
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Table 5.3.: Assets under Management and Available for Private Equity in Select Countries 
Country AUM 
(USD millions) 
Allocation to PE 
(%) 
Available for 
PE (USD millions) 
Botswana 6 000 2.5% 150 
Ghana 2 600 unclear 130 
Kenya 7 280 10% 728 
Namibia 9 960 1.75%-3.5% 348 
Nigeria 25 000 5% 1 250 
Rwanda 482 10% 48 
South Africa 322 000 10% 32 000 
Tanzania 3 100 5% 155 
Uganda 1 500 unclear 75 
Zambia 1 800 unclear 90 
Total 379 240  34 974 
Source: MFW4A 
Private Equity and Affordable Housing 
Private equity continues to play an important role in improving access to long-term finance 
for African enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In 2015, 
African PE firms raised USD 4.3 billion; bringing the total amount raised by African PE funds 
to USD 16.2 billion between 2010 and 2015. As the appetite for African-focused PE funds 
increases, investment activity across the continent has also been on the rise. The total value 
of reported PE deals reached USD 2.5 billion in 2015. Given that most African countries have 
poorly developed capital markets, PE provides an attractive alternative, and an important 
source of patient capital, for the continent’s housing market. Besides providing businesses 
with long-term risk capital, PE finance may also come with many benefits to an economy – 
job creation, an increased tax base, private sector development, and improved 
developmental outcomes. 
Affordable housing programmes present a massive opportunity for the private and public 
sector to partner to create platforms that enable citizens to get a foothold on the property 
ladder. Notwithstanding the attractive investment opportunities (with forecasted returns of 
up to 20%) for affordable housing investments across Africa,32 this has historically been an 
overlooked asset class. Real estate accounted for just 3% of PE transactions by value in 
Africa, with commercial real estate accounting for the bulk of these transactions over the 
period 2007-2014. In October 2014 for instance, Preqin’s real estate online service showed 
that just eight African-focused real estate funds are being raised, with a combined target size 
of USD 1.8 billion. This is in sharp contrast to the 58 Asian-focused real estate funds 
targeting a combined USD 17.5 billion in the same period. 
                                                          
32 Projections from an African focused affordable housing fund. 
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In Africa, few PE firms are dedicated to financing affordable housing projects. Phatisa’s Pan 
African Housing Fund and Old Mutual’s Housing Impact Fund South are some examples of 
real estate funds primarily targeting the low and middle-income housing market segment in 
Africa. The successfully exited South Africa Workforce Housing Fund (SAWHF) managed by 
International Housing Solutions (IHS) provides an illustrative example of how a PE fund can 
support the provision of low-income housing in Africa. As of December 2014, the SAWHF 
fund had fully committed ZAR 1.9 billion (USD 157 million) for the development of over 
28 000 housing units in South Africa for low and middle-income families. This will contribute 
to reducing South Africa’s housing deficit, estimated at 2.1 million housing units. IHS has also 
provided business opportunities for the finance sector in South Africa by attracting 
ZAR 2.8 billion (USD 232 million) of project debt financing for its investments. Through its 
investments, IHS has supported the growth of mortgages at the affordable income level, 
with over 50% of its housing units sold to households that obtained a mortgage loan. In 
terms of development outcomes, IHS’s affordable housing programme has created an 
estimated 97 045 job opportunities (both direct and indirect). 
Tapping into the institutional savings industry and channelling the mobilised long-term 
resources through investments in private equity firms active in the housing sector could be 
pivotal for financing affordable housing at scale across Africa as well as reducing the 
continent’s housing deficit. In so doing, enabling policies, legal and regulatory reforms, 
capacity development of stakeholders and improving access to reliable data are key to 
unlocking long-term PE capital for affordable housing in Africa. 
5.4.4. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
A real estate investment trust (REIT) is an investment vehicle designed to channel equity 
capital into large-scale real estate projects. REITS were first established in the United States 
(US) to pool capital from several small investors into large housing projects. To date, about 
four African countries out of 34 countries globally have adopted REITs to channel capital into 
their real estate market. A common feature of REITs worldwide is their tax-neutral structure. 
Typically, the profits generated by REITs are passed on to shareholders who are responsible 
for paying taxes - usually at a lower tax base. REITs also provide more liquidity than direct 
investments since they can be traded on stock exchanges, in contrast to buying and selling 
property directly, which often entails higher transaction costs. The increased return and 
reduced risks through diversification are an added advantage of REITs as these companies 
can invest in different countries and various real estate projects – commercial, residential, 
rental and industrial (Box 5.2).  
Box 5.2.: Expanding the Supply of Affordable Housing Through REITs 
In 2013, US non-profit organisations joined together to establish an affordable housing REIT, 
called the Housing Partnership Equity Trust (HPET). Today the partnership counts 12 NGOs 
as members. In addition to the Community Development Trust (CDT), this is the second REIT 
in the US focusing on the affordable housing market. Since its creation, HPET has raised over 
USD 100 million from private and non-profit investors, including Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, 
Prudential Financial, the Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation. HPET 
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plans to raise USD 500 million primarily from institutional investors such as insurance 
companies and pension funds.  Driven by its socially oriented mission to preserve and 
expand the affordable rental stock, HPET provides long-term low-cost equity to its member 
NGOs to acquire affordable rental units for low- and modest-income households. It targets 
apartment buildings with 100 to 150 units costing between USD 5 million and 
USD 10 million. As of February 2015, HPET’s total portfolio stood at 1 500 affordable homes. 
HPET provides investors with an option for balanced financial risks and stable returns with 
strong social impact. As a result of its target market segment, HPET enjoys special tax 
treatment. It is exempt from corporate taxes, so long as it distributes 90% of its taxable 
income to shareholders as dividends. Armed with such financial benefits, HPET is better 
equipped to compete with deep-pocketed investors, most of whom concentrate on the high-
end real estate market.  
Source: Authors based on public documents 
As of May 2016, over 200 REITs are traded on the US stock exchanges, with a market 
capitalisation of almost USD 1 trillion33. The economic contributions of REITs cannot be 
overlooked. In 2014, for instance, an EY (formerly Ernst & Young) study showed that US 
REITs invested USD 55.9 billion in new construction and capital expenditure to maintain 
existing property, which supported 366 000 full-time equivalent (FTE) construction jobs34. 
Moreover, these companies also contributed an estimated 1.8 million FTE jobs and 
USD 107.5 billion of labour income, according to the report. In the European Union, 
residential property holdings by investors totalled EUR 172 billion in 2015, an increase of 
more than 50% since 2011, according to the European Public Real Estate Association. 
Despite the success and continuous growth of REITs and residential property markets in 
North America, Europe and other regions, the expansion of REITs in Africa has been slow 
(Table 5.4). Recent initiatives such as the IFC-CITIC USD 300 million investment platform to 
develop affordable housing projects with 2 000-8 000 units should make it possible to build a 
residential portfolio that can yield risk-adjusted returns of at least 6%. 
  
                                                          
33 National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. https://www.reit.com/investing/reit-basics/reit-financial-
benefits/reits-and-liquidity accessed on 19 July 2016. 
34 EY 2016. 
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Table 5.4.: REITs in Africa 
 First REIT regulation date Number of REIT(s) registered 
Ghana 1994 1 
Nigeria 2007 2 
South Africa 2013 30+ 
Tanzania 2014 1 
Kenya 2013 0 
Uganda First draft out 0 
Source: Knight Frank 
Weak corporate governance, small and poorly developed housing markets and the lack of 
enabling legislative frameworks are some reasons for the slow growth of REITs in Africa. In 
Nigeria, for example, REITs cannot acquire properties in other countries. Additionally, the 
leverage cap of 15% compared to 30-35% in developed and other emerging markets 
dampens the expansion of REITs in Nigeria. 
Ideally, REITs could help channel the much-needed institutional capital into Africa’s property 
markets by serving as a conduit for the institutional saving industry (e.g. insurance 
companies, SWFs and pension funds) to invest in housing. The introduction of REIT 
legislation by national governments is a first step in attracting private capital into local real 
estate markets. Strengthening the housing delivery value chain, adopting and implementing 
policies that increase transparency, building the property and land valuation appraisal 
industry, protecting tenant and landlord rights and enforcing contractual agreements are 
crucial in reducing transactions’ costs and risks, and expanding the REIT industry as well. 
5.5. The Way Forward 
In this paper we acknowledged that the lack of long-term financing is a serious problem that 
undermines the development of the housing sector. Adequately tackling this challenge 
requires a long-term perspective with sustained efforts from various stakeholders. More 
specifically, putting in place all the pieces required for a well-functioning capital market may 
seem to be the journey of a thousand miles. However, this journey is full of promise as it 
paves the way for designing innovative solutions that have the potential to accelerate 
Africa’s journey in closing the long-term housing finance gap. In other words, in the near 
term, the sole focus should not be in building capital markets, which we know takes time to 
materialise. This should be done in parallel to strengthening the underlying fundamentals 
and requirements needed for innovative and alternative solutions for capital markets to 
thrive. Few countries in Africa have taken the necessary first steps in this long and 
challenging journey to attract long-term capital into the residential real estate market –
designing a sector-wide strategy and a comprehensive housing development plan that 
tackles bottlenecks across the housing value chain: housing finance land markets, housing 
infrastructure and the construction industry. As elucidated above, developing an enabling 
policy environment and establishing the right institutions including adequate legal and 
regulatory frameworks are crucial for building sustainable and well-functioning housing 
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finance markets. However, doing so will require the joint and collaborative effort of public 
and private sector stakeholders, as well as support from development partners. 
A non-exhaustive list of actions governments across the continent could undertake to build 
the housing finance market so as to attract long-term private capital should include: 
maintaining the good macroeconomic management performance recorded over the last 
decade so as to ensure a stable inflation environment and moderate interest rate levels; 
designing and implementing sound policy and regulatory reforms including strong and 
streamlined land governance and registration systems with the aim of ensuring tenure 
security and enhancing the possibility to use land as collateral for housing finance 
transactions; designing rental, mortgage and foreclosure laws and most importantly a strong 
legal framework that makes property rights enforceable; building and strengthening the 
capacity of institutions involved in the housing sector such as banks and related ministries 
(housing, finance, urban development, social affairs, and so on); and deepening and 
broadening financial systems, including the promotion of non-bank financial institutions 
such as capital markets, institutional investors and private equity funds by implementing 
policy and regulatory measures that facilitate the establishment and progressive 
development of these institutions. These would include measures geared towards 
strengthening the financial infrastructure such as facilitating the establishment of credit 
information systems, improving corporate governance and investor protection laws to 
safeguard the system, as well as promoting the shift from manual trading systems to 
modern electronic systems and real-time settlement systems. 
The private sector as a key partner of governments on the continent should be at the 
forefront of designing innovative financial products and institutions that have the potential 
to attract new and alternative sources of capital into the real estate market. In so doing, the 
private sector needs to spearhead financial innovation while ensuring the quality of 
underlying assets is guaranteed. These innovative financial products and institutions should 
be geared towards solving issues such as the lack of equity for developers, low mortgage 
penetration rates, as well as the inadequacy of financial instruments. This would include 
adopting flexible but prudent underwriting procedures and processes using alternative 
securities and guarantees, developing credit enhancement instruments to de-risk housing 
finance transactions, increasing transparency and responsible lending behaviour. Moreover, 
this would include promoting instruments such as MCBs that could jump-start and 
accelerate the development of secondary mortgage markets and build an asset class that 
attracts long-term capital while at the same time deepening domestic capital markets. The 
private sector, through institutional investors should also foster and implement the 
necessary reform changes, as well as design appropriate investment guidelines that enable 
them to invest the huge patient capital available to them in vehicles such as private equity 
and REITs. Part of these funds could be channelled to respond to the glaring need for 
developer equity finance. What’s more, these vehicles could also be designed to address the 
technical capacity constraints faced by developers. Doing so would help to build up a local 
developer class with the required capacities and expertise to deliver large housing 
development projects across the continent. Some of these developers could be dedicated to 
serving the low-end housing market. 
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In their quest to support the development of Africa’s long-term housing finance market, 
development partners, such as the African Development Bank, the European Investment 
Bank, the World Bank Group and other sister development finance institutions should 
support public and private initiatives that address housing market failures and inefficiencies. 
This would include supporting governments in designing and implementing enabling policies 
and programmes geared towards developing housing finance solutions, facilitating the 
development of secondary mortgage markets, as well as initiatives geared towards 
strengthening current capital markets and providing funding to financial intermediaries 
(such as REITS and residential real estate private equity funds), among others. 
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6. Long-Term Financing in sub-Saharan Africa 
RAFFAELE DELLA CROCE1, MICHAEL FUCHS2 AND MAKAIO WITTE3 
 
 Executive summary 
• The provision of long-term finance for productive investment is crucial to 
sustaining growth and diversifying economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). Compared to financial inclusion and the provision of short-term funding 
in Africa, progress in promoting long-term finance has so far been rather 
limited. 
 
• Even in the medium term the traditional capital-market based asset allocation 
mechanism is unlikely to contribute significantly towards filling the long-term 
investment and financing needs of smaller economies in SSA. Although 
potentially an attractive option, efforts to use regional markets to harvest 
economies of scale have not yielded the expected results to date. 
 
• In order to respond to the needs SSA is facing, it is necessary to broaden the 
options available locally for long-term finance and increase as well as diversify 
the investor base. Diverse financing instruments are needed to adequately 
serve different types of businesses and their different financing needs along 
the business life cycle. 
 
• Making a dent in filling the long-term financing gap is unlikely to take place on 
listed, formal markets (outside a few more developed SSA countries), but 
rather through unlisted instruments and alternative sources of finance, e.g. 
project bonds for infrastructure projects or, given the right incentives, through 
private equity for SMEs. 
 
• A lot remains to be done in strengthening the underlying financial 
infrastructure for long-term finance, whether the local legal, regulatory and 
judicial frameworks, the capacity to prepare projects for external funding, or 
the ability to maintain a stable macroeconomic environment that reduces the 
risks associated with long-term commitments. 
 
• Effectively leveraging private sector capital in SSA faces several challenges. A 
number of innovations, including tailoring the role of donors and MDBs; use of 
risk mitigation instruments and alternative financial instruments to crowd in 
investors are explored in the SSA context. 
                                                          
1 Lead Manager, Long-Term Investment Project, OECD. 
2 Financial Sector Advisor and consultant to Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), 
Sector and Global Programs Department. 
3 Advisor, Financial Sector Development, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), 
Sector and Global Programs Department. 
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• Development finance institutions (DFIs) continue to play a vital role in 
promoting long-term finance. A stronger shift from direct and indirect 
investments to the provision of guarantee and credit enhancement 
instruments would more effectively leverage public funding as a means to 
mobilise private capital. A reformed approach to local DFIs, whereby the role of 
government finance is refocused on addressing market failures and catalysing 
the private sector, and is carefully targeted and monitored, could yield 
significant potential gains. 
 
6.1. Why does Sub-Saharan Africa Need Long-Term Finance? 
While the emphasis of policymakers in SSA and the donor community during the past 
decade has predominantly been on enhancing financial inclusion, there is a growing 
realisation that this is only one side of the coin. As much as inclusion is important in 
reaching the marginalised or informal economy, and in providing short-term loans as 
working capital for firms, term financing is needed to support growth of productive 
activities in key economic sectors4. In many countries in SSA long-term finance is also 
crucial to reducing reliance on exploitation of natural resource wealth. Long-term 
investment, particularly foreign direct investment, is currently concentrated in 
industries related to natural resource exploitation with little diversification into other 
sectors. 
Longer-term investments support growth by reducing costs, e.g. for transport and 
communication, increasing productivity and competitiveness, and thus creating jobs. 
The lack of or poor quality of infrastructure in SSA is a key driver of the high costs of 
doing business and a severe impediment to higher sustained levels of economic 
diversification and growth. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, the continent’s infrastructure deficit lowers Africa’s per capita economic 
growth by 2% a year and firm productivity by 40%5. Greater investment in housing 
could be a major driver of local employment, but housing finance is only at a nascent 
stage in most SSA countries. Most SMEs are potentially important drivers of growth 
and employment, but remain small partly because they can only access short-term 
and often high-cost informal funding to finance their investment needs. 
The limited penetration of SSA markets for long-term finance is of particular concern 
given the huge long-term investment needs of economies south of the Sahara. On the 
one hand, the investment needs relate to fulfilling SSA’s infrastructure needs in 
transport, electricity generation, transmission and distribution, telecommunications, 
                                                          
4 In this report, short-term financing is defined as any source of funding with a maturity of one year or less, while long-
term financing refers to funding with maturities beyond one year. However, the notion of long-term varies between 
sectors and types of investment: While investing in a firm’s capital stock may require maturities of only a few years, 
large infrastructure projects may be in the range of 10-30 years.  
5  UNECA, 2012, Economic Report on Africa 2012. 
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water and sewerage etc. On the other hand, they relate to providing corporations 
with investment- and risk-capital which is particularly difficult to access for micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) at a reasonable cost. By some 
estimates, the SSA’s infrastructure financing gap exceeds USD 30 billion per year6 and 
the financing gap for formal MSMEs (excluding informal businesses) amounts to 
USD 70-90 billion per year7. Finally, the market for mortgage finance in SSA continues 
to be extremely shallow, underscoring the need to ease current funding constraints 
on the construction and housing sectors. A recent cross-country study of gaps in the 
provision of mortgage finance finds that monetary stability, the efficiency of the 
contractual and information frameworks as well as development of long-term funding 
are strongly associated with mortgage market development8.  
Altogether the definition and measurement of such ‘gaps’ leaves important questions 
unanswered and requires further analysis, not only because they are dependent on a 
number of economy-specific parameters (such as the relative size and degree of 
formality of economic sectors, and the availability of public and private funding) on 
which reliable data for most SSA countries is currently scarce, but also because their 
size is ‘dynamic’ as both demand and supply are dependent on a number of factors. 
For example, the maturity and end-user affordability of the funding provided has an 
impact on the stated investment demand of firms and households, while the supply 
of financing is partly determined by the quality of information about potential 
borrowers, and by the availability of alternative investment options, such as high-
yielding low-risk government bonds. 
SSA does not stand alone with challenges relating to finding sufficient funding sources 
for its long-term investment needs. Policy interventions in this area are common in 
other developing regions and in advanced countries where infrastructure investment 
and funding the green transition are of concern9. However, as discussed in the next 
section, the funding gaps in SSA are considerably larger in relative terms, i.e. the 
existing level of long-term funding measured in relation to any gauge of economic 
activity is much smaller than elsewhere.  
6.2. What is currently the Status of Market Development for Long-Term 
Financing in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
The largest and most important segment across financial sectors in SSA is the banking 
system. While not necessarily an ideal source of intermediation for long-term finance, 
given the maturity transformation of short-term liabilities and consequent risks and 
regulatory constraints, banking systems in most developing countries constitute the 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 IFC, 2013, Closing the Credit Gap for Formal and Informal Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises. 
8 Badev, A., T. Beck, L Vado and S. Walley, 2014, Housing Finance Across Countries: New Data and Analysis, World 
Bank Policy Research Paper 6756, January 2014. 
9 See, for example, OECD, 2015, Fostering Investment in Infrastructure, produced by the OECD for the G20 
Development Working Group or European Commission, Communication on Long-Term Financing of the European 
Economy, COM(2014) 168 final. 
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largest source of long-term funding for firms, households and governments. 
Notwithstanding banks’ relatively significant role in providing term finance, their 
primary focus across SSA is on short and medium-term lending products. This bias 
towards the short term owes itself to a number of factors including the short-term 
nature of their liabilities and the risks associated with making longer-term 
commitments given high political and economic uncertainty, issues relating to 
contract enforcement, and alternative safer sources of earnings (such as investment 
in government securities).  
In turn, domestic capital markets in SSA – outside of South Africa – are still very small. 
There are some emerging hubs, such as Nairobi and Lagos, but many of the new 
exchanges established during the past 15 years are struggling due to limited issuance 
activity and secondary markets are hampered by investors’ buy-and-hold strategy. To 
a large extent market viability is determined by scale, so regionalisation might offer 
better prospects. However, governments often associate establishing local markets 
with preventing the export of local savings and with attracting employment in the 
financial sector or simply with prestige. Altogether there has been limited progress in 
developing markets for long-term finance on the continent. When abstracting from 
South Africa the depth of equity markets in SSA falls far short of the capitalisation and 
liquidity of equity markets in other regions such as Latin America.  
A similar profile is illustrated by the limited numbers of issuances of equity, bonds 
and syndicated loans in SSA compared to other regions (Table 6.1). The availability of 
mortgage finance is also relatively low as are the size of the portfolios administered 
by institutional investors, such as insurance companies. Recent reforms in several SSA 
countries have created private pension systems that are rapidly accumulating assets 
under management. The Nigerian pension industry grew from USD 7 billion in 2008 to 
USD 25 billion in 2013; total assets under management in 10 African countries in 2015 
reached close to USD 380 billion, with South African pension funds managing a 
commanding share of 85% of these assets (USD 322 billion)10. However, the pension 
fund industry only intermediates a fraction of assets under management into 
productive long-term investments due to risk aversion, prudential norms, such as 
minimum rating requirements or limits on cross-border investment, the lack of 
project analysis skills, and the limited number of investible projects. 
As a consequence of the lack of funding – whether for the enterprise, infrastructure 
or housing sectors – that is originated on the listed security markets, long-term 
finance in SSA is largely provided outside listed or formal markets. Corporate bond 
markets are underdeveloped leaving larger enterprises to rely on banks to satisfy 
their longer-term financing needs, often with shorter maturities than their 
investment profiles warrant. Small enterprises are largely dependent on informal 
sources of longer-term finance, such as that provided by friends and family. As 
                                                          
10 Ashiagbor, David et al., 2014, Pension Funds and Private Equity: Unlocking Africa’s Potential.  
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evidenced by enterprise surveys the lack of access to patient investment capital is 
among the most important growth constraints for SMEs in SSA.  
Local funding opportunities for infrastructure projects are similarly constrained. 
Funding of infrastructure projects largely relies on government funding (from fiscal 
revenues and government debt issuance both domestically and abroad), donors and 
foreign direct investment. Private participation in infrastructure investment is 
hampered by the poor quality of local legal and regulatory environments, weak 
project preparation capacity, and underdeveloped or untested public/private 
partnership arrangements. These challenges are compounded by weaknesses in 
institutional and funding arrangements, including for the setting up of special purpose 
vehicles, the process of issuance of project bonds and as regards arranging private 
placements and syndications, all of which would normally be precursors to or 
accompany the process of issuing listed securities. These themes are explored further 
in the following sections. 
Table 6.1.: Average Number of Issuers per Year (2004-2013) 
Average Number of Issuers per Year 
 Syndicated 
 Bonds Loans Equity 
United States 1031 2934 1199 
China 276 118 357 
India 160 147 225 
    
Africa 12 30 57 
Australia & New Zealand 144 189 957 
High-income Asia 498 1748 877 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 108 160 133 
Emerging Asia 168 117 315 
Latin America & Caribbean 234 110 99 
Middle East 28 78 84 
Western Europe 753 1131 999 
Source: Cortina, Juan Jose, Tatiana Didier, and Sergio Schmukler, 2015. “How Long is the Financing in 
Corporate Bond and Syndicated Loan Markets?” Working Paper (World Bank). 
Note: This table reports the average number of issues per year in bond, syndicated loan, and equity 
markets. The sample period is 2004-2013. 
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6.3. How to make a dent in closing the Financing Gap? 
In view of the large financing needs and the availability of pools of capital 
internationally and in some local markets in SSA the question arises as to why so little 
progress has been made in the past to close the gap. This section reviews a number of 
‘traditional’ approaches that have been applied with varying degrees of success and 
presents some novel ways of working towards improving the provision of long-term 
finance in Africa.  
6.3.1. ESTABLISHING REGIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
Local capital markets play an important complementary role to the banking system in 
providing term finance in developed financial systems and increasingly play a similar 
role in emerging market economies (EMEs). African capital markets have grown quite 
rapidly in recent years, albeit starting from a very low base. Nonetheless, outside a 
few financial centres with significant growth potential, capital markets are likely to 
remain narrow, illiquid and inefficient. This outcome is largely the result of the limited 
potential scale that can be achieved by smaller capital markets in Africa.  
The absence of deep and liquid local capital markets and suitable local investment 
vehicles, such as specialised investment funds, that might provide adequate 
diversification opportunities for local institutional investors suggests that the 
traditional capital-market based asset allocation mechanism is unlikely to contribute 
significantly towards filling the long-term investment and financing needs of 
individual smaller economies in SSA in the medium term. 
Aiming to overcome the constraints of small scale, African governments have been 
working towards establishing regional exchanges and enhancing the capacity of 
regional markets for longer-term securities11. Regional solutions have been 
sponsored, for example, among the five member states of the East African 
Community (EAC) and the eight member states of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU), but the level of commitment and the outcomes have so 
far been rather tame. Fears remain that regional integration – rather than benefiting 
smaller markets by providing more diversified and cheaper sources of funding – will 
result in funds being ‘diverted’ to the advantage of larger markets outside the 
domestic market. Altogether, careful consideration needs to be given to whether it is 
worthwhile for low-income countries to invest in ‘on-shoring’ the rather specific and 
technical service functions associated with capital market intermediation. Can the 
associated benefits compensate for the costs – both in terms of the commitment of 
scarce, highly-qualified local personnel and the investment needed to build the 
required legal/institutional capacity?   
                                                          
11 For a more detailed discussion of recent developments and prospects, see FSDA Working Paper – Funding the 
Frontier: Developing Capital Markets for Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, October, 2013. The 2013 East African 
Community Financial Sector Assessment technical note on capital markets also provides a useful reality check as 
regards the prospects for smaller, local capital markets and their integration. 
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6.3.2. DEVELOPING PROJECT PIPELINES 
As indicated above, rather than the availability of funding, the binding constraint 
often lies closer to the investment side. Especially in the infrastructure sector an 
important constraint has proven to be building a pipeline of investible projects which 
could form the basis of corporate bond issuances and be suitable for pension funds to 
invest in. There is a dearth of well-structured, viable projects, inadequate availability 
of project structuring skills among local sponsors, and lack of confidence in the ability, 
willingness and commitment of governments to fulfil their contractual obligations12.  
Support provided by the international donor community seeks to address these 
constraints and build the pipeline of projects through interventions in three different 
areas. On the supply side, the preparation of projects can be supported by 
standardising contracts and bidding procedures, by setting up dedicated project 
feasibility funds and contingent liability frameworks and by assisting commercial 
financial institutions and local DFIs in designing appropriate financial instruments, 
such as bonds, funds and credit enhancement instruments. On the demand side, it is 
important to establish a stable set of investment rules, build capacity for investors 
and regulators and work towards improving the conditions for foreign investors (e.g. 
tax regime, foreign exchange hedging). Finally on the meso and macro level, 
programmes aim to strengthen the market architecture, infrastructure and 
regulations. Examples include building a government bond yield curve as a reference 
for pricing; developing credit ratings; and introducing market regulations regarding 
the issuance process, securitisation, SPVs, etc. as further discussed in section 6.4.  
The long-term impact and sustainability of such donor interventions crucially depend 
on the level to which local structures (institutions, rules and regulations) and capacity 
in the public and private sector (e.g. project developers) can be built up locally. 
Clearly programmes of the breadth outlined above require coordinated, concerted 
and sustained effort over several years, and one of the major challenges facing the 
development of longer-term finance in Africa is commitment to legal and regulatory 
reforms as well as capacity building. 
The development and financing of successful pilot projects can be conducive in 
strengthening the institutional infrastructure both as regards project preparation and 
with a view to strengthening the facilitating legal and regulatory framework. DFIs 
therefore play an important role, be it through direct investments, by crowding in 
private investment or – in more advanced SSA markets – by assisting the issuance of 
corporate bonds to promote the corporate bond market. 
                                                          
12 For discussion regarding developing investment opportunities for Nigerian pension funds, see World Bank Note: 
Financing Options for Infrastructure PPP in Nigeria, January 2013.  
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6.3.3. TAPPING LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL BOND MARKETS 
Governments in SSA have increasingly turned to tapping local and international bond 
markets in the past decade. They have sought to increase the availability of long-term 
funding, mostly for infrastructure investment, both through domestic issuances of 
longer-term government securities and through borrowing in foreign currency on the 
Eurobond market. Increased domestic borrowing could have the important positive 
side effect of extending the domestic yield curve, but all too often such borrowing – 
whether domestic or foreign – has resulted in increasing the government’s revenue 
sources with little measurable impact on investment and the resulting quality of local 
infrastructure. The lack of a stronger association between the available funding and 
infrastructure investments is worrisome, particularly given the risks assumed by the 
government in borrowing abroad and the incentives provided to local investors13. 
Until 2006 the only issuer of foreign-denominated bonds in SSA was South Africa. 
Between 2007 and 2015 countries ranging from Seychelles to DRC and Nigeria issued 
Eurobonds in excess of USD 24 billion (see Figure 6.1. below). External borrowing 
brings with it exchange rate exposures that are often ill-matched to the longer-term 
activities being funded domestically. Domestic investments, for example in 
infrastructure projects, provide little natural hedging against FOREX exposures, other 
than in those particular circumstances where foreign currency is invested in activities 
that generate foreign currency revenues. Thus, while recent foreign-currency 
borrowing through the issuance of Eurobonds pursued by a number of African 
sovereigns appeared to provide access to low-cost funding as regards interest rate 
cost, given the recent appreciation of the USD, such borrowing is already turning out 
to be a risky and in retrospect very expensive way of augmenting the envelope for 
financing of domestic investment programmes. Aside from the associated risks, the 
earmarking of these funds has been weak, and there is no guarantee that such funds 
are used for investment purposes. Indeed, given the perennial challenges faced by 
African governments in implementing their capital budgets, it is more than likely that 
such funds are in part diverted to current expenditures. 
Overall, governments should consider foreign borrowing with extreme caution, and 
efforts should be undertaken to deepen local sources of funding.  
                                                          
13 In Kenya, for example, investors in so-called infrastructure bonds were both provided with tax relief and allowed to 
use the bonds as collateral. For further discussion regarding the limited impact of such financing on the quality of 
infrastructure, see IMF Regional Economic Outlook, Sub-Saharan Africa, October, 2014. 
Banking in sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and Digital Financial Inclusion 
© European Investment Bank, November 2016  151 
 
Figure 6.1.: Eurobond Issuances in Africa 2007-2015 
USD billions 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank Research Briefing Nov. 2015: Eurobonds in Africa: Will the Boom Continue?  
6.3.4. DIVERSIFYING FINANCING INSTRUMENTS FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS 
A more diverse set of financing instruments than is currently deployed in most 
countries in SSA is needed to adequately serve the different types of businesses and 
their different financing needs along the business life cycle. Private capital takes many 
forms, and each class of investor (corporate, institutional investor, domestic or 
foreign) will point to different reasons for underinvestment in developing countries. 
Domestic investors may lack sufficient investment opportunities, or may find 
themselves constrained by the underdevelopment of local capital markets14. Foreign 
investors may start with a set of geographies where they are comfortable operating, 
based on determinants such as the investment environment, respect for the rule of 
law and tradition of respecting foreign capital. 
As governments seek greater levels of private finance in infrastructure and SMEs, 
efforts are underway to better identify the role of governments and DFIs in catalysing 
private sector capital. The ultimate aim is to broaden the financing options available 
for long-term finance and increase as well as diversify the investor base. 
6.3.4.1. DIVERSIFYING FINANCING INSTRUMENTS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE15 
Leveraging Development Finance Solutions 
To a large extent long-term funding of infrastructure in SSA is provided circumventing 
the intermediation process altogether – e.g. as long-term financing funded by 
                                                          
14 An illustrative classic case on African markets is change of ownership in the case of inter-generational transfer of 
larger family-owned businesses, where the opportunities for IPOs are constrained, often resulting in considerable loss 
of value.  
15 Drawing from OECD research completed in the report Infrastructure Financing Instruments and Incentives, 
delivered to the G20 in September 2015, and the G20/OECD Support Note on Diversification of Financial Instruments 
for Infrastructure accompanying the G20/OECD Guidance note endorsed by G20 leaders in September 2016 in 
Hangzhou, China. 
Côte d’Ivoire 
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governments, donors or in the form of foreign direct investment. Such direct funding 
tends to be of relatively significant size in SSA economies compared to the funds 
intermediated by local financial markets. Therefore developing funding mechanisms 
and institutional capacity that leverages these external sources of funds may well be 
important in enhancing the supply of long-term finance. It may also be a precursor to 
deepening local markets for term finance, whether this takes the form of private 
placements, syndicated loans or issuance of securities on these local markets as they 
evolve. This agenda seems particularly important, as the availability of concessionary 
funding is under pressure due to budget constraints in donor countries. The challenge 
facing policymakers is to turn this process into a virtuous cycle, gradually leveraging 
greater funding contributions from the private sector, as illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
Given the role of the government as a source of funding and in developing the local 
legal, regulatory and institutional environment, it is worth revisiting the role of 
development finance as a catalyst in filling long-term financing gaps. A reformed 
approach, whereby the role of government finance is confined to catalysing the 
private sector, and is carefully targeted and monitored, could yield significant 
potential gains16. The difficulty arises in exercising a flexible mandate whereby 
governments contribute to the provision of services and functions that generate value 
added, but also withdraw as soon as private sector provision becomes viable. 
Involving the private sector in the governance, and if possible ownership, of such new 
development finance initiatives will therefore be crucial so as to avoid situations 
where their mandates could be diluted due to untoward government interference or 
the lifetime of such initiatives is extended beyond their usefulness. The performance 
of these initiatives is to be measured according to their ability to sustainably catalyse 
service delivery by the private sector. They can perform an important function as 
‘first-movers’, in providing demonstration effects, or in galvanising otherwise risk-
averse investors. Importantly they will harness the involvement of the private sector 
as an interested investor and the sponsor of broader sector-wide institutional 
reforms17. 
                                                          
16 The World Bank’s Global Financial Development Report 2013 notes three essential design features relating to the 
institutional design of state banks that are essential to their performance: (a) a clear and sustainable mandate so they 
complement rather than substitute private efforts in the credit markets; (b) an adequate risk management system to 
guarantee financial sustainability of the institution; and (c) sound corporate governance. 
17 For further discussion, see de la Torre, A., J. Gozzi and S. Schmukler, 2007, Innovative Experiences in Access to 
Finance: Market Friendly Roles for the Visible Hand?, World Bank Working Paper, August 2007. See also the Project 
Appraisal Document for Nigeria Development Finance Project, World Bank, September 2014. 
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Figure 6.2.: The Infrastructure Funding Escalator 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration 
Broadening the range of financial instruments 
In as much as private investors are to play a larger role in the funding of infrastructure 
investment, steps can be taken to encourage their wider participation. Many private 
investors perceive a lack of suitable financing structures. Only the largest investors 
have the capacity to invest directly in infrastructure projects. Pension funds in 
particular require pooled investment vehicles. Where available, collective investment 
vehicles, such as infrastructure funds, are as yet more focused on attracting foreign 
investors and may also be associated with high fees and potential mismatches 
between asset life and fund vehicle. Furthermore, in many countries in Africa the 
legal and regulatory framework for such collective investment vehicles is still nascent 
or untested. Yet the market is evolving to address some of the concerns. For instance, 
several newer unlisted equity funds, albeit foreign-domiciled, are offering longer 
investment terms, and competition from direct-equity investors is putting pressure 
on the fund management industry to lower fees18. 
6.3.4.2. DIVERSIFYING FINANCING INSTRUMENTS FOR SMES  
Asymmetric information is a more serious problem in SMEs than in larger firms: In 
SSA the vast majority of SMEs do not produce audited financial statements that yield 
credible financial information. Furthermore, in smaller enterprises, the line of 
demarcation between the finances of the owner(s) and those of the business is 
usually blurred. Also, the principal/agent problem inherent in all financing operations 
is particularly acute in the case of SMEs, which may undertake projects that are 
                                                          
18 This section draws on more extensive research in OECD 2017 (forthcoming), Infrastructure Financing Partnering 
with the Private Sector, OECD Publishing, Paris.  
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deemed excessively risky by the lender. Against this backdrop, the lack of credit 
history, which is particularly acute in SSA, and collateral19 often results in severe 
credit constraints for SMEs.  
In SSA, rather than seeking funding on formal markets SMEs may obtain funding 
provided by family and friends, although this is unlikely to be sufficient in size and 
maturity to satisfy their investment needs. Nonetheless, among policymakers the 
tendency has been to focus on the establishment of formal banking markets. When it 
comes to capital markets, policy implementation has often been focused on formal 
markets, and has not actively sought to promote the provision of a continuum of 
informal and formal/private and public financing vehicles. 
Figure 6.3.: The Corporate Funding Escalator 
 
Source: Author’s illustration 
While bank financing will continue to be crucial for the SME sector, a more diversified 
set of options for SME financing can be envisaged to support long-term investment in 
SSA and reduce the vulnerability of SMEs to changes in credit markets. Figure 6.3 
illustrates how various sources of finance – ranging from funds provided by family 
and friends and venture capital at one end of the spectrum to private equity and 
listed instruments at the other end – progressively become more available at various 
stages of market development.  
Moving up each step on the funding escalator is predicated on a reduction of 
information asymmetry and agency costs, as formality in the provision of capital rises, 
enabling larger levels of capital to be intermediated on financial markets. Thus there 
is a correlation between the steps on the escalator and the progression from market 
opacity to greater transparency. At earlier stages of development with little private 
sector involvement in infrastructure finance and where enterprises largely rely on 
informal sources of finance (family or friends) and banks, very little information is 
                                                          
19 In SSA collateral requirements often exceed the value of the loan, indicating problems with the liquidation of the 
collateral due to the limited and very lengthy enforceability of financial contracts. 
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available as to the risks assumed by those providing funding or the nature and size of 
the finance provided.  
In practice the list of instruments that can suit the risk appetite of institutional 
investors in EMEs is constrained by institutional, regulatory and practical hurdles. 
Importantly, the number of SMEs eligible as the basis for market-based third-party 
funding is typically limited due to weaknesses in the financial infrastructure (such as 
the absence of a well-developed credit information industry) combined with opacity 
as to the finances and business plans of potential SME borrowers, as well as a lack of 
collateral. This suggests that the development of private equity investment in SMEs 
may be a more viable option in SSA, provided that funds could be made available to 
defray the costs of assessing many smaller enterprises and monitoring their 
performance. It can be expected that the larger and more sophisticated institutional 
investors in SSA will have an appetite for this type of investment – and there are 
some experiences in this regard. As institutional investors become more 
sophisticated, their appetite for equity investment tends to grow20.  
6.4. Catalysing Private Financial Resources 
Essentially, long-term funding provision by the private sector depends on an 
acceptable risk-return profile. While returns on infrastructure investments or 
investments in African corporates may be attractive, they compete with high-yielding 
government bonds with the latter often crowding out the former. Apart from the high 
interest rates on government paper the level of risk is perceived to be elevated in 
most African countries, including commercial, technological, and particularly 
regulatory and political risk. For investors to be willing to take these risks, adequate 
de-risking instruments are required as are enforceable long-term contractual 
commitments which in turn rely on respect for the rule of law.  
Going beyond the procurement processes associated with delivery on government 
contracts, which in themselves can pose challenges, long-term commitments in the 
fields of infrastructure and SMEs depend on a rather sophisticated set of legal, 
regulatory and institutional frameworks that are often only partially implemented in 
SSA. Among these are property and collateral registries, reliable accounting and 
reporting procedures, tested and reliable foreclosure mechanisms, proven regulatory 
frameworks supported by reliable judicial processes, etc. The longer the term of 
contracts and the larger the funding commitments, the more important such ‘basic’ 
institutional and legal infrastructure becomes. The legal and regulatory challenges 
                                                          
20 See OECD, 2015, New Approaches to SME and Entrepreneurship Financing: Broadening the Range of Instruments, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. See also Iota Kaousar Nassr and Gert Wehinger, 2016, “Opportunities and limitations of public 
equity markets for SMEs", OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, Vol. 2015/1. 
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alluded to here have often been all too clearly demonstrated when governments 
have embarked on public-private partnerships21. 
Thus, while governments and donors realise that public funds are insufficient to meet 
the huge long-term financing needs, effectively leveraging the private sector capital 
has in the past often been hampered by investors’ lack of trust in the domestic 
institutional environment and the implied risks. In addition, the private sector’s 
reluctance may reflect risks emanating from potential macroeconomic instability that 
could well raise uncertainty associated with (re-)financing costs.  
How can these obstacles be circumvented or addressed? The following sections 
review strategies including a new role for donors and MDBs, the use of risk mitigation 
instruments, and alternative financial instruments to crowd in investors.  
6.4.1. RISK-SHARING INSTRUMENTS 
Several governments have been active in facilitating private sector involvement in the 
financing of infrastructure and SMEs, through the promotion of risk-sharing 
instruments. In many SSA countries, governments are not in a position to provide 
these instruments themselves, given they entail contingent fiscal liabilities that are 
complex to manage. Here financial institutions and MDBs may have a key role to play. 
In infrastructure, direct loans (sometimes syndicated) and loan guarantees have been 
the key mechanisms used by development banks to support financing. However, 
currently new ways are being explored to expand the use of capital markets. For 
example, Colombia recently constituted a development bank specialising in 
infrastructure, Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional (FDN). FDN intends to use different 
types of risk-sharing mechanisms to support infrastructure projects, including partial 
guarantees. Insurance could be another way of managing certain types of commercial 
and political risks.  
Many EMEs have experience with guarantee programmes to encourage bank lending 
to SMEs. In some cases these guarantees are provided directly by the government, 
while in others they have been provided by public financial institutions, such as Corfo 
in Chile or Nafin in Mexico. For the larger EMEs, where a robust pipeline of “high 
quality” loans might exist, the challenge and opportunity lies in further leveraging 
those programmes to increase the availability of funding to SMEs via capital markets, 
for example by linking guarantee programmes to securitisation structures or even to 
SME bond issuances. This secondary market funding is the financing model envisaged 
by the recently-established Development Bank of Nigeria, which as a wholesale-only 
                                                          
21 Recent efforts by World Bank projects to support the implementation of PPP projects in countries such as Ghana 
and Nigeria bear witness to the challenges and complexities associated with overcoming the institutional, regulatory 
and legal hurdles referred to here. 
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lender intends to leverage donor funding with local bond issuance to be used for 
providing financial institutions with both credit lines and partial credit guarantees22. 
An innovative new structure in this context being developed by the European 
Investment Bank and aiming to increase private sector involvement in the African 
energy sector is the African Energy Guarantee Facility. The facility will be structured 
as a mezzanine portfolio guarantee providing access to risk mitigation and credit 
enhancement solutions for private sector reinsurance providers. While the reinsurer 
will retain a portfolio first-loss tranche, the facility would guarantee a tranche of the 
portfolio above the first loss. Losses in excess of the guaranteed tranche will be borne 
by the reinsurance company. The facility will be an open architecture framework of 
insurance and reinsurance agreements, offering political and credit risk insurance for 
investors, lenders and other stakeholders in energy projects in North Africa and SSA. 
The proposed structure is designed to reduce economic and regulatory capital 
consumption for the reinsurance company. This will unlock additional risk bearing 
capacity dedicated to energy projects in Africa, which would otherwise not be 
available. 
6.4.2. ROLE OF DONORS AND MDBS 
Beyond being a significant source of long-term capital in low income countries, donor 
funds and MDBs have an instrumental role to play in supporting SSA governments. 
Their support ranges from technical assistance in preparing projects to providing 
advice, offering risk-sharing mechanisms, helping to structure and underwrite 
instruments and even serving a catalytic role with their participation in strategic 
transactions. 
More often than not, donor funds are used to directly finance capital projects, e.g. 
through lending or equity investments or indirectly through credit lines for on-lending 
through local financial institutions. Given the gap between needs and means and the 
hesitancy of the private sector in significantly stepping up its investments, 
consideration should be given as to how donor funds could be leveraged so as to 
more effectively ‘crowd in’ private equity and lending through contingent funding 
instruments such as credit enhancements. In this regard, MDBs already have 
programmes in place to support EMEs’ efforts to develop their local securities 
markets. These programmes range from providing advisory services to participating 
as guarantors or even investors in specific transactions or instruments that could have 
a catalytic effect in the market. 
Some projects that are clearly and unequivocally commercially viable will be able to 
attract private sector finance in the market. This could involve local issuance of 
project (private placement) bonds, corporate bonds, and pooled financing structures 
– which would contribute towards reducing FOREX exposure and deepening local 
                                                          
22 See “Nigeria Development Finance Study: Lessons from international experience in designing the Development 
Bank of Nigeria”, World Bank, September, 2016. 
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intermediation capacity. However, for other socially desirable and economically 
transformative projects where the rate of return may be insufficient to compensate 
private sector investors for the level and/or nature of risk, various risk mitigation 
techniques and incentives may be employed to manage risks and/or enhance returns 
so as to crowd in private capital23.  
It is increasingly clear that MDBs can leverage the role they play by increasing the role 
of private debt and equity markets. An important component of the G20 
infrastructure agenda for 2016 is to encourage MDBs to increase investment through 
joint actions, including by catalysing private resources. Several proposals have been 
made in the context of the G20 Investment and Infrastructure Working Group to 
optimise the use of existing MDB resources and thus enhance the volume and quality 
of lending available for development. 
Measures proposed to optimise the capital side of MDBs' balance sheets include 
higher leverage while maintaining the AAA rating, mainstreaming concessional 
lending windows or making portfolios of assets available to outside investors. For 
example, an MDB could finance the initial development of an infrastructure project, 
and once the project was nearing completion, could sell the project debt, and 
possible equity, to private investors. MDBs would assume risk during the most 
challenging stages of project preparation and would then exit the project through a 
securitisation. More robust secondary market securitisation would enable MDBs to 
exit their infrastructure investments faster and free up capital for deployment in new 
projects, while allowing institutional investors to participate when the project is 
operational and has a more tolerable risk level. 
This capital-side balance sheet optimisation could be complemented by asset-side 
measures, whereby MDBs re-orientate parts of their operations from traditional loans 
to risk-sharing instruments such as credit enhancement and guarantee instruments. 
These can be particularly effective in middle income and lower middle income 
countries, which currently absorb significant MDB financing. For example, in the 
infrastructure sector, such instruments could provide credit enhancement for project 
loans and bonds, guarantees covering offtake agreements in (renewable) energy 
projects, local currency swaps and targeted loan guarantees (e.g. covering the 
construction and ramp-up period of projects). 
6.4.3. INSTRUMENTS FOR THE FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE RELEVANT FOR SSA 
This section provides an overview of debt and equity instruments that could 
potentially play a larger role in filling SSA’s infrastructure financing gap going forward. 
The focus was chosen as most of the innovation in recent years has taken place in the 
infrastructure space. After the financial crisis there has also been significant 
innovation in the type of instruments and mechanisms used by institutional investors 
                                                          
23 Any government intervention to these ends may, however, generate unintended consequences, such as moral 
hazard and market distortions, which should be addressed ex ante in policy design to the extent possible. 
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to provide financing to SMEs, notably through SME bond, loan and credit funds. These 
funds are collective investment schemes pooling together SME-related assets, such as 
loans and receivables, and offer a participation in the returns of the fund to the 
investors. Interest in these funds is growing, but their adoption is still at the early 
stages in advanced economies (AEs) and they are of very limited relevance to SSA. 
Debt instruments for the financing of infrastructure 
Infrastructure debt funds are collective investment schemes with infrastructure loans 
or bonds as underlying assets. The funds (i) buy existing loans made by banks to 
infrastructure project companies, (ii) make new loans to these companies or 
participate in syndications of loans along with banks, and/or (iii) buy bonds issued by 
these companies. Given their underlying assets, investors receive as income the flows 
stemming from the loans and/or bonds (minus fees and operating costs). They are 
usually structured as closed-end funds, unlisted and placed through private offerings, 
exclusively to qualified buyers, mainly institutional investors. 
Interest for these types of funds is growing; however, globally their share of the asset 
management industry is still very small. Most of these funds currently invest in 
infrastructure in AEs; however, the number of funds targeting infrastructure in 
emerging markets is also growing. In practice many of these funds aim at providing 
exposure in EMEs’ infrastructure assets to foreign institutional investors. In addition, 
a few examples exist of “domestic” infrastructure debt funds in EMEs, i.e. funds 
constituted in EMEs to attract domestic institutional investors. Examples can be found 
in India, Peru and South Africa, while Colombia is currently exploring the constitution 
of such type of funds. 
Project bonds can be used as an alternative debt funding instrument for 
infrastructure projects complementing traditional bank financing. Project bonds can 
be listed or unlisted and proceeds can be used for both greenfield and brownfield 
projects. They are attractive as they allow companies/developers to access additional 
sources of capital and reduce all-in funding costs compared to bank lending. Project 
bonds also help align the needs of domestic and foreign institutional investors by 
providing long-term and stable cash flows while tending to produce lower defaults 
and higher recovery rates of infrastructure assets. From the perspective of financial 
market development, project bonds have the potential to evolve into an asset class 
and contribute to deepening fixed income markets.  
In SSA, the project bond market is still nascent. In 2013 South Africa saw the first 
listing of an investment-grade rated infrastructure project bond listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The bond is held entirely by institutional investors and 
its proceeds were used to finance the construction of a large concentrated 
photovoltaic plant. 
Nigeria and Kenya have also started using project bonds as a means to finance their 
large infrastructure gaps and tap private sector expertise. In Nigeria corporate bonds 
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are tax exempt while in Kenya specific exemptions apply to infrastructure bonds. 
Corporates in the telecoms sector have been active issuers in both markets, and in 
Kenya parastatals such as KenGen have issued infrastructure bonds. Major challenges 
relate to incomplete or untested regulatory and tariff frameworks and to ensuring 
that public borrowing, high inflation and high interest rates do not crowd out 
issuance by the corporate sector – i.e. that the macroeconomic situation is stable 
enough to provide investors with a stable real return over the lengthy lifetimes 
associated with infrastructure investment24. 
Looking forward, the use of project bonds in Africa as an alternative funding 
mechanism holds potential for those countries with relatively more developed capital 
markets, while many other countries will need to deepen sovereign and multilateral 
bond issuance as a precursor to the issuance of corporate and project bonds. Another 
important challenge relates to building experience in structuring complex, long-term 
project financing.  
Box 6.1.: Project Bonds for the Financing of Infrastructure in Emerging Markets 
In recent years a number of emerging markets ranging from Brazil, Mexico and Peru 
to Russia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa have made their first experiences in issuing 
project bonds.   
In Chile, infrastructure bonds were successfully used to mobilise domestic 
institutional investors for infrastructure finance, particularly for toll roads. The first 
infrastructure bond in Chile, and in all of Latin America, was issued in 1998, followed 
by many others, amounting to an average of USD 1 billion a year during the period 
1996-2001. The common model was to issue project bonds with a full wrap guarantee 
from monoline insurers. However, when monoline insurers faced severe downgrading 
during the 2008 financial crisis these infrastructure bonds were automatically 
downgraded to the new rating of the monoline insurers, thus losing their AAA rating. 
This caused serious disruption to the market as pension funds could no longer invest 
in these lower-rated assets. The demise of monoline insurers triggered the need to 
develop alternative models of project bonds. Recent project bond issuances in Brazil 
and Mexico involved support through a form of partial guarantee scheme to bring 
down the risk for investors with monoline insurers’ full wrap no longer being an 
option.  
Peru has developed a form of quasi-sovereign bonds contributing to the financing of a 
number of large-scale infrastructure projects, such as toll roads and water treatment 
facilities.  The strong appetite for the securitised instruments can be explained by the 
fact that the Peruvian government would honour them independently from the 
performance of the underlying project, even if it was never concluded. This is why the 
quasi-sovereign bond model is currently under review due to the high contingent 
                                                          
24 See Cedric Mbeng Mezui and Bim Hundal, 2013, Structured Finance: Conditions for Infrastructure Project Bonds in 
African Markets, African Development Bank, 2013. 
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liabilities it entails for the government. In Costa Rica and El Salvador, public entities 
and the government itself have issued project bonds in hard currency, via special 
purpose vehicles. The bonds were placed in the local markets among institutional 
investors from the region. 
Source: Fiona Stewart, Pension Funds and Capital Markets: Portfolios and Returns (World Bank, 2016, forthcoming) 
Equity Instruments for the Financing of Infrastructure 
Infrastructure funds represent a potentially important segment of the unlisted equity 
market. Governments should review the ability of funds to access infrastructure 
assets in the local market, including the suitability of greenfield assets for existing 
business models, and also the local laws that govern such vehicles. This could include 
the formation of secondary markets for asset transactions and recycling of capital. 
This will be particularly important where the regulation of local pension funds 
constrains their ability to invest in PE funds domiciled offshore. 
The global infrastructure fund management industry is growing as the number of 
funds in the markets increases along with total assets under management. There is 
some evidence that investment managers are responding to investor demands to 
lengthen fund terms with long-term investment objectives, and to better align fee 
structures with the underlying economics of the assets. These are important trends to 
survey when reviewing unlisted infrastructure equity fund markets (see examples in 
Box 6.2.). 
Box 6.2.: Selected Examples of Equity Instruments for the Financing of 
Infrastructure 
Listed Vehicles 
In Mexico, the regulator CONSAR has deregulated investment restrictions gradually as 
alternative investments have been created for pension funds. In July 2009 significant 
regulatory changes were made to create a new type of securities known as CKDs 
(Certificados de Capital de Desarrollo), which are traded on the Mexican Stock 
Exchange. As the principal sources of capital for these instruments are the Mexican 
mandatory pension funds25, part of these regulatory changes involved amending 
these funds’ investment rules to allow for the possibility of making investments in 
private equity, real estate and infrastructure projects through CKDs, structured 
vehicles. Such investments were also encouraged by providing tax exemptions26. 
CKDs are designed to enhance projects in the fields of infrastructure (highways, 
airports, ports, railways, water, electricity, etc.); real estate; mining; SMEs; technology 
development; and private capital. The most active sector in CKD listing since 2009 has 
been real estate, amounting to almost 30% of the total. CKDs are registered on the 
stock exchange, which fosters market discipline and transparency. To ensure that 
                                                          
25 Sociedades de Inversión Especializadas en Fondos para el Retiro 
26 Groenewold 2012, Mexico: Institutional Private Equity Emerges, IFLR 2010.  
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these financial products are consistent with the best interests of members, investors, 
beneficiaries and other stakeholders, the National Banking and Securities Commission 
has established specific regulation regarding the issuance of CKDs, including 
shareholders’ rights and responsibilities. In addition, the Commission has developed 
monitoring and surveillance processes in accordance with best international 
practices.27  
 
Unlisted Vehicles 
In Namibia, similar structures have been created to allow for and indeed encourage 
the investment of pension funds in domestic, unlisted assets. The Pension Funds Act 
was amended in 2014, with Regulation 28 now requiring pension funds and insurance 
companies to reserve between 1.75% and 3.5% for locally unlisted investments. 
Regulation 29 supports institutional investors by creating Special Purpose Vehicles 
that enable them to comply with this requirement. These SPVs must have an 
independent Board or Trustees with fiduciary duty towards the SPV and its investors. 
The Board must appoint fund managers licensed to manage unlisted investments. The 
SPVs can invest in debt or equity according to their own objectives. Most so far have 
invested in real estate and SME debt. Fees average around 2-3% AUM – which is a 
high PE-style cost, but the regulator, NAMFISA, sees the overall impact on pension 
funds’ costs as limited since these instruments will only form a small overall 
percentage of the total portfolio.  
 Source: Fiona Stewart, 2016 (forthcoming), Pension Funds and Capital Markets: Portfolios and Returns (The World 
Bank,) 
6.5. Conclusion 
As the demand for investment continues to rise with economic growth, trade, 
urbanisation and growing expectations for improved quality of life, many SSA 
countries are likely to continue to struggle in addressing their long-term funding 
needs. Key priorities for SSA countries will be to strengthen the process of project 
preparation and create financial systems that can provide the finance needed for 
project implementation, especially for infrastructure and SMEs. 
Given the diversity of countries in SSA, a wide range of policies and sources of finance 
are to be considered, and their appropriateness will depend on factors such as the 
depth of the local institutional investor base, the level of domestic savings and foreign 
reserve buffers, the sustainability of external debt and the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility. Finally, the quality of the domestic legal and judicial framework, and the 
strength of governance and institutions, will play a key role in how successfully 
financial resources will contribute towards making growth inclusive and sustainable. 
Domestic resource mobilisation allows countries to move towards financial autonomy 
and reinforces their ownership of public policy. However, African countries still face 
                                                          
27 OECD, 2014, Annex to the Report on Effective Approaches to Support Implementation of the G20/OECD High-Level 
Principles on Long-Term Investment Financing by Institutional Investors, OECD Publishing, Paris.  
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formidable challenges in raising more and better taxes, mostly as a result of economic 
structure and the prevalence of the informal sector. 
Local investors – banks, pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds – offer 
a number of potential advantages, if they can be tapped. International experience in 
countries such as Mexico and Chile suggests that institutional investors, in particular 
pension funds, can be instrumental to the growth of the corporate bond market, and, 
in turn, to the provision of investment finance. Large, foreign institutional investors 
are another possible source of financing. Foreign private equity, sovereign wealth and 
pension funds in search of higher returns and diversification are increasingly looking 
at emerging markets.  
Official providers of development finance, such as MDBs, also have a critical role to 
play in helping to scale up investment financing, and in crowding in private capital in 
developing countries. This could be encouraged by allocating a substantially larger 
share of MDBs’ balance sheets to risk mitigation products rather than to direct 
lending, thereby ‘leveraging’ available capital and potentially attracting greater 
private sector participation. 
As countries are at different levels of development, they face different challenges and 
stand to benefit in learning from different experiences. Adoption of innovative 
funding instruments – whether by the private market (as for example in Latin 
America) or by MDBs – can provide a variety of useful lessons for countries in SSA. A 
bottom-up approach to testing different instruments for specific transaction types is 
advisable so as to reveal how best specific projects stand to benefit from experiences 
already tried and tested elsewhere. 
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7. The EIB in sub-Saharan Africa 
TIM BENDING, CLAUDIO CALI, NINA FENTON AND BARBARA MARCHITTO1 
The EIB is the bank of the European Union and the world’s largest multilateral borrower and 
lender. The Bank is a key provider of both long-term financing and expertise, supporting 
investments that foster EU policy objectives, inside and outside the EU. In sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), EIB’s engagement is geared towards promoting local private sector 
development, social and economic infrastructure, regional integration and mitigation 
of/adaptation to climate change. In 2015, the Bank provided loans totalling EUR 971 million 
in SSA. 
Overview 
Over more than 50 years, since the launch of its activities in SSA in 1963, the Bank has 
supported 1 100 projects in 47 countries totalling over EUR 17 billion of funding. EIB 
investment aims at contributing to economic and social development while ensuring 
environmental sustainability. Special emphasis is placed on unlocking the potential of the 
private sector – including micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) – as an engine of 
job creation and sustainable, inclusive growth. In this context, increasing the soundness, 
efficiency and depth of financial sectors – including helping banks contribute to allocating 
resources to productive investment – lies at the heart of that effort.  
Since 2000, the Bank’s activities in SSA have been governed by the Cotonou Agreement, 
which is the main framework for the EU’s relations with partner countries in the African, 
Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) regions. The Cotonou Agreement has endowed the EIB with: 
• EUR 3 637 million under the Investment Facility (IF) – a risk-bearing revolving fund 
managed by the Bank, with reflows re-invested in new projects2. This includes the 
additional EUR 500 million approved in 2013, which in 2014 was used to establish 
the Impact Financing Envelope (IFE) as a special facility; 
• EUR 1 221 million for technical assistance and interest subsidies; 
• EUR 6 200 million from the Bank’s own resources benefiting from a comprehensive 
guarantee from the EU Member States.  
The Bank operates in a wide range of economic sectors and supports investment by private 
and commercially-run public sector entities, including infrastructure projects that are vital to 
bolster private sector development and create a thriving business environment, particularly 
for MSMEs. The main goals of EIB’s operations in SSA are to support poverty reduction, 
sustainable development, climate action and the progressive integration of the region into 
                                                          
1 Statistical assistance was provided by Tomasz Olejnik and Rafal Banaszek. Comments from Heike Ruettgers and Robert 
Schofield are gratefully acknowledged.  
2 Since 2000 a total amount of EUR 4 424 million has been invested under the IF. 
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the world economy3. The Bank is fully committed to contributing to the achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and its engagement towards promoting inclusive and 
sustainable growth in SSA – as well as in other Partner Countries – is to be viewed in the 
context of the post-2015 Development Agenda.  
Alongside its standard senior loan product, the EIB invests via credit guarantees, equity, 
junior loans and subordinated loans4. The Bank also backs regional private equity funds – 
including funds investing in local enterprises, ranging from microbusinesses to midcaps – 
and it can provide subordinated bank capital to banks in the region. Funding in much-
needed local currency – which effectively provides financial intermediaries and their 
borrowers with insurance against foreign exchange risk – is also available to a number of SSA 
countries that have demonstrated a track record of macroeconomic stability.  
The Bank also actively contributes to knowledge transfer and technical assistance (TA) to 
enhance project design, preparation and implementation. TA has indeed become an 
increasingly important tool for the Bank to assist promoters, national authorities and 
financial intermediaries in SSA. Since 2000 approximately 124 TA projects have been 
approved in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, worth a total of EUR 142 million.   
Overall, the EIB has provided more than EUR 11.8 billion of finance in 36 SSA countries over 
the past 16 years, making it one of the biggest multilateral lenders in the region. This effort 
would not have been possible without close cooperation with the European Commission and 
with leading private and public sector business partners, including domestic and regional 
banks. 
Figure 7.1.: EIB funding in SSA by sector (%, 2000-Sept 2016) 
 
Source: EIB 
                                                          
3 The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement under the Cotonou Agreement does not cover activities in the Republic of South Africa 
(RSA), which are instead governed by the EU-South Africa Trade, Cooperation and Development Agreement. The EIB has been 
active in RSA since 1994. Priorities for RSA are similar to those for the ACP countries. 
4 In South Africa the Bank’s product offering is limited to senior loans. 
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The Bank constantly explores innovative ways to address the challenges affecting the region. 
The Impact Financing Envelope (IFE) focuses on higher-risk private sector projects and aims 
for a superior development impact with the overarching objective of poverty reduction. The 
envelope targets, in particular, high impact sectors and financial intermediaries in ACP 
countries where the IF has had limited outreach so far. Providing finance in a way that is 
focused on addressing social and environmental challenges typically means having to 
manage increased exposure to operating and macroeconomic risks. The IFE allows EIB to 
accept a higher risk, or lower risk-adjusted return, than would be acceptable under the IF. 
This enables EIB to serve sectors such as agriculture, and to lend in fragile and conflict-
affected countries. The provision of long-term, affordable finance, often in local currency 
and accompanied by technical assistance, to these sectors and countries can pay large 
dividends in terms of development results, while at the same time being financially 
sustainable.  
EIB adopts a portfolio approach to the IFE in order to strike the right balance between risks 
and return, selecting four instruments: social impact funds, loans to financial intermediaries, 
credit enhancement tools and direct investments. Twelve investments have been approved 
to date. These have been distributed across all four instruments and have included a diverse 
range of high impact investments such as: a financing facility to extend funding for small-
scale agriculture and agri-business opportunities, targeting smallholder farmers; direct 
investment in telecoms network connectivity in unserved, remote areas of Cameroon and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo; support to two social impact equity funds, expected to 
equip early stage companies that have a high potential with capital and mentoring, enabling 
them to generate employment and provide affordable and quality products and services to 
the Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP); a capital injection into Access Bank Liberia, aiming to 
demonstrate the viability of business opportunities during post-Ebola recovery; and direct 
investment in a project providing irrigation and establishing an integrated agri-industry 
supply chain in an area of Senegal characterised by erratic rainfall and high poverty rates. 
Based on preliminary estimates of expected results, the IFE is expected to reach at least 
6 million direct and the same number of indirect beneficiaries. Around 59% of direct 
beneficiaries are expected to belong to the BoP5.  
Investing in sub-Saharan Africa 
The EIB invests in financial sector development and is actively engaged in enhancing access 
to finance for private enterprises in SSA providing liquidity and funding capacity building. 
Poor access to credit, and to financial services in general, is a severe constraint on growth in 
many SSA countries. Domestic credit to the private sector amounts to less than 24% of GDP 
in SSA compared to close to 50% in South Asia and Latin America6. Out of 40 million 
                                                          
5 Responding to the clear appetite for investments under the IFE from its clients and the initial indications of success in 
achieving both financial success and development results, EIB has recently stepped up its efforts by approving adjustments to 
the IFE that will extend the capacity of the envelope by EUR 300 million. The additional funds will be used to help ACP 
countries, particularly in SSA and in fragile or conflict-affected situations, to reap the benefits and deal with the challenges 
deriving from irregular migration and forced displacement.  
6 IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database.  
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enterprises in SSA, 55% are either underserved (8%) or not served at all (47%) by the 
financial sector; only 9% of firms have access to a bank loan7. The situation is especially 
challenging for SMEs and micro-enterprises.  
The EIB supports financial sector development and access to finance both by providing 
financing directly to corporates and through intermediated credit lines covering a wide 
range of sectors, from manufacturing to agriculture. Local intermediaries are typically relied 
on to channel funding to clients that would be too small for the EIB to reach directly. Many 
EIB credit lines are indeed designed to reach SMEs, but the Bank has also used 
intermediaries in the region to reach smaller-scale projects in sectors such as infrastructure, 
climate mitigation and social housing. The Bank also supports operations that are directly 
linked to extending the availability and quality of financial services in the region, for instance 
financing of branch network extensions or investments in new technology. Since 2000, EIB 
credit lines and funding for regional or domestic banks and other financial institutions in SSA 
have totalled EUR 4.7 billion.  
Along with the provision of liquidity to SSA financial sectors, the EIB has become increasingly 
active in the financing of technical assistance (TA) activities with a view not only to 
maximising the effectiveness of the Bank’s operations but also to build/strengthen capacity 
locally. TA programmes are typically directed at financial intermediaries, including banks and 
microfinance institutions, in order to address existing weaknesses – for instance in the areas 
of risk management and monitoring – and strengthen their ability to cater for micro and 
small enterprises. More recently, regional TA programmes in East and Southern Africa have 
been designed to reach out to the entrepreneurs receiving EIB financing to enhance their 
capacity to present projects that are effectively bankable. Overall 40 TA projects in support 
of financial sector operations have been approved since 2000, worth approximately 
EUR 43 million. 
 
BOX 7.1.: FOCUS ON PROJECTS 
A capital injection for Africa’s health sector 
Improving health services is a key priority for most African countries. With only 11% of the world’s 
population, SSA accounts for half of the world’s maternal deaths and deaths of children under five. 
Investing in African health systems not only contributes to saving lives but also strengthens the 
foundations for economic development; it is essential for achieving the objectives of national poverty 
reduction strategies and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  
The private sector plays an important role in African health systems, not only in running hospitals and 
clinics but also in providing health insurance, manufacturing and distributing healthcare products, and 
supporting industries such as education and ICT services. But raising the capital necessary for 
expansion to reach larger populations is not easy for the African healthcare sector, with limited 
interest from private investors.  
                                                          
7 IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database. 
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The EIB’s EUR 22 million participation in the Investment Fund for Health in Africa (IFHA) 2 fund is 
targeted at this gap. The fund will provide equity funding to an expected 15 companies seeking capital 
to provide or improve healthcare services. Results monitoring is expected to demonstrate how the 
project has contributed to development of the sector. For example, it is expected that over 50 clinics 
will be created or acquired and developed, that approximately 6 000 jobs will be created over the life 
of the Fund, a large proportion of them for women, and that the training and qualifications of 
healthcare personnel will considerably improve. The EIB’s early investment in the Fund will also have 
an important demonstration effect, helping to attract funding from investors who do not currently 
view African healthcare as a financially attractive sector. 
Improving access to water in Ethiopian towns 
In Ethiopia, only 67% of the population has access to safe drinking water and only 39% has access to 
adequate sanitation services. The existing infrastructure also suffers from being in poor technical 
condition and inadequate maintenance. In response, the EIB will contribute EUR 40 million to a 
EUR 94 million fund to finance projects to build or rehabilitate water treatment plants, reservoirs and 
raw storage facilities in small and medium-sized towns across Ethiopia. These projects are expected to 
connect 65 000 additional households to the water network and provide access to safe drinking water 
for a further 120 000 households, reducing the prevalence of waterborne diseases. People collecting 
water outside the house – often children – spend an average of two hours per day on this task. As a 
result of the project, they will be able to devote this time to other activities, including education. 
The EIB will also provide a EUR 1.9 million grant to fund technical assistance to support the promoter 
in appraising, funding and monitoring the projects. This will improve institutional capacity and ensure 
technical quality and compliance with social and environmental standards. 
Connecting Angolans to the web 
In the face of falling oil prices, economic diversification leading to reduced dependence on oil is 
considered a top priority for Angola. Infrastructure investment, including in telecommunications, is 
vital to achieve this. Access to broadband connectivity can lead to increased productivity across the 
entire economy by allowing better flows of information. A connected environment is more favourable 
to private sector development, and more attractive to international investors.  
In this context, the EIB will finance EUR 20 million of a EUR 47 million investment by TVCABO, a 
multimedia service provider, to install or expand broadband networks in seven cities across the 
country. A total of 83 400 additional homes will be passed by fibre networks capable of providing 
ultra-high speed broadband services, with 45 300 new connections and nearly 25 000 new fibre lines 
activated. Expanded access to broadband connectivity will contribute to the development of the 
Angolan broadband market: increased volumes will lead to reduced prices for international 
connectivity, and increased competition through the expansion of TVCABO is expected to exert 
downward pressure on retail prices.  
Rural Impulse Fund I – Extending access to rural microfinance 
In 2007 the EIB invested EUR 3 million in Rural Impulse Fund (RIF), a Microfinance Investment Vehicle 
managed by Incofin. Since then, the fund has been able to provide long-term capital to 
47 microfinance institutions across 27 countries, including six in SSA.  
For example, RIF 1 has supported the growth of KWFT Microfinance Bank since 2008 by providing it 
with the funding needed to grow its portfolio. In 2010 KWFT succeeded in obtaining a deposit-taking 
license, enabling it to provide clients with savings services. KWFT has also developed new agricultural 
loan products such as irrigation system loans, as well as environmentally-friendly products like specific 
loans to set up biogas facilities or purchase solar-powered lamps. Over time KWFT has developed a 
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very strong network of branches and outlets throughout Kenya with specific targeting of rural areas 
whilst at the same time maintaining its traditional focus on credit for women. KWFT now has more 
than 350 000 clients (almost all women) who borrow the equivalent of USD 1 036 on average. 
 
With a view to addressing long-term structural needs, the EIB is a major provider of 
infrastructure finance in SSA. Poor roads and insufficient or unreliable electricity supply 
constitute significant constraints on growth in large parts of the region. Since 2000, the Bank 
has committed over EUR 5.8 billion to funding infrastructure projects in SSA. The energy 
sector accounts for the largest share of this effort (about 52%) – reflecting the large needs 
for investment in electricity generation and distribution in most SSA countries. A special 
emphasis has been placed on renewable energy sources, as a means of both reducing 
dependence on expensive imported fossil fuels and contributing to the mitigation of climate 
change.  
Table 7.1.: Aggregated Results of EIB activity in SSA (2013-2015) 
Instrument/sector Indicator  
SME/midcap credit lines Total loans (EUR m) 998 
Total loans # 7 061 
Average loan tenor (years)  
Jobs sustained (total) 171 483 
Microfinance institutions (*) Loans to microenterprises (#) 130 991 
Loans to microenterprises (EUR m) 301 
Jobs sustained in microenterprises 304 301 
Microfinance investment 
vehicles  
Total MIV fund size (EUR m) 613 
Leverage ratio  
MFIs supported (#)  94 
Loans to final beneficiaries by 
supported MFIs (#) 
2 160 000 
Private equity funds Total fund size (EUR m) 1 440 
Investee companies (#) 128 
Net creation of direct permanent 
employment 
50 500 
Energy Generation capacity (MW) 535 
New/upgraded substation 
capacity (MVA) 
1 068 
New/upgraded power lines (km) 3 049 
Households potentially served by 
new generation 
949 200 
Households potentially served by 
new generation from RE 
949 200 
Annual electricity transported 
(GWh) 
3 730 
New households connected 341 800 
Banking in sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and Digital Financial Inclusion 
© European Investment Bank, November 2016  171 
 
Transport Length of roads built/upgraded 
(land km) 
75 
Water & sanitation New/upgraded water treatment 
capacity, per day (m3) 
550 100 
New/upgraded water mains/pipes 
(km) 
4 825 
New/upgraded domestic water 
connections 
157 859 
New/upgraded wastewater 
treatment capacity (person-eq.) 
643 483 
New/upgraded sewer/storm pipes 
(km) 
111 
Households benefiting from 
improved water supply 
506 350 
Households benefiting from 
improved sanitation services 
65 000 
Health, education and housing Population accommodated in new 
housing units 
96 000 
Telecoms Homes passed by broadband 186 500 
Homes connected to broadband 105 500 
Household broadband 
connections activated at 
completion 
56 900 
Jobs Employment during operation 
(full-time equivalent) 
2 093 
Employment during construction 
(person-years) 
95 021 
 
Source: Results Measurement (ReM) database. 
Note: (*) Results for Microfinance Institutions refer to the entire 2013 MFI portfolio 
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